Tim Phillips on Total Disclosure (November 2025)

Source: YouTube, Total Disclosure Podcast, "Investigating UFOS for the Government- Director of AARO (Ft. Tim Phillips)." Published: 2025-11-01. Duration: 1:38:12. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pXaAlAxSQiY. Extraction: YouTube English auto-captions via youtube_transcript.py --timestamps. Captured: 2026-08-27. Machine transcription may contain minor errors. Phillips discusses the claimant later identified as Whistling Mike at about 45:00. Analysis: ../../sources/whistling-mike-contractor-claimant.

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[00:00:05.839] Did you hear the claims that Jim Watsky
[00:00:07.919] did make about breach the hull of a of
[00:00:10.639] an unknown craft that did not originate
[00:00:13.360] from here? He was running the OSAP
[00:00:16.000] program. Have you heard that claim?
[00:00:17.760] >> We've heard claims and a lot of that was
[00:00:20.000] addressed and volume.
[00:00:22.240] >> There was a person, he came to Arrow
[00:00:24.800] with a story. We had a referral when I
[00:00:28.000] was the acting director. Uh chairman of
[00:00:30.800] one of the oversight committees asked us
[00:00:33.520] to uh meet with an individual that
[00:00:36.880] claimed to have reported to us a UAP
[00:00:39.840] parter that was so shooken up, so in
[00:00:44.000] experienced that she resigned from the
[00:00:46.320] program. He was asked to deliver
[00:00:49.440] doctorred photographs at the Nevada test
[00:00:52.239] site, what a lot of the public refers to
[00:00:54.079] as Area 51. We know that the Soviet
[00:00:57.520] Union during the Cold War came up with
[00:01:00.559] UFO stories that tried to undermine
[00:01:03.600] Americans confidence in their
[00:01:05.760] government's ability to protect them and
[00:01:08.640] tell them the truth about aliens. And I
[00:01:10.960] had mentioned the black triangles
[00:01:12.880] because we known it's a proven
[00:01:15.280] engineering design. Um it helps you know
[00:01:17.920] the [music] fly and will move from
[00:01:19.520] triangles to flying wings. the
[00:01:22.479] unexplained the the true UAP cases which
[00:01:26.400] and I agree with you is about 2% of our
[00:01:28.960] cases it's very very small but we can
[00:01:32.640] confirm they're there we don't know what
[00:01:34.720] they are.
[00:01:48.076] [music]
[00:01:52.640] Welcome back to Total Disclosure. My
[00:01:55.119] name is Ty and I'm your host and
[00:01:57.759] creator. We're pulling back the curtains
[00:02:00.079] on one of the most secretive programs
[00:02:01.920] inside the US government, the All Domain
[00:02:04.399] Anomaly Resolution Office, better known
[00:02:06.640] as Arrow. My guest today is Timothy
[00:02:08.959] Phillips. He was the former acting
[00:02:11.120] director of Arrow, the man who stepped
[00:02:13.360] in through Dr. Sean Kurpatre, or some
[00:02:15.440] call him Dr. Evil after his departure.
[00:02:17.520] In this exclusive conversation, Tim and
[00:02:20.080] I dive into what Arrow really does, how
[00:02:22.480] he got involved, and the explosive
[00:02:24.640] allegations that came with
[00:02:26.066] [clears throat] extortion of the program
[00:02:27.680] potentially and internal pressure within
[00:02:29.680] the office itself on how to do this
[00:02:32.239] stuff and go public with it. If you're
[00:02:33.920] ready to hear from someone who's been on
[00:02:35.920] the inside, someone who's seen the data,
[00:02:37.760] the politics, and the truth behind the
[00:02:39.440] headlines, you're in the right place.
[00:02:40.800] Hit subscribe, turn on notifications,
[00:02:43.040] and if you're listening on Apple Podcast
[00:02:44.959] or Spotify, drop that five star review
[00:02:47.040] because what we're about to hear, you
[00:02:48.560] won't find anywhere else. I'm asking the
[00:02:50.319] harder questions. We're talking about
[00:02:52.319] UFOs and nukes and how the fiery orbs
[00:02:54.720] and black triangle crowd are among the
[00:02:56.879] most anomalous. And Arrow doesn't know
[00:02:59.280] what those are, which contradicts what
[00:03:00.959] the Wall Street Journal put out. Now,
[00:03:02.480] Tim does try to talk about this hazing
[00:03:05.040] ritual that the Wall Street Journal also
[00:03:06.800] talked about, and I did challenge him
[00:03:08.400] pretty hard on that. Um and and when it
[00:03:10.159] comes to using specific language like
[00:03:11.760] aliens and little not little gay men but
[00:03:14.400] for lack of a better term uh instead of
[00:03:16.080] non-human intelligence, is that a way of
[00:03:17.840] lying by omission? These are tactics
[00:03:19.440] that that would have to be used. He even
[00:03:21.840] mentions that there are things that
[00:03:23.519] Arrow did and is doing that won't be
[00:03:25.840] unclassified for 75 years. So we had a
[00:03:28.560] lot to discuss in this part one
[00:03:30.159] interview. Next time he'll be in studio.
[00:03:31.680] I really hope you enjoy it. I'm super
[00:03:33.120] excited. I'll see you on the other side.
[00:03:34.720] This is Total Disclosure.
[00:03:41.392] >> [music]
[00:03:49.040] >> All right, welcome back. As I said in
[00:03:51.760] the intro, uh we are joined today by
[00:03:55.680] Timothy Phillip. Welcome. I'm so happy
[00:03:58.159] to have you here, Tim.
[00:03:59.200] >> Oh, it's great to be on today.
[00:04:01.120] >> I listen, I think, um and I and I I've
[00:04:04.720] I've interviewed lots of people. lots
[00:04:07.439] of, you know, and I'm not like like
[00:04:09.360] showboating or trying to like, you know,
[00:04:11.599] blow smoke up my own ass, but I've I've
[00:04:13.920] interviewed like, you know, my fair
[00:04:16.000] share of big hitters and nothing has
[00:04:19.280] gotten the anticipation and the people
[00:04:23.440] in the community as riled up as doing
[00:04:27.040] this interview. I don't know what it is
[00:04:30.080] about you, but people uh people are
[00:04:33.520] paying attention, Tim. People are paying
[00:04:35.600] attention. So, I wanted to start off the
[00:04:38.240] conversation and listen,
[00:04:40.800] we talked about this in a in a pre phone
[00:04:43.840] call. So, I I just because so many
[00:04:47.360] people have talked about it and so many
[00:04:49.520] people have put out these clips about
[00:04:51.440] these things. Um I I'm not going to
[00:04:54.240] start any I want to start the way I
[00:04:56.560] always wanted to start. And uh if you
[00:04:59.280] can introduce yourself to my audience um
[00:05:02.320] to the people who may have not heard you
[00:05:04.479] on shows I think you did one with Green
[00:05:06.560] Street which we will touch on with MC
[00:05:08.720] West which we will touch on. We don't
[00:05:10.800] have to get too far into it but um can
[00:05:13.360] you tell me I mean who is Tim Phillips?
[00:05:16.960] >> I'm a retired government bureaucrat now
[00:05:19.360] but uh
[00:05:21.600] I uh kid from a Air Force family, son of
[00:05:25.039] an airman. grew up in Europe and Asia as
[00:05:30.240] my dad retired from the Air Force 1973
[00:05:36.720] Tucson, Arizona where I attended my last
[00:05:40.160] year of high school.
[00:05:42.400] Um,
[00:05:44.320] you know, started my college
[00:05:46.880] career at the University of Arizona,
[00:05:48.800] joined the Marine Corps, spent about 22
[00:05:52.000] years as a Marine, uh, travel all over
[00:05:54.960] the world. Uh, 911 happened, uh, still
[00:05:58.560] in uniform. I was I had decided to
[00:06:01.600] retire. A lot of the rules changed
[00:06:04.880] concerning uh, transitioning from active
[00:06:08.240] military to civil service. they needed
[00:06:10.880] people um with qualifications and
[00:06:13.280] current accesses and clearances. And one
[00:06:16.479] day um I was a lieutenant colonel and
[00:06:19.680] the next day I was a GS-15 division
[00:06:21.919] chief um working at the time at the
[00:06:24.160] Defense Information Systems Agency. Um
[00:06:27.600] and then shortly after I put my hand in
[00:06:30.240] the air and swore in, I would I was
[00:06:32.560] asked if I would volunteer for a an
[00:06:35.680] assignment and I asked them what it was
[00:06:37.520] and they told me they couldn't tell me.
[00:06:39.440] So I went to the Pentagon and found out
[00:06:41.759] that I'd be in invading Iraq again in
[00:06:45.680] 2003. So uh that was the introduction to
[00:06:49.520] the uh intelligence community. I was
[00:06:51.600] with DA for about four years and then
[00:06:54.319] when they were standing up the office
[00:06:56.800] the director of national intelligence.
[00:06:59.199] Um I had worked with uh uh the staff of
[00:07:03.680] Ambassador Negapani there in Baghdad and
[00:07:07.120] um I became part of the ODNI as they
[00:07:09.520] were standing up and had a uh almost a
[00:07:13.520] 23-year career um as a senior national
[00:07:18.080] intelligence service executive and a
[00:07:20.800] senior intelligence service officer. So
[00:07:23.680] I got to work with served at CIA. I was
[00:07:27.039] at DIA, the National Geospatial
[00:07:30.000] Intelligence Agency. So, I had a pretty
[00:07:32.880] diverse uh career. And probably uh the
[00:07:36.880] most bizarre assignment I ever had is
[00:07:40.080] when uh my boss at the time, Lieutenant
[00:07:42.720] General Cruz, walked in.
[00:07:46.000] >> My last assignment in government service
[00:07:47.919] was uh
[00:07:49.039] >> there we go. the deputy and then serving
[00:07:51.919] as the u acting director of Arrow which
[00:07:56.160] was probably the most fascinating
[00:07:59.120] assignment I had during my 45 year
[00:08:01.520] career. Um I knew absolutely nothing
[00:08:05.199] about the UFO UAP world. Uh I knew a lot
[00:08:08.960] about technical collection um national
[00:08:11.680] security you know I was very very aware
[00:08:13.840] of that. um did a lot of deployments
[00:08:16.800] downrange in Iraq and Afghanistan. Um so
[00:08:21.440] I used to work in a war zone but I had
[00:08:24.400] never um been part of a large
[00:08:27.039] investigative team um looking at uh
[00:08:30.160] anomalies and the maritime, air and
[00:08:32.479] space domain. So learned a lot about it,
[00:08:34.719] work with some amazing people. um never
[00:08:37.839] had the scrutiny that uh we enjoyed um
[00:08:42.159] reporting back to 12 different
[00:08:44.240] committees
[00:08:45.760] um committees both the Senate and House
[00:08:48.959] side. never had anything like that
[00:08:51.120] before. And we kind of had a we had two
[00:08:53.680] bosses. Uh the deputy, you know, the
[00:08:56.800] deputy uh secretary of defense and then
[00:08:59.760] working for the principal director of
[00:09:01.760] national intelligence and often the
[00:09:04.000] director of national intelligence would
[00:09:05.760] be there when we have we went back and
[00:09:08.000] brief them on our developments, our
[00:09:09.839] investigations.
[00:09:11.279] >> Um
[00:09:11.760] >> so thousands of cases work.
[00:09:15.600] >> Let me ask you let me ask you a
[00:09:17.360] question. So, so were you aware of when
[00:09:22.640] were you aware as as being around um not
[00:09:27.519] around the topic but just being in the
[00:09:29.519] military and being up up to speed on
[00:09:32.880] things um did you I mean before you were
[00:09:36.320] ever asked to be a part of Arrow did had
[00:09:39.040] you ever [clears throat] thought about
[00:09:40.480] UFOs? had you ever, you know, thought
[00:09:42.880] about them in a more serious capacity,
[00:09:46.640] maybe even after the 2017 New York Times
[00:09:49.279] article and the, you know, Pentagon and
[00:09:52.880] the the uh confirming, you know, all but
[00:09:55.760] confirming that there are unidentifies
[00:09:58.800] um had it ever piqued your interest as
[00:10:01.440] as just a general person beforehand?
[00:10:04.320] >> Uh not so much the UFO UAP issue. you
[00:10:08.399] remember I was working counterterrorism
[00:10:10.560] and dealing with counterp proliferation
[00:10:12.720] of nuclear weapons. So I had a a pretty
[00:10:15.120] defined problem set that I was working.
[00:10:17.760] We did have a couple of cases um
[00:10:21.360] downrange working in Afghanistan where
[00:10:24.480] we became aware of the danger um of
[00:10:28.160] UAS's. So, we were able to find some
[00:10:30.720] Iranian systems that had uh crashed
[00:10:34.560] outside some of our facilities in
[00:10:36.320] Afghanistan, and we realized that we
[00:10:38.880] were being surveiled. They use them for
[00:10:40.560] ISR, not strike at the time, but we
[00:10:43.120] realized how easy it would have been to
[00:10:45.200] weaponize these things, and how
[00:10:47.120] vulnerable we were, the fact that these
[00:10:49.440] things had been flying um against our
[00:10:52.160] bases for months at a time, and we were
[00:10:54.800] unable to to uh detect them. So, uh kind
[00:10:58.640] of aware [clears throat] of uh having
[00:11:01.519] situational awareness,
[00:11:03.600] domain was very very important. And then
[00:11:06.399] I've got three years at sea. Um flew a
[00:11:09.760] little bit and I wasn't an aviator. I
[00:11:11.519] was always a ground officer. So, you
[00:11:13.279] would see things you couldn't
[00:11:14.800] understand. You know, I couldn't
[00:11:16.240] identify what they were. But since there
[00:11:18.720] was never um any uh aggression towards
[00:11:23.680] us really never really thought about it,
[00:11:26.000] I had enemies um who wanted to kill us I
[00:11:29.680] had to worry about. So wasn't about UA,
[00:11:33.279] you know, UAP or UFOs during my time in
[00:11:36.560] the service or the intelligence
[00:11:38.240] community before I served with Arrow.
[00:11:41.680] >> Interesting. you know, because, you
[00:11:43.519] know, I find that a lot of pe and I I
[00:11:47.040] asked that for obvious a specific
[00:11:48.560] reason. I'm trying to set your character
[00:11:50.320] up as someone who is, you know, and and
[00:11:52.880] how would you h if um if I were to ask
[00:11:56.160] you before you took the job at Arrow, um
[00:11:59.680] your thoughts on and and be I'd like you
[00:12:03.360] to be as honest as possible. Um, if I
[00:12:06.959] were to ask you before you ever heard of
[00:12:08.800] Arrow, before you ever stepped foot in
[00:12:11.120] any investigation uh, capacity, if I
[00:12:13.839] were to ask you, are we alone in the
[00:12:15.360] universe, what would I mean, what would
[00:12:17.120] your answer be? Would it be yes or no?
[00:12:19.760] >> I wouldn't know. Um, I have never had uh
[00:12:23.920] any, you know, personal experience
[00:12:26.000] myself. Um, I know there's credible
[00:12:29.760] people that have experienced things they
[00:12:32.240] couldn't understand and they their
[00:12:34.480] assessment was of some type of
[00:12:36.160] supernatural event. Um, but I
[00:12:39.760] >> give any credence to that.
[00:12:42.880] >> It never bothered me. Um, I I honored uh
[00:12:47.760] I knew these people professionally. Um,
[00:12:50.320] they saw things they didn't understand.
[00:12:52.320] And during my generation to report a UFO
[00:12:56.959] incident, uh that could be career
[00:12:59.040] ending,
[00:13:00.160] >> right?
[00:13:00.480] >> If you're flying and you reported
[00:13:02.399] something, um next thing you know,
[00:13:04.560] you're talking to the shrink or talking
[00:13:06.560] to the flight surgeon and you could be
[00:13:08.639] losing, you know, your your tickets to
[00:13:10.480] fly. Um
[00:13:11.519] >> Right. You'd be flying a desk for for
[00:13:13.279] the rest of your career.
[00:13:14.639] >> Exactly. My father flew. Um and that's
[00:13:17.519] just not something they discussed. They
[00:13:20.079] saw something they didn't understand.
[00:13:21.519] that kept it to themselves [laughter]
[00:13:22.480] unless it was a threat,
[00:13:24.800] >> right?
[00:13:25.279] >> And I I would say that's one of the
[00:13:27.839] great things we tried to do with the
[00:13:30.079] office to remove that stigma and and en
[00:13:33.440] encourage military and intel personnel
[00:13:35.680] to report what they saw. We're not going
[00:13:37.760] to understand it unless people are free
[00:13:39.519] to report, you know, their experiences
[00:13:42.399] and working with staff J3 and actually,
[00:13:46.160] you know, getting directives out there
[00:13:47.760] to the Department of Defense saying if
[00:13:50.160] you have, you know, a UAP UFO incident,
[00:13:53.440] you will report it. And more just as
[00:13:55.600] importantly, you're going to retain, you
[00:13:57.519] know, retain data. Um you know part of
[00:14:00.399] part of the frustrating um aspect of
[00:14:03.440] this job as we were looking back at
[00:14:05.440] cases 20 25 years old the fact that
[00:14:08.880] there was no direction to the force
[00:14:12.000] actually to preserve data. So it was
[00:14:14.720] very frustrating trying to go back and
[00:14:17.440] understand the cases and of course our
[00:14:19.920] scientists want to work with the
[00:14:21.600] original data set you know the zero ones
[00:14:24.720] and you know apply tools to try to
[00:14:28.079] extract you know some type of
[00:14:29.760] intelligence from what we were seeing
[00:14:32.079] >> right
[00:14:32.480] >> so that was probably the biggest change
[00:14:36.480] is the fact that you remove the stigma
[00:14:39.040] there was you know there was actually a
[00:14:40.639] directive to report and the fact that
[00:14:44.480] you could report these things without
[00:14:47.120] your credibility or sanity being
[00:14:50.000] questioned or you know risk losing um
[00:14:53.839] access or a security clearance. That was
[00:14:56.079] a that was a sea change in the
[00:14:58.560] government that didn't happen before.
[00:15:00.959] >> Right. Right. And this is, you know, and
[00:15:03.120] then Congress has mandated, you know,
[00:15:05.600] Congress mandates the the ARO office and
[00:15:10.639] um things are changing in the world and
[00:15:15.040] I I think you know the UFO community on
[00:15:17.680] one hand uh you know we're really
[00:15:21.920] spoiled in that way that you know 20
[00:15:25.360] years ago any one of these hearings any
[00:15:28.399] one of these offices being established
[00:15:32.079] like Arrow um you know aside from maybe
[00:15:36.079] you know post project blue book of
[00:15:38.000] course but you know this it would be
[00:15:43.199] it'd be the only thing talked about for
[00:15:44.880] years and years and now it's you know
[00:15:47.360] things are happening every day and a lot
[00:15:50.480] you know I know people don't think that
[00:15:52.399] Arrow does a lot but you know part of
[00:15:55.120] why we're here is to explain that you
[00:15:57.120] know there is or to to to find out like
[00:16:01.040] should should Arrow continue to be
[00:16:03.920] funded and um so when did so when were
[00:16:07.600] you asked to to be a part of Arrow and
[00:16:12.480] why? Uh see going back um
[00:16:20.320] it would been what the fall of 23 is
[00:16:23.680] when uh I was actually asked to uh be
[00:16:28.560] part of Verl.
[00:16:30.480] So, I think I got there in October of
[00:16:34.800] 2023 is when I showed up as the deputy
[00:16:38.079] and then uh Sean um left the government
[00:16:42.959] in December
[00:16:45.120] of 2023 and then I became the acting
[00:16:49.120] well maybe it would have been the
[00:16:50.000] following year 24 could say it's 25.
[00:16:52.639] Yeah, it would have been I was there
[00:16:54.639] about 18 months so it it would have been
[00:16:57.920] all of 24. Um, and it started in in
[00:17:02.320] October of 23 working with Sean. So,
[00:17:05.600] >> why do you think they asked you to to to
[00:17:08.079] be a part of that?
[00:17:10.079] >> Uh, they wanted a career intel officer
[00:17:12.480] that uh was absolutely neutral on the
[00:17:16.079] subject. I knew nothing about it.
[00:17:18.240] However, um I was uh the the former uh
[00:17:24.240] director of of technical collection at
[00:17:27.199] ODNI. Um I had worked a number of uh uh
[00:17:33.760] sensitive reconnaissance operations. I
[00:17:36.000] maintained the book for it, the SRO
[00:17:38.640] program. Um I was an expert with a lot
[00:17:42.559] of both airborne and overhead national
[00:17:45.360] technical means. I knew a lot about
[00:17:47.600] collection and orchestrating collection,
[00:17:50.080] working with uh other intel collectors,
[00:17:53.679] working with foreigners. And as I talked
[00:17:56.240] to Sean about the possibility of working
[00:17:58.320] there, I saw it as a hard problem. Kind
[00:18:02.000] of fascinating. What if he were to take
[00:18:03.919] all the elements of national, you know,
[00:18:06.320] power, all our capabilities, kind of
[00:18:08.480] understand this phenomena. There has
[00:18:11.200] never been an organization that the
[00:18:13.120] government has established to actually
[00:18:16.080] investigate uh UAPs.
[00:18:19.200] Um, similar to Arrow, you know, if you
[00:18:21.600] go back at Project Blue Book and the
[00:18:23.919] derivatives after that, they never had
[00:18:26.799] they never worked at the cabinet level.
[00:18:29.520] >> Um, they never had access to information
[00:18:31.919] at any classification level the way
[00:18:34.640] Arrow had. They never had the authority
[00:18:38.000] um to go out and have joint duty
[00:18:40.080] assignments and be able to recruit um
[00:18:42.880] some of the the best and brightest from
[00:18:44.960] throughout the government. Um, Arrow had
[00:18:48.000] people come to us from NASA, DHS, FBI,
[00:18:52.559] all of DoD, all of the intelligence
[00:18:55.440] community at at one time. We had four
[00:18:58.720] senior executives on the staff at Arrow.
[00:19:01.520] Um, we had a lot of horsepower. We had a
[00:19:03.840] lot of expertise. We had an amazing
[00:19:06.480] amazing budget. um the
[00:19:10.240] very very wellresourced and probably
[00:19:13.120] most important importantly we had the
[00:19:15.760] support of the most senior members of
[00:19:18.240] the department of defense and the
[00:19:19.840] intelligence community. So when I would
[00:19:22.480] go in and brief the director of national
[00:19:24.559] intelligence or the uh the deputy
[00:19:28.559] secretary of defense, I would always be
[00:19:30.960] asked, hey, is there anything we can do
[00:19:33.360] for you? Is there anybody not
[00:19:34.720] cooperating?
[00:19:36.400] just unprecedented
[00:19:39.200] support and access to any program. You
[00:19:42.799] know, at one time we were investigating
[00:19:45.760] claims of over 40 special access and
[00:19:49.840] controlled access programs allegedly
[00:19:53.120] dealing with the recovery or the
[00:19:56.160] exploitation
[00:19:57.919] of um
[00:20:00.480] UFO materials or UAP.
[00:20:03.840] >> Okay. ET that those were the claims that
[00:20:07.039] we were we had uh
[00:20:11.108] [snorts] supporting investigations with
[00:20:13.120] both the department of defense IG and
[00:20:17.200] the ICIG. We had a secure reporting
[00:20:20.559] mechanism where uh current and former
[00:20:24.320] government employees or our contractors
[00:20:27.200] could contact us securely. Um we would
[00:20:31.039] maintain their
[00:20:33.360] uh anonymity.
[00:20:35.520] >> Absolutely. Absolutely. We'd give them a
[00:20:38.159] random number. Um and we would protect
[00:20:41.280] their identities. Um and that's when I
[00:20:44.240] first realized that, you know, they were
[00:20:45.840] there were Americans that were scared to
[00:20:47.919] death to talk to us. Um they were very
[00:20:50.400] concerned about being harmed. Um,
[00:20:52.960] >> oh, I mean, I think that brings up a
[00:20:55.440] really good segue and because and and
[00:20:58.320] and I
[00:21:00.880] think
[00:21:03.440] if all of this was just lights in the
[00:21:07.760] sky, I don't think people would be
[00:21:12.080] scared for their life to come forward
[00:21:14.880] and to want to, you know, gain nothing
[00:21:18.080] from it. Um, I mean the some of the
[00:21:22.480] people that like you said that you had
[00:21:24.000] come to you that they they literally
[00:21:26.080] they feared for their life. Now I know
[00:21:28.880] that we I think most people in the UFO
[00:21:31.120] community if they're smart, right? If
[00:21:33.840] they're up to speed, we know that 95% of
[00:21:37.200] what's seen can be prosaically
[00:21:39.280] explained. There is a 5% margin. And if
[00:21:43.200] I'm being very generous, 2% of that is
[00:21:47.120] really anomalous in my uh in statistical
[00:21:51.440] means. Um that is a very small
[00:21:53.760] percentage. So you know arrows it seems
[00:21:57.200] what arrow is is at least mandated to do
[00:21:59.919] or the idea and the mission was to sift
[00:22:03.120] through all the data and find that 2%.
[00:22:07.440] Um, and the people that are coming to
[00:22:09.440] you that are fearing for their lives. I
[00:22:11.520] mean,
[00:22:13.039] it's it's got to make this pretty real,
[00:22:16.240] right?
[00:22:17.120] >> Well, it was real to them. Um,
[00:22:20.320] what we got from these individuals and
[00:22:22.799] be able to
[00:22:25.360] align that with hard evidence and data
[00:22:28.559] that we can scientifically
[00:22:31.039] um, examine to understand the phenomena
[00:22:33.520] really wasn't there. A lot of these
[00:22:35.200] people who came in with these amazing
[00:22:37.039] claims that the government had recovered
[00:22:40.080] and were reverse engineering or exploit,
[00:22:43.200] you know, exploiting um alien
[00:22:45.679] technologies. We never could find any
[00:22:48.480] hard evidence to back any of that up.
[00:22:50.960] There were a lot of
[00:22:52.320] >> Can I ask you something?
[00:22:55.120] >> Sure.
[00:22:56.000] >> When you say alien, this is something
[00:22:58.080] that Arrow does and and this is
[00:23:00.559] something I do want cleared up for
[00:23:02.400] myself. Um, when you say alien and when
[00:23:07.360] Arrows reports say extraterrestrial,
[00:23:12.320] why be so specific?
[00:23:14.559] >> We would refer to material
[00:23:18.240] um, sentient beings from a planet other
[00:23:20.880] than ours, extraterrestrial, using that
[00:23:23.520] that term. But wouldn't that so but if
[00:23:26.799] you say you found evidence of
[00:23:28.799] ultraterrestrial something that that had
[00:23:30.720] been here for you know that somehow is
[00:23:36.240] been developing alongside us and somehow
[00:23:39.360] you know is is a uh avoiding us like and
[00:23:43.600] I'm just I'm really asking this as a
[00:23:45.360] question and I I I
[00:23:48.559] if something you know to suspend a
[00:23:50.960] little belief here uh to to to walk with
[00:23:53.280] me you know, if something had had been
[00:23:56.000] here and maybe is now what people see as
[00:23:59.120] UFOs, uh, and it had been here the whole
[00:24:01.360] time. I mean, by definition, that would
[00:24:03.280] not be extraterrestrial. So, what what I
[00:24:05.760] mean is, why be so specific? Because
[00:24:08.640] some people think that is Arrow trying
[00:24:11.520] to pin it on aliens and green men and
[00:24:15.039] then not address the fact that, you
[00:24:17.520] know, angels and demons are nonhuman
[00:24:19.840] intelligence. They're not aliens, but
[00:24:22.080] they're by definition nonhuman
[00:24:24.320] intelligence. And I think that's what we
[00:24:27.600] should be looking for, not aliens,
[00:24:29.760] because that's specific.
[00:24:32.000] >> Okay. I I I see your point. Um,
[00:24:35.760] we had no evidence of uh
[00:24:39.840] anything that we recovered or was given
[00:24:43.760] to us that we examined
[00:24:46.240] to come from any other planet than our
[00:24:49.360] our our own. Um, the technologies that
[00:24:53.840] we did examine, the phenomas that we did
[00:24:57.120] observe um were designed and operated by
[00:25:00.799] human beings. Um, one of the one of the
[00:25:04.240] things that was I I think frustrated a
[00:25:06.880] lot of people and didn't understand what
[00:25:08.880] was the value what of arrow arrow
[00:25:12.159] produced quite a bit of uh new
[00:25:15.440] understanding of uh foreign technologies
[00:25:20.240] and new capabilities. So two of Arrow's
[00:25:23.840] missions that were not widely known was
[00:25:26.080] prevent technological and operational
[00:25:28.559] surprise.
[00:25:29.440] >> Surprise. Yeah. Arrow would pick up, we
[00:25:32.559] would have the services the intelligence
[00:25:35.120] community use in their operational
[00:25:36.960] platforms or ISR systems would pick up a
[00:25:41.120] signature that didn't correspond with
[00:25:43.840] something known. So we would have a
[00:25:46.159] partial signature of a system that did
[00:25:50.559] not correspond
[00:25:52.400] with u say the enemy order battle
[00:25:55.200] capability. We didn't know what this
[00:25:57.120] was. So it would be reported to us as a
[00:26:00.720] UAP and then we would throw a lot of
[00:26:03.760] science, a lot of sensors. We would put
[00:26:06.240] together some integrated collection
[00:26:07.840] plans trying to find exactly what is
[00:26:11.520] that and then working with the community
[00:26:14.799] try to put together the pieces to
[00:26:16.960] understand the puzzle. And there was and
[00:26:20.799] there was intelligence reporting. Okay,
[00:26:24.480] that originally started off as a UAP
[00:26:28.400] incident report. So, we would have an
[00:26:31.520] F-35 platform would pick up an unusual
[00:26:35.279] signature of something we didn't
[00:26:36.799] understand and then Arrol working with
[00:26:39.440] the community would go after it and then
[00:26:42.320] we would able um to produce new
[00:26:45.760] understanding of say a uh a new or
[00:26:50.080] emerging uh foreign uh you know,
[00:26:54.240] aircraft capability that we just
[00:26:56.480] observed for the first time. Um, Arrow
[00:26:59.279] did a lot of that. Now, that's going to
[00:27:00.960] be classified reporting. The public's
[00:27:02.799] never going to see it. Um, and that was
[00:27:05.440] one of the frustrating things. People
[00:27:07.039] are saying, "What does Arrow do?" Well,
[00:27:08.720] Arrol did quite a bit, but you're not
[00:27:11.440] going to be able to see it declassified
[00:27:13.200] for 75 years. So, it's going to take a
[00:27:15.919] while for that to get out there. But we
[00:27:17.679] did work very very closely um with the
[00:27:21.760] service um intelligence lab. So we would
[00:27:25.360] work like the national um
[00:27:28.960] air and space intelligence center or the
[00:27:31.200] national space intelligence center um
[00:27:34.559] because we would we would get reports
[00:27:36.559] and we look at it and the first thing
[00:27:39.760] that we would do is is there any other
[00:27:42.240] system that may have detected that
[00:27:46.640] incident. So we would start in space
[00:27:49.520] because we do a lot of space
[00:27:50.720] surveillance. Okay. Can we establish a
[00:27:53.600] track? Did anything deorbit? Um, was
[00:27:57.039] there any data that we could get from
[00:27:59.840] weather radar? Okay. From air traffic
[00:28:03.520] control radar, surveillance radar,
[00:28:06.880] biostatic
[00:28:08.960] um, you know, processing. [snorts]
[00:28:11.200] So, we can say there's an incident. Now,
[00:28:14.640] we have hard data that can prove the
[00:28:17.679] existent. Now, we've got a heading,
[00:28:19.679] we've got a speed, we've got an
[00:28:21.600] altitude. So now we can build a track
[00:28:23.840] and now we we have an observer of what
[00:28:26.159] happened where and then can we take
[00:28:30.080] those facts and kind of have an
[00:28:32.559] understanding of what the incident was.
[00:28:35.520] Um did Arrol did a lot of that and most
[00:28:39.679] of the data that we needed was
[00:28:41.440] available. We just never had the network
[00:28:43.440] or the tools to be able you know to
[00:28:46.799] exploit it. So we're talking large data.
[00:28:50.240] um you needed to have an architecture
[00:28:52.960] fast enough and large enough to take
[00:28:55.120] this data and you aggregate the data. So
[00:28:58.480] now the data is going to be at a higher
[00:29:00.240] classification level than any individual
[00:29:02.799] data stream um to kind of understand and
[00:29:06.399] build that common operational picture.
[00:29:08.640] So you can say yeah okay that incident
[00:29:11.520] corresponds with that track. What is it?
[00:29:15.520] and and and I totally understand why
[00:29:19.600] Arrow um in all of the ways that you
[00:29:22.880] just described doing that actual leg
[00:29:25.919] work uh is actually is really valuable.
[00:29:29.200] However, I I can't help but hear a a
[00:29:33.679] natural flaw in the process because if
[00:29:38.240] you had pro
[00:29:40.399] and and and forgive, you know, uh not
[00:29:42.880] forgive me, but um uh forgive me if I if
[00:29:45.840] I don't say the the right words because
[00:29:48.399] all the acronyms are they're sometimes a
[00:29:50.480] little bit confusing when you're trying
[00:29:51.440] to jumble them all. But you guys had
[00:29:53.919] title is it title 15 and title
[00:29:57.919] >> title 15 intelligence.
[00:30:01.440] >> Title 10 is department of defense.
[00:30:05.039] That's military.
[00:30:06.720] >> Okay.
[00:30:07.760] >> Okay. And then you would have uh legal
[00:30:10.399] authorities from law enforcement through
[00:30:12.240] the FBI or DHS title 18 title 14. So we
[00:30:18.080] would work together in a task force. So
[00:30:21.760] there would be an incident and you would
[00:30:23.600] bring in officers from these other
[00:30:26.559] agencies. They would bring their
[00:30:28.799] authorities. Arrow would would be the
[00:30:33.120] aggregator. Think of Arrow as taking all
[00:30:36.000] these legal authorities in because we
[00:30:38.000] have permission to work with everybody
[00:30:39.440] in their data. And then we could produce
[00:30:42.480] a common operational pictures
[00:30:45.039] >> to kind of lay out this is our
[00:30:47.440] understanding of what is going on. And
[00:30:49.679] then from that the if it's domestic,
[00:30:53.279] DHS, FBI, local, tribal, they could
[00:30:56.559] respond operationally. Um,
[00:30:59.360] >> got it.
[00:31:00.880] So that that that was kind of the work
[00:31:02.960] that Arrow did primarily when we would
[00:31:06.159] have
[00:31:07.919] >> uh state, local, tribal um DHS, they
[00:31:11.919] would pick up things that they thought
[00:31:14.240] were UAPs, but as we got in and started
[00:31:17.520] um to examine the cases, we realized
[00:31:19.600] they were UAS's.
[00:31:22.480] So we started actually developing and
[00:31:25.520] researching a lot of counter UAS systems
[00:31:28.240] that were kind of that um short range um
[00:31:32.480] detection system. There's a lot of great
[00:31:34.640] systems out there that we would
[00:31:36.640] incorporate with our sensor grids and
[00:31:39.760] our active sensors. So we would have
[00:31:41.760] passive and active emitters. So we would
[00:31:44.559] go into an area where we had a UAP
[00:31:46.880] incident and then we would try to
[00:31:49.440] capture it near real time to understand
[00:31:51.840] what was going on. And since Arrow is a
[00:31:54.880] DoD organization,
[00:31:57.039] okay, partnering with the intelligence
[00:31:59.200] community, we were looking at it from a
[00:32:02.399] national security perspective. So we
[00:32:05.120] have detected some airborne system
[00:32:08.080] operating in restricted airspace. Okay,
[00:32:11.600] why is it there? who's operating it and
[00:32:14.159] what are their interests. Um, that was
[00:32:16.960] of great concern to us because as you
[00:32:19.840] can imagine there's a lot of sensitive
[00:32:21.679] sites that our country wants to protect
[00:32:25.360] >> which I will want to get to. But so what
[00:32:28.080] I and what I meant by all that was now
[00:32:31.039] say Arrow and again here here we go down
[00:32:35.360] down a little bit of the rabbit hole.
[00:32:38.159] Okay, say I'm I'm Arrow as as an entity
[00:32:42.080] and I come across because I have the
[00:32:45.919] clearance. I come across a unacnowledge
[00:32:50.159] special access program, something that's
[00:32:52.880] deep black, deep covert, right? And I
[00:32:57.440] learn about something and I mean I'd
[00:33:01.279] like to have you probably address this,
[00:33:02.799] but even guys like Jim Lacatsky have
[00:33:05.840] claimed that OAP breached the hole of a
[00:33:09.519] UFO. And I'm sure Green Street had
[00:33:11.840] brought that part up to you. But if if
[00:33:14.320] they had if you had come across
[00:33:15.840] something that was deep, dark, and and
[00:33:18.159] you've already said it, some of the
[00:33:19.840] stuff that Arrow's done, we're not going
[00:33:21.039] to hear about for 75 years. So, how do
[00:33:23.360] we know that you didn't find anything?
[00:33:26.000] And it's not just I mean, wouldn't you
[00:33:28.399] be required by law, by your oath, and by
[00:33:31.840] your duty to lie to me like and lie to
[00:33:35.120] and I'm and I'm saying this really
[00:33:36.880] honestly and I and and and in the most
[00:33:40.240] sincere way, like, wouldn't it be your
[00:33:42.480] duty to tell me that you didn't find it
[00:33:45.440] for operational
[00:33:48.080] reasons?
[00:33:49.519] Well,
[00:33:51.519] a never was a originating
[00:33:55.279] um classification authority. So, we
[00:33:58.399] didn't have a classification guide, but
[00:34:00.559] we provided guidance on how to classify
[00:34:05.039] UAP
[00:34:06.880] uh related topics. So, the fact that a
[00:34:10.639] UAP exists or was detected wasn't
[00:34:14.320] necessarily classified or sensitive.
[00:34:17.200] However, if that incident occurred in
[00:34:20.800] restricted airspace or um acknowledge
[00:34:25.119] some type of failure in a surveillance
[00:34:29.520] or a defensive system to protect that um
[00:34:32.879] restricted or protected site, that would
[00:34:35.359] be a little bit sensitive if Arrol had
[00:34:38.720] actually found um
[00:34:42.879] a system that was not man-made.
[00:34:47.200] And you know, we came across a, you
[00:34:49.760] know, a crash site or, you know, remains
[00:34:53.760] or some hard evidence that there was
[00:34:56.079] something uh an advanced capability or
[00:34:59.119] system that was not um, you know,
[00:35:02.720] engineered, manufactured, and operated
[00:35:04.880] by humans. the fact that that existed.
[00:35:08.480] We actually talked with public affairs
[00:35:10.960] and thought that would well be go well
[00:35:13.760] beyond the authority of the Arrow
[00:35:15.599] director and there'd be a lot of
[00:35:16.800] coordination with the executive in the
[00:35:19.119] White House on how they wanted to share
[00:35:22.079] that with the American people. That
[00:35:23.760] probably wouldn't be the director of
[00:35:25.200] Arrow sharing the fact that we found uh
[00:35:28.960] remnants of a spacecraft that we
[00:35:32.079] couldn't identify um with attributes of
[00:35:36.000] new technologies and capabilities that
[00:35:38.640] were not humanmade. Um if that happened
[00:35:41.760] and it did not happen um we would
[00:35:45.760] probably kick that up to the White House
[00:35:48.079] and let them share that information.
[00:35:50.640] >> But you see my conundrum here, right?
[00:35:52.960] You you do see my conundrum here.
[00:35:55.599] >> I do. I I do. But part of the the task
[00:36:00.720] that Arrow had from um congressional
[00:36:04.400] oversight, they were looking um and as
[00:36:08.560] as federal officers, you know, we we had
[00:36:11.599] gun carrying law, you know, federal law
[00:36:13.599] enforcement officers on our staff,
[00:36:15.920] >> right? So if we found evidence of a
[00:36:18.640] crime, if we found a uh a program that
[00:36:23.280] was being concealed from oversight where
[00:36:26.240] they were using um you know federal
[00:36:29.119] funds without authority, that's a crime
[00:36:32.160] and Congress was very very sensitive to
[00:36:34.960] that. And we actually had um you know a
[00:36:39.119] hotline. We had a way that people could
[00:36:41.920] call in um their belief that there was a
[00:36:46.400] undeclared sapper cap that was being
[00:36:48.640] concealed from oversight. And we
[00:36:51.520] aggressively
[00:36:53.200] um researched those and investigated
[00:36:55.520] those cases. And we did it in parallel
[00:36:58.880] with IGs with both the Department of
[00:37:01.599] Defense and with the intelligence
[00:37:03.599] community. Um we would have weekly
[00:37:06.320] meetings where we would say this is what
[00:37:08.320] we heard from a witness and we would go
[00:37:10.640] back and forth you know without
[00:37:13.280] compromising our you know our ability to
[00:37:17.200] um honor NDAs and their and agreements
[00:37:22.160] we had with witnesses. We would always
[00:37:24.079] protect those making protected
[00:37:26.160] disclosures. But there was a lot of
[00:37:29.200] coordination and there were plenty of
[00:37:32.560] JAG officers and attorneys with
[00:37:34.400] Department of of Justice to give us
[00:37:37.839] legal guidance on how to pursue these
[00:37:40.720] cases,
[00:37:41.119] >> which is great. Which is great. And and
[00:37:43.119] that kind of brings me to a point here
[00:37:45.599] um which I think is good. Uh it is. Now,
[00:37:52.320] with that being said, um what what and I
[00:37:56.880] want to wrap this in a bit ribbon here.
[00:37:58.960] Um
[00:38:00.640] have did you hear the claims that Jim
[00:38:02.560] Latsky did make about breaching the hull
[00:38:05.599] of a craft of a of an unknown AC? He
[00:38:09.119] what he said and this is again this is
[00:38:12.320] verbatim. breached the hull of a of an
[00:38:16.160] unknown craft that did not originate
[00:38:18.640] from here and he was running the OSAP
[00:38:22.079] program. Have you heard that claim?
[00:38:24.480] >> We've heard claims and a lot of that was
[00:38:26.800] addressed in volume one of the
[00:38:29.839] historical report which we did in a very
[00:38:33.200] compressed amount of time. Of course.
[00:38:35.599] Oh, yeah. I'm sure
[00:38:37.760] >> there there's an addendum to it with
[00:38:39.760] some new findings uh on that report
[00:38:42.880] after Sean left and some of the
[00:38:44.800] follow-up investigations that we had and
[00:38:47.760] new claims that were brought in, new
[00:38:49.680] interviews, uh new referrals from
[00:38:51.920] Congress and the IG. Um, we continue to
[00:38:55.200] research these claims because it was of
[00:38:57.280] interest both to the cabinet secretaries
[00:39:00.320] and to the um oversight officials, the
[00:39:04.400] committees that we worked with up on the
[00:39:06.079] hill. But we never even when we had
[00:39:09.440] materials delivered or claims that these
[00:39:13.040] materials came from a nonhuman
[00:39:16.240] um craft or system. In every case where
[00:39:20.000] we had uh independent labs verify the
[00:39:24.240] you know the identity of the materials
[00:39:26.640] we never uh discovered or were able to
[00:39:30.240] validate any claim that that material
[00:39:33.280] came from a craft not you know a
[00:39:35.119] non-human craft that did not happen
[00:39:37.760] during my time and era and we spent
[00:39:40.480] millions of dollars um doing these
[00:39:43.680] analysis of these materials
[00:39:54.640] Okay, I'm
[00:39:56.000] >> I was muted. I I I was muted. That was
[00:39:58.240] my fault. Um I wanted to give you the
[00:40:00.320] floor. Uh so with that and with that
[00:40:02.880] being said, um
[00:40:05.520] so with materials, I find that to be
[00:40:07.760] very interesting because obviously guys
[00:40:10.480] like Dr. Gary Nolan are saying different
[00:40:14.240] things. Um you know uh him at Stanford
[00:40:18.720] uh what he's saying is they've come
[00:40:20.640] across any some or materials that the
[00:40:24.800] isotopic ratios uh don't match anything
[00:40:28.240] on Earth and they're atomically layered.
[00:40:31.440] Um were you guys given any of those
[00:40:33.760] materials to also analyze and come up
[00:40:36.880] with uh maybe you know um any
[00:40:41.200] collaboration with that effort?
[00:40:43.520] >> Um we didn't work with him. Uh the labs
[00:40:46.880] that we used to do the material analysis
[00:40:50.480] were um basically the old Manhattan
[00:40:53.280] programs the department of energy labs
[00:40:56.160] sandia Oakidge um who we worked with. Do
[00:41:00.720] you think um do you is it possible is it
[00:41:06.079] I mean I'm I'm and I'm really genuinely
[00:41:09.119] curious. Is it possible that there are
[00:41:14.160] there are metals or parts out there uh
[00:41:17.520] that people do have that may still be
[00:41:21.680] anomalous?
[00:41:23.680] nothing that was ever shared. There was
[00:41:26.240] no materials that was ever shared with
[00:41:28.640] Arrow
[00:41:29.599] >> that had any unusual characteristics.
[00:41:33.040] Everything we looked at came from this
[00:41:35.359] planet.
[00:41:36.800] >> Okay. And Okay. And and that's fair
[00:41:38.560] enough. Um I definitely think, you know,
[00:41:41.280] you guys should run down like I mean
[00:41:43.040] because Gary Nolan, I'm pretty sure uh
[00:41:45.760] is it works with the CIA and um or at
[00:41:49.200] least has worked with the CIA. So, I'd
[00:41:51.680] be I' I'd be interested to to find out
[00:41:54.800] why a guy like that would make claims
[00:41:57.119] like that. Um, knowing and and and that
[00:42:01.920] had there there's this other story
[00:42:06.079] >> UAP UFO crash parts wanted to come to
[00:42:09.520] Arrow and say, "Hey, this is the
[00:42:11.200] pedigree." One of the one of the
[00:42:13.520] challenges we had when people had parts
[00:42:16.640] is we would go back and almost like it
[00:42:19.280] was um evidence used in a trial. So,
[00:42:22.800] right,
[00:42:24.160] >> you know, proper custody and document
[00:42:27.760] um who possessed it, you know, how was
[00:42:30.240] it controlled? And it's funny as you
[00:42:33.359] were getting closer to the
[00:42:37.280] the actual incident where the material
[00:42:39.520] was collected um a lot of the
[00:42:43.680] you know the details seem to be lost.
[00:42:47.839] >> You know we we had materials were
[00:42:49.920] sitting on a warehouse in a shelf for
[00:42:52.319] the last 40 years but as we try to get
[00:42:55.119] back to where that material was
[00:42:56.800] collected the trail would go cold. And
[00:43:00.480] we did have people that contacted ERA.
[00:43:02.960] We actually had um citizens that went to
[00:43:06.079] their congressional representative and
[00:43:08.640] they wanted Arrol to validate the fact
[00:43:10.880] that they actually had a UFO crash card.
[00:43:14.480] >> So, and I want
[00:43:15.599] >> they were going to go on the road and
[00:43:16.800] they they wanted that, you know, that
[00:43:18.720] seal of approval from Merill. You know,
[00:43:20.800] we're not in the business to help people
[00:43:23.200] make money. However, if there was an
[00:43:26.000] entity that had worked with a part of
[00:43:28.560] the US government and they claimed they
[00:43:30.400] had material that was part of some type
[00:43:34.240] of UAP or UFO incident, ERA would love
[00:43:38.160] to help them um go back and actually
[00:43:42.160] identify the material. We can do that.
[00:43:43.920] We have an active program. Um, we've
[00:43:47.119] invested
[00:43:49.200] millions of dollars in equipment and
[00:43:51.680] clean rooms and procedures where we
[00:43:54.640] could take custody of a piece of
[00:43:57.440] material, do a double blind study, have
[00:44:00.319] different teams work on different, you
[00:44:02.640] know, parts of a, you know, a piece of
[00:44:05.760] material and come up independently with
[00:44:08.000] what they thought it was. And we love
[00:44:11.119] that. And but every time that that was
[00:44:14.400] done, the materials came from this
[00:44:16.960] earth. They were man-made.
[00:44:18.675] [clears throat]
[00:44:20.079] >> Okay. And and that's and that's fair
[00:44:21.760] enough. I w to I want to swi you know
[00:44:24.560] speaking of uh parts and evidence. Uh
[00:44:28.560] there you may there there was this claim
[00:44:30.800] made and um people have asked me to and
[00:44:36.240] we talked like I said we talked about
[00:44:37.520] this on the phone and um
[00:44:41.280] you you had just brought up that you
[00:44:43.119] know Arrow try or someone tried to get
[00:44:45.040] Arrow's seal of approval. There was
[00:44:47.040] another claim made that there was a
[00:44:49.520] person and he now goes by uh Whistling
[00:44:53.119] Mike on on X I believe um and he's made
[00:44:58.160] some claims and Burles
[00:45:01.760] has said he's a interesting person and
[00:45:05.359] uh he's a defense contractor who's
[00:45:08.160] trying to get contracts with the US
[00:45:10.720] government and he came to Arrow with a
[00:45:14.000] story and uh what you say is that that
[00:45:18.880] there was an attempt at extortion. Um
[00:45:22.319] can you address this and clear this up?
[00:45:25.359] What happened there?
[00:45:26.800] >> Well, Errol doesn't comment on people
[00:45:29.200] that come to him with um UAP incident
[00:45:33.359] claims. We we protect their identities.
[00:45:36.319] Um
[00:45:36.720] >> but what if they blow their identity?
[00:45:39.520] >> Well, that's up to them. We we've had we
[00:45:42.000] had a referral when I was the acting
[00:45:44.560] director. Uh chairman of one of the
[00:45:46.800] oversight committees asked us to uh meet
[00:45:50.560] with an individual that claimed to have
[00:45:54.480] reported to us a UAP part. Um, when we
[00:45:58.000] actually met with this individual, what
[00:46:00.960] we realized is the claim was that he
[00:46:04.240] recovered a part that that fell from a
[00:46:09.839] an advanced US stealth aircraft.
[00:46:14.000] So, the part that he recovered was
[00:46:16.640] actually a piece of government property.
[00:46:19.760] Um this individual
[00:46:22.560] um
[00:46:24.079] came up with a new manufacturing process
[00:46:26.401] [snorts]
[00:46:27.040] to duplicate the part. Um wanted found a
[00:46:32.800] or developed a procedure to be able to
[00:46:35.839] detect these advanced aircraft. At one
[00:46:39.359] point, uh, there was a claim that wanted
[00:46:42.240] us to purchase the part or they was
[00:46:45.359] going to sell it to another foreign
[00:46:47.440] entity such as the Chinese. To us, that
[00:46:50.400] sounded like extortion and that's how we
[00:46:52.319] treated it and we referred it off to the
[00:46:54.640] FBI. But that was kind of the end of
[00:46:56.560] that. The fact that someone recovered a
[00:46:59.200] part from aircraft, that right there
[00:47:02.160] means it's not it's not an Arrows uh
[00:47:05.359] mission set. Arrow investigates UAP.
[00:47:08.560] Right.
[00:47:09.280] >> If it's a US advanced aircraft has
[00:47:12.000] nothing to do with UAP.
[00:47:14.640] >> Okay. So there there so what and we
[00:47:17.920] don't have to talk about any we don't
[00:47:19.359] have to infer anyone. So what what the
[00:47:23.359] what the scenario was was there was a
[00:47:26.160] person who claimed to have a part. it.
[00:47:30.880] You discovered that it was from a nextg
[00:47:33.200] fighter, but it had already been
[00:47:35.040] >> They claim it was from an advanced
[00:47:37.440] concept.
[00:47:38.800] >> Oh, gotcha. Gotcha. Gotcha.
[00:47:40.880] >> Not updared
[00:47:49.760] uh any of those videos with us. We we'd
[00:47:52.720] asked for them. We did from the uh the
[00:47:56.000] chairman. We did get a still image of a
[00:47:59.680] aircraft, an advanced, allegedly it was
[00:48:02.640] advanced um stealth, you know, aircraft
[00:48:05.920] that was in development. Um Congress was
[00:48:09.760] concerned that there had been some type
[00:48:11.760] of compromise and that these images of
[00:48:15.599] this aircraft had got out into the
[00:48:17.599] public was very concerned about a leak.
[00:48:20.720] Um, that's one reason I was asked to go
[00:48:23.280] out to the Nevada Test Range, uh, to
[00:48:27.119] actually meet with the program managers
[00:48:29.040] that were developing these sixth
[00:48:30.559] generation aircraft out there and I did
[00:48:33.760] that. Um,
[00:48:36.640] >> okay.
[00:48:37.200] >> The we we we analyzed the image and the
[00:48:40.800] image looked like promotion video that
[00:48:44.319] had come from uh, an aircraft uh,
[00:48:47.359] manufacturer. It kind of looked like an
[00:48:50.000] F-17 on steroids.
[00:48:53.200] Um, the the vast majority of of our um
[00:48:57.760] aerospace engineers
[00:49:00.000] uh thought it was uh you know uh a
[00:49:03.680] photoshopped
[00:49:05.200] version of something that was in a
[00:49:06.880] promotional video and that's what we
[00:49:09.200] reported back to the Hill and again it
[00:49:12.960] wasn't a UAP, it was a stealth aircraft
[00:49:15.520] so it really wasn't in our lane.
[00:49:18.319] So, so did this person ever even make it
[00:49:21.680] to a skiff?
[00:49:24.640] >> Yes. To talk to us.
[00:49:26.640] >> Okay. Oh, so, so there, so there was a a
[00:49:28.800] meeting in a skiff with that individual
[00:49:30.880] and then it was referred to federal law
[00:49:33.920] enforcement because there was a a a
[00:49:37.280] concern by Congress that there was a
[00:49:39.680] breach somewhere and that um Yeah.
[00:49:42.400] >> No, no, the the concern was an extortion
[00:49:46.000] attempt. The other concern Congress had
[00:49:49.119] that they could have had a compromise
[00:49:50.800] and you had
[00:49:51.520] >> compromise. Yeah.
[00:49:52.640] >> An individual with a, you know, an image
[00:49:55.119] of an advanced concept aircraft,
[00:49:58.000] >> right?
[00:49:58.800] >> That was the concern. But again, that's
[00:50:00.720] really not Arrol's mission set. We'll
[00:50:02.720] turn that over to, you know, a DoD CI.
[00:50:06.160] We'll let them work that. Yes.
[00:50:08.720] >> Totally. Totally understandable. Um and
[00:50:13.599] you know I think that uh you know that
[00:50:16.480] just goes to say uh or goes to show at
[00:50:19.760] least how many so it does show that
[00:50:22.240] Arrow is working uh really in and
[00:50:25.359] intently uh with other agencies. So you
[00:50:29.839] guys are cooperating and uh have in law
[00:50:34.000] enforcement that is working with you
[00:50:36.160] that that you you're able to refer these
[00:50:38.319] things to. So you're actively
[00:50:41.200] as a you know as a country we really
[00:50:44.640] really have to federate and work with
[00:50:46.960] state local tribal authorities to
[00:50:50.240] understand the phenomena
[00:50:52.960] we looked you we were working with
[00:50:54.960] Northcom because one of the things that
[00:50:57.040] we were work that we were developing was
[00:50:59.119] a UAP recovery plan as you can imagine
[00:51:02.240] >> oh an actual recovery plan so like
[00:51:04.880] >> plan because I was asked when early on u
[00:51:08.720] members of Congress the committee
[00:51:10.720] chairman came to me and wanted to see
[00:51:12.720] the plan and I was pretty new to this
[00:51:15.440] business and Sean had left. So I had
[00:51:18.319] gone back and asked do we have is there
[00:51:22.000] a UAP recovery plan and can someone show
[00:51:24.480] something to me? So there there was some
[00:51:26.720] things we found that they thought were
[00:51:29.040] part of the Majestic program and the
[00:51:32.559] analyst thought it was
[00:51:34.240] >> it was fake. But we had actually working
[00:51:37.200] with um DoD and the Northern Command
[00:51:40.880] actually to put together an actual
[00:51:43.359] recovery plan. As as you know, you know,
[00:51:46.319] we do have uh organizations that recover
[00:51:50.559] um you know, fallen satellites or
[00:51:52.640] objects from space. as things re-entry
[00:51:56.160] into our atmosphere, often um they have
[00:51:59.920] hazardous fuels or payloads and it and
[00:52:03.040] it could be dangerous.
[00:52:05.680] So, we have DoD teams on standby
[00:52:08.880] actually to fly out and work with state,
[00:52:11.520] local, tribal authorities to help clean
[00:52:13.599] these things up. We do that. But this
[00:52:16.720] could also I mean is are is it is it
[00:52:20.319] safe to say that one of these protocols
[00:52:23.839] if ever there was an incident with a
[00:52:27.920] crashed legitimate UFO that this one of
[00:52:31.440] these uh recovery uh plans could be
[00:52:35.119] utilized in case of that kind of
[00:52:37.680] scenario.
[00:52:38.880] >> Yeah. Yes. because that DoD does
[00:52:42.800] extremely well is plan,
[00:52:45.520] >> right? I and that's what I think we've
[00:52:47.920] all assumed, you know,
[00:52:50.800] >> that you'd have a plan. So, Errol was
[00:52:53.520] working with Northcom to put together a
[00:52:55.599] plan and we realized the actual p, you
[00:53:00.319] know, probability of a UAP landing on
[00:53:05.680] federal property or a military base was
[00:53:08.000] actually pretty small. it would actually
[00:53:10.640] land in a farmer's field or in state
[00:53:12.960] property and then you would have DoD
[00:53:16.640] providing support to domestic
[00:53:18.800] authorities. So that's why we had port
[00:53:21.760] partnered with the Northern Command
[00:53:24.240] because that's what they do. They're a
[00:53:26.800] defense of the homeland and that's
[00:53:28.720] another way that Arrow kind of got into
[00:53:32.000] the the counter UAP or UAS mission. Um,
[00:53:36.240] after the Langley incident, we were
[00:53:38.160] actually asked during the incident by
[00:53:40.319] the Joint Staff J3 if we could bring
[00:53:43.040] some of our sensors and our scientists
[00:53:45.599] and help them [clears throat] recover
[00:53:47.440] and make tracks so the law enforcement
[00:53:50.400] task force could narrow down their
[00:53:53.440] search area of where they thought these
[00:53:55.200] UAS's being launched from.
[00:53:58.480] You know, what was the path and what
[00:54:00.720] were the UAS's interested in
[00:54:02.880] surveilling? So we had partnered with
[00:54:05.920] MIT that were the British that helped
[00:54:08.400] invent radar in World War II and we were
[00:54:11.119] helping reconstruct
[00:54:13.119] you know the forensic radar tracks
[00:54:15.440] trying to make us make sense of what
[00:54:17.760] happened down in uh Langley a couple of
[00:54:21.040] years ago
[00:54:22.640] >> and so Arrow developed an expertise you
[00:54:26.720] know we had our gremlin systems that we
[00:54:30.079] would put out we do long-term
[00:54:32.240] surveillance of a fairly large area and
[00:54:35.920] of course we're looking for UAPs but we
[00:54:39.040] would detect UAS's. So what we want to
[00:54:41.920] do is have the ability to pass that
[00:54:44.240] track to that local commander
[00:54:46.640] responsible for defense of a military
[00:54:49.280] installation saying we've detected a UAS
[00:54:51.839] in real time and pass them the
[00:54:53.920] information so they could deal with it.
[00:54:56.000] That's not really our mission. In the
[00:54:58.400] same time, if they were to detect a UAP,
[00:55:01.599] they're looking for UAS's, and they find
[00:55:04.480] a craft they don't understand, but they
[00:55:06.480] know it's much larger than UAS, they
[00:55:08.720] pass that to us. I um [clears throat]
[00:55:13.280] so jumping back in Tim um I I I
[00:55:19.599] was listening to your interview and
[00:55:23.359] right at the end with Stephen Green
[00:55:25.440] Street, you started talking about black
[00:55:29.200] triangles and the possibility that these
[00:55:34.400] so because Arrow I mean Arrow did find
[00:55:38.400] some interesting things and you made
[00:55:40.319] some interesting comments about these
[00:55:42.960] triangles and and let's be fair, uh
[00:55:45.760] these black triangles have been seen for
[00:55:48.640] a long time, a long long time by people.
[00:55:51.920] They've been reported um the famous 1997
[00:55:55.680] Phoenix Lights incident. Uh that was a
[00:55:58.480] big, you know, black triangle, if you
[00:56:00.480] will. There's also been uh a lot of of
[00:56:03.200] of
[00:56:05.200] uh reports of even up to this day guys
[00:56:09.200] like Dylan Borland uh just sat in front
[00:56:12.160] of Congress uh and testified to the fact
[00:56:15.040] that he and and uh you know I'm I'm just
[00:56:18.079] using that as an example. Many other
[00:56:20.000] people have have seen these triangles.
[00:56:22.160] Um, what what can you elaborate on on
[00:56:27.520] what you were saying with Stephen in
[00:56:29.280] that interview and why the black
[00:56:30.960] triangle stand out to you specifically?
[00:56:34.079] >> Yeah. Um, the delta wing or the the
[00:56:36.720] triangular shaped wing aircraft is a
[00:56:39.359] proven design. Um, so he had asked me
[00:56:43.520] about, you know, what what bothered you,
[00:56:45.680] you know, what what were you concerned
[00:56:47.040] about? And I had mentioned that the
[00:56:48.720] black triangles because we known it's a
[00:56:51.680] proven engineering design. Um it helps
[00:56:54.960] you know the fly and we'll move from
[00:56:56.720] triangles to flying wings. You know it
[00:57:00.319] it it actually has some inherent stealth
[00:57:02.720] characteristics.
[00:57:04.400] It minimizes the radar cross-section.
[00:57:07.119] Um,
[00:57:08.799] I know that the the first time I ever
[00:57:11.119] saw an F-17
[00:57:13.680] out in Yuma, you know, before I knew
[00:57:15.599] what the hell they were, it looked like
[00:57:17.040] a a flying black triangle from the
[00:57:19.440] angle, the aspect I had on the ground.
[00:57:22.000] So when we detect um force protection
[00:57:25.760] and security personnel at very sensitive
[00:57:28.960] sites, that's that's a national security
[00:57:32.319] issue for me because we know that we
[00:57:36.480] have produced aircraft and systems that
[00:57:39.920] look like black triangles. It works and
[00:57:42.720] our adversaries, you know, probably have
[00:57:44.960] as well. So when we have UAP incidents
[00:57:49.680] and we get credible reporting that it's
[00:57:53.359] a triangular shaped aircraft, that's a
[00:57:55.599] huge concern to us. And the other thing
[00:57:58.960] I had mentioned about is the corona or
[00:58:02.559] the plasma type dis you know discharge
[00:58:06.319] from a airborne system. Um, we thought
[00:58:10.640] maybe that could be a form of stealth
[00:58:13.599] using some kind say a force field um to
[00:58:17.920] provide that minimized or that small
[00:58:20.880] radar cross-section um because that was
[00:58:23.760] another thing in the the unexplained the
[00:58:27.119] the true UAP cases which has and I agree
[00:58:30.240] with you it's about 2% of our cases it's
[00:58:32.960] very very small but we can confirm
[00:58:36.880] they're there we can measure their speed
[00:58:38.880] and velocity. We don't know what they
[00:58:40.480] are and we're trying to do much better
[00:58:42.799] to be able to detect and track these
[00:58:44.880] things. Um, but those are the two
[00:58:47.760] things, the two shapes that I was
[00:58:49.920] concerned about, the triangular shaped
[00:58:52.160] objects and then the the fiery spheres.
[00:58:56.799] Um, speak
[00:58:58.880] as as relate to us by the witnesses. And
[00:59:01.680] one of the things I do want to say about
[00:59:03.920] the witnesses, um, we had some, you
[00:59:07.440] know, early on during the historical
[00:59:09.280] report, people were coming to us and we
[00:59:12.000] wanted them to report on any reverse
[00:59:15.040] engineering,
[00:59:16.880] you know, or alien spacecraft
[00:59:19.520] exploitation programs. And we had some
[00:59:22.559] uh, primarily contractors, some DoD
[00:59:25.280] personnel that talked about the the
[00:59:27.599] amazing things that they saw. and we
[00:59:31.520] listened to their claims. Then we
[00:59:33.040] thanked them for the patriotism, remind
[00:59:35.119] them of the lifelong obligation under
[00:59:37.520] the non-disclosure agreements they
[00:59:39.200] signed and sent them on their way. And
[00:59:41.680] then we would have to start the
[00:59:43.200] investigation. What is this? And their
[00:59:47.200] descriptions were very very accurate for
[00:59:49.920] the most part. when we would actually
[00:59:51.839] get um the videos or we get the reports
[00:59:55.440] on what was being tested or developed
[00:59:57.839] and we saw the videos. Now we can
[01:00:00.559] understand the description and there was
[01:00:04.240] one
[01:00:05.760] um it was a spacecraft that was on a on
[01:00:08.960] a launch platform that was described as
[01:00:11.599] an alien spaceship by a a contractor a
[01:00:15.040] support contractor was lit lawfully
[01:00:17.280] present but not part of that test. So it
[01:00:20.640] wasn't read into the program. But when
[01:00:23.200] you looked at that and you grew up, you
[01:00:26.880] know, looking at sci fi, you know, fi,
[01:00:29.680] you know, science fiction movies and you
[01:00:32.640] saw this crap, you would think it was an
[01:00:36.079] alien system. Um I I think I mean with
[01:00:39.119] with Stephen I I think it was getting
[01:00:41.040] pretty late and I said it looked like a
[01:00:43.520] you know an alien, you know, death ship
[01:00:45.920] or something. uh you you look at it and
[01:00:48.559] you can understand and we wanted that
[01:00:50.960] image in the SAP cap version of the
[01:00:54.640] historical report. So we had a a version
[01:00:58.559] of that report which was about 85% of it
[01:01:02.147] [snorts] um which was public releasable.
[01:01:04.720] Then there was a top secret SEI version
[01:01:07.760] of that report and then primarily for
[01:01:10.400] the gang of eight there was a SAP cap
[01:01:13.040] version of that report. Um they got into
[01:01:16.720] some of these um systems that we really
[01:01:20.319] really wanted to protect um where people
[01:01:23.520] had assessed that they were part of some
[01:01:26.799] type of um you know alien exploitation
[01:01:30.880] program that the government was running.
[01:01:33.280] Um,
[01:01:34.240] >> okay.
[01:01:35.040] >> We had about 40 claims, 45 claims that
[01:01:38.640] we we had to research. And another thing
[01:01:42.240] that was unique about the work we did
[01:01:45.040] when we would have an incident and it it
[01:01:48.559] was actual, you know, we we couldn't
[01:01:50.799] cross reference it with something known.
[01:01:53.040] Okay. A known air aircraft or some type
[01:01:56.480] of uh event such
[01:02:00.319] >> Exactly. we couldn't correlate it with
[01:02:02.160] that. Then we would have to do blue
[01:02:04.559] force deconliction.
[01:02:06.559] Then we would have to go out into the
[01:02:08.640] R&D and the SN the research and
[01:02:11.440] development of science and technology
[01:02:13.200] world and say were you all
[01:02:16.799] >> flying something or demonstrating the
[01:02:19.119] system in this area at that time? And
[01:02:21.760] you you had to be very very precise as
[01:02:25.119] you went back into that community to ask
[01:02:28.319] them because they're not gonna they're
[01:02:30.319] really not going to give you anything.
[01:02:32.240] But you had to be very descriptive and
[01:02:34.880] give very precise dates and times places
[01:02:38.079] to get anything out of them to kind of
[01:02:39.920] understand what they were doing because
[01:02:41.839] they wanted to compartmentalize
[01:02:44.400] and minimize exposure to these systems
[01:02:46.960] so they couldn't be compromised. We
[01:02:48.799] understood that, but we needed to we
[01:02:52.000] needed to confirm that it wasn't one of
[01:02:55.040] our blue systems that was detected. It
[01:02:57.599] was truly a UAP.
[01:02:59.760] >> And this brings me to one of my biggest
[01:03:01.920] points, uh, Tim, and and you know, I
[01:03:05.119] again, I have so much respect for you.
[01:03:08.559] You are a true patriot. I and I I
[01:03:12.000] sincerely sincerely say that. Um, but
[01:03:15.520] I've also worked with other true
[01:03:18.559] patriots and um I I the Wall Street
[01:03:22.400] Journal published an an article and they
[01:03:25.760] claimed that the the Malmstrom uh uh
[01:03:29.520] nuclear shutdowns uh were part of a
[01:03:32.640] directed EMP. And I'm going to I'll get
[01:03:35.599] this all out so you can kind of we can
[01:03:37.920] just have a general discussion about
[01:03:39.359] this because it ties into it. um you
[01:03:43.440] know so the Malmstrom uh case being an
[01:03:47.520] an EMP training uh of some sort and then
[01:03:51.920] you know uh but but Malmstrom is not the
[01:03:54.720] only uh uh nuclear base that you know
[01:03:58.559] dealt with these things uh may not uh
[01:04:01.440] and they what they're saying is the the
[01:04:04.160] fiery spheres are are are a very common
[01:04:08.319] thing from Mario Woods at Ellsworth to
[01:04:10.880] Luring Air Force base in in Maine to
[01:04:14.240] Langley to um Malmstrom May not
[01:04:18.079] Vandenberg um nuclear witnesses have
[01:04:21.359] come forward and and when those guys
[01:04:24.400] come forward and I know some of them
[01:04:26.559] have testified to Arrow because they've
[01:04:28.720] been open about it. Uh we don't have to
[01:04:30.640] go into any names. We don't have to go
[01:04:32.400] into any specifics, but these guys I
[01:04:35.200] find to be at least of the most
[01:04:38.319] concerning credible people. Um, so when
[01:04:42.240] looking at that, um, how did how did the
[01:04:47.440] Wall Street Journal come to that
[01:04:49.039] conclusion? And people think that Dr.
[01:04:51.520] Kurpatre was was giving information to
[01:04:54.319] them about that. Um, so I just want to
[01:04:56.480] kind of clear that up because there's
[01:04:58.559] very conflicting reports on this.
[01:05:01.920] No, that was the fiery orbs was probably
[01:05:05.359] one of the most intriguing, most
[01:05:07.920] concerning cases we had because there
[01:05:10.160] seemed to be consistency
[01:05:12.400] in the visual, you know, descriptions
[01:05:17.520] um
[01:05:19.039] from various very credible um security
[01:05:24.160] personnel at these nuclear a lot of them
[01:05:27.280] were nuclear weapon sites um not only
[01:05:30.000] here but overseas as as well and their
[01:05:33.440] descriptions of what they observed was
[01:05:35.599] very consistent.
[01:05:37.520] So, I can see how the Wall Street
[01:05:40.720] Journal um would have a story on it
[01:05:43.119] because they probably interviewed some
[01:05:44.640] of the same witnesses as we did. And we
[01:05:47.760] have actually partnered um with, you
[01:05:51.280] know, organizations in the Department of
[01:05:53.200] Defense and Department of Energy to help
[01:05:56.079] improve the technology to be able to
[01:05:59.039] detect and you know, actually track
[01:06:02.559] these objects. Um, in one case at a very
[01:06:06.160] very sensitive location, the there was a
[01:06:09.680] ground security force that actually
[01:06:12.640] followed one of these fiery orbs for,
[01:06:16.000] you know, I would say 15 miles and the
[01:06:20.000] orbs was hovering was moving slowly uh
[01:06:23.920] small car-sized object um in the air
[01:06:28.240] hovering above a road and when a truck
[01:06:33.359] depart parted main side was coming out
[01:06:35.599] on that range road. The system actually
[01:06:40.079] got off the road and hovered and turned
[01:06:44.160] off its nav lights. There were red
[01:06:46.079] lights on the back of it that the
[01:06:48.160] security personnel could see.
[01:06:51.039] Um not sure what it is, but the fact
[01:06:53.440] that it was following roads, it
[01:06:56.880] attempted to evade detection.
[01:07:01.039] Okay. And then after the threat, after
[01:07:03.839] the truck had passed, it got back on its
[01:07:06.720] merry way and headed back toward uh the
[01:07:09.680] main test area at this location. Um to
[01:07:12.799] me, it tells me that there was uh a
[01:07:15.280] human in the loop. Um the concern was
[01:07:18.720] the distance from public access into
[01:07:22.240] this range. So how was it being
[01:07:24.480] controlled and what was the nature of
[01:07:28.720] that uh you know that auror or that that
[01:07:33.440] discharge around the object.
[01:07:36.640] So you guys are saying that you don't
[01:07:38.400] know arrow
[01:07:39.359] >> doesn't we don't know and we found that
[01:07:42.240] to be very very alarming and the people
[01:07:45.440] who observed it and tracked it and then
[01:07:48.079] in one case there were two uh
[01:07:50.960] departments that had detected it
[01:07:53.599] >> actually went from the range one range
[01:07:57.200] onto another range and was detected by
[01:07:59.599] two organiza two independent
[01:08:01.440] organizations. So it it tells us
[01:08:03.839] something's there. Um, not sure what it
[01:08:07.039] is. I think it's a an adversary
[01:08:10.400] capability or system. Um,
[01:08:13.599] >> but there's not you're not ruling out
[01:08:16.000] say something else because you it's
[01:08:17.920] still un
[01:08:18.480] >> we don't know what it is and no it'd be
[01:08:20.400] foolish to rule anything out. We need to
[01:08:22.640] understand it. We need to be able to
[01:08:24.239] detect it, build tracks and then mediate
[01:08:26.480] it to deal with it.
[01:08:28.560] >> Okay. Have you ever have you heard this
[01:08:30.400] other narrative uh that's going around
[01:08:33.199] uh in the Washington Street Washington
[01:08:36.159] Street Jesus
[01:08:38.400] Wall Street Journal um tried to say that
[01:08:41.679] there is a hazing ritual that has been
[01:08:44.319] going on in special access programs. Um
[01:08:48.319] you know hazing recruits uh to these
[01:08:51.359] special access programs telling them
[01:08:52.960] there are UFOs. Um, but then you know in
[01:08:56.159] in my at least in my experience with
[01:08:58.000] hazing um usually the hazer becomes the
[01:09:02.159] hazy becomes the hazer and they get let
[01:09:04.239] in on the joke. Um, have you heard these
[01:09:07.120] claims and and um did you guys hear
[01:09:10.560] anything similar?
[01:09:11.759] >> We we actually came across the program.
[01:09:14.799] Um, we investigated it. Um, we passed it
[01:09:17.920] back to the DoDig and a service IG to
[01:09:22.080] actually investigate it. And we actually
[01:09:25.359] thought that that could be the origins
[01:09:29.839] of a lot of these UFO stories where we
[01:09:34.400] had the time it was an Air Force special
[01:09:37.520] access management office, the SAPCO
[01:09:39.600] office that had come up with a uh a
[01:09:44.480] false SAP. Originally, they were going
[01:09:47.920] to use it for training purposes. So,
[01:09:51.120] they didn't want to use a real a real
[01:09:53.520] SAP. So, they came up with a fake SAP
[01:09:56.800] program. I actually saw it. It was
[01:09:59.440] beautiful, beautiful graphics. Um, it
[01:10:02.400] didn't say anything about a UFO or UAP
[01:10:04.800] in it, but you had the image was a
[01:10:07.920] classic 1950 flying saucer hovering in a
[01:10:12.719] lab being surrounded by technicians in
[01:10:15.679] white lab, you know, coats. and it was a
[01:10:18.640] anti-gravity motor or device. Uh, and
[01:10:22.480] that was the SAP. Um, it was used um, it
[01:10:28.239] was created as a training program. It
[01:10:31.360] went wild. Um it was probably in
[01:10:35.840] existence for over 20 25 years where you
[01:10:40.560] know personnel assigned to the base
[01:10:44.560] special access program management office
[01:10:47.600] were read into or aware of this program
[01:10:50.480] without knowing that it it wasn't a real
[01:10:54.000] program. So you probably had, you know,
[01:10:59.520] thousands, possibly tens of thousands of
[01:11:02.400] military personnel who were exposed to a
[01:11:06.640] a false sap dealing with this
[01:11:11.679] anti-gravity motor
[01:11:14.640] um that came from, you know,
[01:11:18.560] another world, you know,
[01:11:19.920] extraterrestrial exploitation
[01:11:23.280] that we possess.
[01:11:25.280] And there some people thought that that
[01:11:28.400] could be the basis for all these
[01:11:32.400] allegations that the US government have
[01:11:35.199] had these unacnowledged saps and caps
[01:11:38.320] dealing with recovery and exploitation
[01:11:42.480] of alien technologies or nonhuman
[01:11:44.880] technologies.
[01:11:46.800] So
[01:11:47.280] >> I mean but
[01:11:49.600] >> that we actually found that the program
[01:11:53.120] had morphed a bit had got out um to a
[01:11:56.800] different combatant command. It got off
[01:11:58.800] into a different service.
[01:12:01.520] Um so
[01:12:02.719] >> you don't think that's we were aware of
[01:12:05.679] a false sat program that um was in
[01:12:10.880] existence for 20 years. We never really
[01:12:14.239] We knew it got back into the 1980s.
[01:12:17.199] >> You don't find that a that's ridiculous
[01:12:19.760] to try to say that that would explain
[01:12:22.000] every UFO sighting, but b um that would
[01:12:26.080] also mean that anyone who was hazed um
[01:12:29.600] wouldn't they have a pretty good um
[01:12:32.320] wouldn't they have a pretty good lawsuit
[01:12:33.840] against the the the the program?
[01:12:36.800] >> It was it was a joke and then they
[01:12:38.640] signed an NDA. So the these are service
[01:12:41.840] members that were managing a SAP office
[01:12:45.520] re and they would have in their
[01:12:47.440] portfolio they could have hundreds of
[01:12:50.080] different SAPs that were in existence
[01:12:53.199] that were operational at that base
[01:12:55.280] facility and they would just read people
[01:12:57.679] in and read people out. Um they didn't
[01:13:00.719] actually participate in those programs.
[01:13:03.199] they were just administering the
[01:13:05.520] clearances then and then writing people
[01:13:07.440] off after they, you know, had no longer
[01:13:09.840] had a need to have access to that
[01:13:12.080] program.
[01:13:13.360] I guess we'll we'll have to probably
[01:13:15.840] agree to disagree on this because I find
[01:13:18.560] that to be I I find that to be really
[01:13:23.440] unethical to not let because what if
[01:13:26.159] what if you got what if you got told
[01:13:28.400] that there was UFOs and you see these
[01:13:30.239] amazing graphics and um then you live
[01:13:33.199] your life and no one no one tells you
[01:13:35.360] like isn't the best part of the joke
[01:13:36.880] when they find out it's a joke and now
[01:13:38.800] we have a hundred thousand of these guys
[01:13:40.480] running around thinking there's aliens
[01:13:42.640] out there and at any day the world
[01:13:45.120] would, you know, erupt into an
[01:13:47.040] intergalactic Star Wars. That would
[01:13:49.360] cause some psychological issues, don't
[01:13:51.520] you think?
[01:13:52.400] >> Well, that that was the concern of some
[01:13:54.480] cabinet officials. They were how
[01:13:56.400] extensive, you know, was this hazing?
[01:13:59.840] How many people were exposed to it? Um,
[01:14:03.280] and it could be could that be the basis
[01:14:05.679] for these claims that your reaction
[01:14:09.920] to discovering that this program existed
[01:14:12.480] was the same as some, you know, Senate
[01:14:15.920] confirmed cabinet officials when they
[01:14:17.920] were briefed on the programs. They were
[01:14:20.080] actually concerned and angry about it.
[01:14:24.159] No, we we we had another we actually had
[01:14:27.120] another we I never could get the photos,
[01:14:30.400] but we had allegations that
[01:14:33.840] there at one of the test sites they
[01:14:35.840] actually had a room they had a gurnie
[01:14:37.520] and they had like a big rubber arm like
[01:14:40.640] a you know a reptilian hand sticking out
[01:14:44.159] from underneath the the white sheet on a
[01:14:47.040] gurnie and there was a group of uh
[01:14:50.000] military personnel going by and they
[01:14:53.280] happened just glance in and see this and
[01:14:55.920] then the staff rapidly went up and shut
[01:14:58.480] the door and cover, you know, pulled the
[01:15:00.560] sheet back over the arm. And we heard in
[01:15:04.640] one incident there was a young officer
[01:15:08.000] that was so shooken up, [snorts] so in
[01:15:13.679] set of experience that she resigned from
[01:15:16.960] the program.
[01:15:18.960] >> That was a claim. We also had a claim of
[01:15:22.320] a retired Air Force flag officer that
[01:15:25.199] worked at one of the national test sites
[01:15:27.360] where he was asked to deliver um
[01:15:31.360] doctorred photographs at the Nevada test
[01:15:34.080] site, what a lot of the public refers to
[01:15:36.320] as Area 51s of traditional UFOs flying
[01:15:41.440] over the test site. And those photos,
[01:15:44.880] those images were delivered um to a bar
[01:15:49.280] to the east of the base there where a
[01:15:53.040] lot of the UFO observers and you know
[01:15:56.320] the people interested in this topic
[01:15:58.560] would go out to eat and plan and and you
[01:16:01.520] know discuss their experiences as they
[01:16:03.840] observed uh the Nevada test site out
[01:16:06.560] there. So, we've we've got um you know,
[01:16:10.159] witnesses that claim programs like that
[01:16:13.440] occurred. We know that the Soviet Union
[01:16:16.400] during the Cold War actually came up
[01:16:19.440] with UFO stories to try to undermine
[01:16:24.159] Americans confidence in their
[01:16:26.159] government's ability to protect them and
[01:16:29.120] tell them the truth about aliens.
[01:16:30.960] There's been a lot of disinformation
[01:16:34.719] when it came to UAP UFO and that's why I
[01:16:39.440] thought it was so brilliant to actually
[01:16:42.640] establish a narrow office for the first
[01:16:45.679] time. And you had an organization with
[01:16:48.000] the horsepower working for the right
[01:16:50.159] people with the budget and the you know
[01:16:54.159] the authority to work across the US
[01:16:56.640] government to you know to investigate
[01:16:59.199] these claims and try to understand
[01:17:01.679] what's going on. And I know there's a
[01:17:04.400] lot of frustration with the public that,
[01:17:06.560] you know, we didn't show them the alien
[01:17:08.960] bodies or the, you know, UFO crash sites
[01:17:11.679] despite people who have sworn under oath
[01:17:14.080] in Congress that, you know, they have
[01:17:16.480] observed, you know,
[01:17:19.520] um, you know, alien spaceships or
[01:17:22.320] non-earth, you know, non-human
[01:17:24.080] spaceships and they found nonhuman
[01:17:27.040] remains
[01:17:28.719] >> and you guys are saying
[01:17:30.159] >> we looked for that. We investigated uh
[01:17:33.600] virtually every credible claim we had.
[01:17:36.560] Um I know that our investigators
[01:17:40.480] um hosted congressional delegations
[01:17:43.199] wanting to go out to Dayton, you know,
[01:17:46.800] going to write Patterson to um
[01:17:49.840] personally investigate the claims that
[01:17:52.800] there was some type of UFO power source
[01:17:56.560] um that was hidden underground at the
[01:17:58.719] base there. Um, we know that we've
[01:18:02.159] hosted um investigators that wanted to
[01:18:05.679] go out to other ranges um to be able to
[01:18:08.880] investigate claims that were made under
[01:18:10.880] oath to Congress. And we were part of
[01:18:13.280] that. And we had um authority to go
[01:18:17.840] anywhere to look. And I will tell you
[01:18:20.560] during my tenure there, we never had
[01:18:23.600] anybody attempt to block access to
[01:18:26.560] information or locations or materials.
[01:18:30.080] Why, you know, I worked at Arrow. That
[01:18:32.400] never happened.
[01:18:34.159] >> So, you're saying that no one and is it
[01:18:37.600] conceivable? Is it is it at leastable?
[01:18:43.440] >> A lot of people think you were fired
[01:18:45.040] from Arrow. Um, that doesn't seem to be
[01:18:47.920] the actual case. You
[01:18:49.520] >> I wasn't fired from Arrow,
[01:18:51.600] >> right? And I wanted to clarif
[01:18:54.239] I I I know. I I I know. But people
[01:18:57.440] online said that you were fired. They
[01:18:59.920] put these graphics up, but you were also
[01:19:02.560] given one of the highest um um service
[01:19:06.880] honors and a like a huge like nice um
[01:19:11.679] commenation. And it seems like it was
[01:19:15.040] just your time for retirement and you
[01:19:18.239] and the DoD, for lack of a better term,
[01:19:20.800] split up. Now, um, can you clear that up
[01:19:24.000] because people think people like to say
[01:19:25.760] that you got fired? I want to make sure.
[01:19:27.840] >> No, not at all.
[01:19:30.800] Errol worked with the under secretary
[01:19:33.360] for intelligence security and as a
[01:19:36.640] senior executive um I we actually um had
[01:19:41.440] to come up with a criteria on how we
[01:19:45.280] would rack and stack how we would
[01:19:47.360] prioritize a new intelligence officer
[01:19:50.560] assigned to the department of defense.
[01:19:53.679] So we came up with a criteria on how if
[01:19:58.080] we had to um execute a reduction in
[01:20:02.320] force um who we would fire first. So, I
[01:20:06.560] was part of the working group that came
[01:20:09.040] up with the um it was almost a matrix um
[01:20:14.880] on how we would rack and stack, how
[01:20:16.880] would we how we would um fire our
[01:20:21.040] officers who were still on probation.
[01:20:23.440] So, we would spend a lot of time
[01:20:25.679] assessing, recruiting, training. They
[01:20:28.239] had a two-year probationary period. And
[01:20:30.880] I just thought that by doing that, by,
[01:20:34.400] you know, firing these junior officers
[01:20:37.199] that never really had an opportunity to
[01:20:39.040] work in the community, that we were
[01:20:41.760] consuming our feed stock. I I had 45
[01:20:45.760] years as military and as a civil servant
[01:20:49.679] and I had already um told the DNI that I
[01:20:54.800] was going to retire um when my tour was
[01:20:57.679] up and my tour era was going to be up in
[01:20:59.679] October of this year. So when they came
[01:21:02.400] out with the deferred resination
[01:21:04.320] program, we did not know what the number
[01:21:08.159] was if you were looking for an 8% or 10%
[01:21:12.000] um reduction in force. So I thought I
[01:21:16.159] had a full career and I was willing to
[01:21:19.360] give up my seat so a new officer that we
[01:21:23.440] had recruited and brought into the
[01:21:25.040] intelligence community could serve.
[01:21:28.239] So
[01:21:29.920] >> that's what I did. Um, and I had talked
[01:21:33.120] to John and because I didn't want to
[01:21:34.880] leave him high and dry, but we had
[01:21:37.360] actually gone out and solicited um, we
[01:21:40.480] put out an advertisement and we were
[01:21:42.480] actually interviewing people as the due
[01:21:45.280] deputy. I was actually recruiting my
[01:21:48.000] replacement the same way I recruited,
[01:21:50.640] you know, John to bring him in as the
[01:21:52.560] director. We were actually, you know,
[01:21:54.400] trying to ensure we had continuity and
[01:21:56.400] that was the plan. But the uh delays
[01:22:00.719] that we had in getting the new
[01:22:02.719] administration's
[01:22:04.400] uh political officers confirmed through
[01:22:07.120] the Senate slowed things down to get,
[01:22:09.760] you know, have people come in and
[01:22:11.600] approve um and make the appointments as
[01:22:14.320] a deputy. And I understand the officer
[01:22:16.960] that we had recruited replaced me got
[01:22:19.360] frustrated and he took the DRP and he
[01:22:22.400] resigned. So um I was actually I took
[01:22:25.600] the resignation program um and left
[01:22:29.120] Arrow in April,
[01:22:31.760] >> right?
[01:22:32.320] >> So I had already left Arrow and then
[01:22:34.960] later on in July
[01:22:37.360] um one of the programs that we have when
[01:22:40.480] you're on the DRP all the rules um that
[01:22:43.679] you have to follow as a uh title 50
[01:22:47.280] intel officer, you got to report foreign
[01:22:49.920] contacts. We've got to report our
[01:22:52.239] financial activities and trades over a
[01:22:55.600] certain amount of money. You have to
[01:22:57.280] report um
[01:23:00.320] if you have uh you're publishing, you
[01:23:03.679] have to go through a a publish review
[01:23:06.239] process to make sure that you're not
[01:23:08.719] revealing any sensitive or classified
[01:23:10.800] information. And if you have contacts
[01:23:13.199] with the media, you have to go up and
[01:23:15.520] you've got to ask permission to do so.
[01:23:18.159] But to do those outsiz activities, you
[01:23:22.320] have to be in the system to get on and
[01:23:24.639] into the database and say, "Hey, I've
[01:23:27.920] got this reporter that wants to talk to
[01:23:29.840] me about this subject to get permission
[01:23:32.000] to do so." You're outside of the system
[01:23:34.639] to do that. Um, that was one of the
[01:23:37.040] limitations about this DRP. It's a very,
[01:23:39.679] very weird thing because you're read out
[01:23:42.159] of the programs. you're basically on
[01:23:44.880] terminal leave until 30 September when
[01:23:48.080] you were, you know, you would you'd be
[01:23:50.000] over and then you would retire on one
[01:23:51.679] October is kind of the plan. So I had
[01:23:55.600] made some interviews and I thought I had
[01:23:58.000] followed the procedure. There was only
[01:23:59.920] one time where I was told not to proceed
[01:24:04.560] in the interview with somebody, but I
[01:24:07.199] said something that irritated somebody
[01:24:08.960] at the DNI and then I got called into
[01:24:12.080] the DNI. I had the counter intelligence
[01:24:14.480] and the HR people pulled me in while I'm
[01:24:17.199] on leave. I'd already checked out
[01:24:19.840] >> and I got a a very nice word worded
[01:24:22.880] letter from the director of national
[01:24:24.400] intelligence telling me that it was no
[01:24:27.040] longer in the interest of the government
[01:24:29.199] um for me to be employed with the office
[01:24:31.600] of the director of national intelligence
[01:24:33.920] and I was terminated and then I was put
[01:24:36.560] on the retired roles. So
[01:24:38.800] >> So it's safe to say it was like an
[01:24:40.880] amicable
[01:24:43.280] split up. Uh they they just decided that
[01:24:47.840] uh they no longer required my services
[01:24:50.400] as a senior national intelligence
[01:24:52.320] service officer and they retired me.
[01:24:54.800] Yes.
[01:24:55.360] >> Yeah. Yeah. So so pretty amicable
[01:24:57.360] because then you go on and you're also
[01:24:59.120] given uh uh what was the uh uh the medal
[01:25:04.719] you were given the the
[01:25:06.080] >> Well, I actually got two this year. I
[01:25:08.480] got one uh it was kind of like a
[01:25:12.159] civilian
[01:25:14.480] achievement or meritorious service
[01:25:16.639] medal. I [clears throat] know Hillary uh
[01:25:19.120] Clinton got one, I got one, and then I
[01:25:21.840] got the uh Secretary of Defense
[01:25:29.360] exceptional service medal. I think I got
[01:25:31.600] two of them. One was civilian service
[01:25:34.000] and one was as a uh DoD. I got the
[01:25:37.120] highest ranking award they could give
[01:25:38.639] me.
[01:25:39.600] >> Wow.
[01:25:40.000] >> So, yeah, I got that. So, yeah,
[01:25:43.119] [laughter] I the but it was the the
[01:25:45.360] Department of the Department of Defense
[01:25:48.000] that terminated me because I I didn't
[01:25:50.400] work for the Department of Defense. I
[01:25:52.080] was on a joint duty assignment to the
[01:25:54.960] Department of Defense. I was uh an ODNI
[01:25:59.679] employee at the time when the director
[01:26:02.639] of national intelligence gave me the
[01:26:04.320] letter saying that my continued service
[01:26:07.760] um was no longer required.
[01:26:10.880] >> So um if you could change we have two
[01:26:14.480] more questions and we'll wrap up on this
[01:26:16.239] on this part one we'll call it. Um,
[01:26:18.719] sure.
[01:26:19.520] >> If you could change one thing about how
[01:26:21.760] the Pentagon uh handles this topic
[01:26:24.800] specifically, what would that be?
[01:26:29.199] I think the way uh John the last time we
[01:26:32.400] were up on the hill and I believe that
[01:26:34.400] was around March um we came out of the
[01:26:37.120] skiff and then and what we what John is
[01:26:39.199] the the director decided to do is just
[01:26:42.239] go public and actually admit that there
[01:26:45.920] were actual UAP cases that we didn't
[01:26:49.280] understand. Um, another thing I I think
[01:26:52.239] I would have done much earlier is
[01:26:54.880] solicit um uh c or or attempt to come up
[01:26:59.520] with a crowdsourcing
[01:27:02.000] uh reporting of UAP and uh incidents.
[01:27:05.840] The states have state fusion centers um
[01:27:09.199] to kind of control um state level
[01:27:11.760] response to incidents.
[01:27:14.159] Um,
[01:27:16.560] we thought state, local, tribal, um,
[01:27:19.600] they're normally the first responders.
[01:27:21.679] If they hear or see something, you know,
[01:27:24.320] how can we how can we operationalize
[01:27:26.960] that and get that reporting back to
[01:27:29.360] Arrow as fast as possible so Arrow could
[01:27:32.560] respond? We had people on standby that
[01:27:35.920] could uh deploy the same day to try to
[01:27:39.840] understand an incident to gather
[01:27:42.560] evidence and maybe capture the phenomena
[01:27:45.360] in near real time. I would have
[01:27:48.000] solicited um the support of the American
[01:27:51.120] public sooner. We've been working on a
[01:27:54.480] public reporting mechanism and with the
[01:27:57.120] change of the trans of uh administration
[01:28:00.639] and the transitions. We had to have some
[01:28:03.280] of forms approved by GSA.
[01:28:07.120] Um you know it's part of how they would
[01:28:10.000] report to the government. I would have
[01:28:12.159] loved to have that in place and using
[01:28:15.679] some of the large data um some of the
[01:28:19.600] machine learning the algorithms we
[01:28:21.679] developed to try to um
[01:28:26.159] speed [clears throat] the detection the
[01:28:28.320] building of tracks and the operational
[01:28:31.360] response to UAP incidents. Um and we
[01:28:34.560] were working very very hard um to get
[01:28:37.520] that capability in place in partnership
[01:28:41.040] with an all of government rep you know
[01:28:43.440] um response we found that department of
[01:28:47.040] homeland security especially CBP
[01:28:50.400] um along our country's borders they have
[01:28:53.040] an amazing network of sensors where they
[01:28:56.880] were willing to share us share the feeds
[01:29:00.639] um as we looked at this administr
[01:29:03.520] ation's um desire to enhance air defense
[01:29:08.400] in the continental United States. You
[01:29:10.159] know about the Golden Dome Initiative.
[01:29:13.040] Well, there's data there. Okay. If I
[01:29:16.000] know they're looking at threats, they're
[01:29:17.520] looking at cruise missiles. They're
[01:29:18.960] looking at ballistic missiles, UAS's,
[01:29:21.360] but if we invest in that sensor
[01:29:24.000] technology, we're going to pick up
[01:29:25.600] things that may not be threats, but it's
[01:29:29.679] information. and it's anomalies that
[01:29:31.440] Arrow needs to investigate so we can
[01:29:33.360] have an understanding. Um there was a
[01:29:36.159] little bit of frustration because we we
[01:29:39.040] had a bias in our collection because we
[01:29:41.920] tended to put sensors out and defenses
[01:29:44.960] around things that we wanted to protect.
[01:29:48.159] But
[01:29:48.480] >> did that include nuclear sites?
[01:29:50.880] >> Absolutely included nuclear sites. But
[01:29:53.760] how how do you know if if we have a
[01:29:56.639] higher um number of incidents around
[01:29:59.520] nuclear sites when you don't know what's
[01:30:01.360] going on over the corn fields in
[01:30:03.199] Nebraska? So one of the things that we
[01:30:06.159] were actually researching was investing
[01:30:09.120] in a series of unattended sensors. We
[01:30:13.920] were thinking of working with Department
[01:30:15.520] of Interior and the Bureau of Land
[01:30:17.600] Management where they have a series of
[01:30:19.679] towers. Um, they're primarily looking
[01:30:22.080] for fire detection and disasters at the
[01:30:24.960] national parks. But if we could put out
[01:30:27.920] sensors staring up at the stars, you
[01:30:30.880] have themworked. You know, maybe we can
[01:30:33.920] detect anomalies before the public sees
[01:30:36.159] them and start having a more
[01:30:38.080] comprehensive understanding of what's
[01:30:40.960] going on because we don't. And I talk a
[01:30:44.320] lot about what's going on in the air
[01:30:46.000] domain because that's where we had a lot
[01:30:48.159] of sensor capability and understanding
[01:30:51.280] on and tools to be able to exploit
[01:30:54.400] what's going on in the EO and IR.
[01:30:57.920] >> Um,
[01:31:01.199] >> oh, but we were working in space. We
[01:31:03.440] actually had a definition of what a UAP
[01:31:06.400] incident was in space and we were
[01:31:08.639] actually wargaming with Spacecom.
[01:31:11.920] um and the space force, you know, trying
[01:31:14.800] to say how do we get UAP incidents that
[01:31:18.159] they detect in space and at mission
[01:31:20.960] speed past those tracks to Arrow so
[01:31:24.960] Arrow can apply some machine learning,
[01:31:27.040] some AI, so maybe we can detect things
[01:31:29.840] as they approach our solar system, our
[01:31:32.080] planet, and maybe re-entry into the
[01:31:34.560] atmosphere. um you know, we wanted to
[01:31:36.800] kind of tie it together and do it at
[01:31:40.400] operationally um you know, speeds. It
[01:31:44.400] was frustrating to be reactive
[01:31:47.199] >> or to go back and have to investigate a
[01:31:49.679] UAP case from 20 years ago when there's
[01:31:52.400] no data.
[01:31:54.159] >> Another domain where
[01:31:56.320] >> frankly we we we didn't have a lot of
[01:31:58.800] sess. We were just starting was in the
[01:32:00.880] maritime environment. So there was there
[01:32:03.679] were incidents at in the maritime
[01:32:06.320] environment, but the community is even
[01:32:09.120] more compartmentalized than they are in
[01:32:11.280] space. And their primary concern was the
[01:32:15.040] sound of metal moving through water.
[01:32:18.000] That's what they were focused on. And if
[01:32:20.960] it it didn't really correspond, it
[01:32:24.080] wasn't part of that threat, they didn't
[01:32:25.679] care. Well, we care. and we partnered a
[01:32:30.880] couple of times with the maritime
[01:32:33.199] committee and and helped them. We
[01:32:35.679] actually had worked with some cases with
[01:32:37.360] them, but we we really didn't have a
[01:32:40.800] good foothold there. We were most our
[01:32:42.719] success tended to be in the air domain.
[01:32:45.600] We were starting to build some
[01:32:47.280] partnerships in space, but we were the
[01:32:50.560] all domain anomaly resolution office and
[01:32:52.960] we were still addressing the maritime
[01:32:56.239] domain. and when I separated and I I
[01:32:58.560] went into retirement. But there's a lot
[01:33:00.159] of work to be done. Another thing that
[01:33:02.639] we thought was fascinating, had a lot of
[01:33:04.800] potential. I talked a little about
[01:33:06.800] crowdsourcing. NASA
[01:33:09.920] used to have these public like
[01:33:12.320] competitions where they would have a a
[01:33:14.480] problem. They would have non-classified
[01:33:16.960] nonsensitive data and kind of give a
[01:33:19.280] science problem to the public and ask
[01:33:21.199] them, hey, you know, what can you do to
[01:33:24.480] help us solve this? We would like to do
[01:33:27.120] that with UAP cases and I know the
[01:33:30.560] current, you know, John was actually
[01:33:32.480] working on how do we do that and a lot
[01:33:34.719] of things got slowed down uh due to the
[01:33:37.679] transition and the change in government
[01:33:39.199] and the fact that we no longer had the,
[01:33:42.320] you know, the politicals to report to
[01:33:44.320] and get permission to execute from. Hey,
[01:33:46.800] I'm actually on low battery right now.
[01:33:49.520] We've been talking for about 90 minutes
[01:33:52.239] >> and I'm gonna have to get off or I'm
[01:33:54.000] going to lose the the signal. But I
[01:33:56.560] would love to do this again, but I'll
[01:33:59.360] make sure that I'm on a computer next
[01:34:01.040] time or we're face to face to do this.
[01:34:03.360] >> Yeah. Well, real quickly, I just want to
[01:34:05.280] say thank you uh for being a a patriot.
[01:34:08.159] I know we have differing views. Um and I
[01:34:10.960] know that there's much more to be to be
[01:34:13.199] spoken about. Um, you know, I I know
[01:34:16.000] what I've seen and uh maybe, you know,
[01:34:18.960] we can help um educate the community on,
[01:34:23.040] you know, what what UAPs really are and
[01:34:26.159] how how to investigate them. And I
[01:34:28.960] really hope that um some people get
[01:34:31.360] something out of this and and learn who
[01:34:33.520] you really are because you're you're you
[01:34:35.360] are a hard skeptic, but I don't think
[01:34:36.960] you're opposed to the actual evidence
[01:34:39.440] being shown. And if it shows that there
[01:34:42.159] is something non-human, I think you'd
[01:34:44.080] be, is it fair to say you'd be at least
[01:34:46.800] open to it?
[01:34:48.000] >> Oh, absolutely. Let the evidence speak
[01:34:49.920] for itself. You know, we like diversity
[01:34:52.400] of thought. We don't want group think,
[01:34:54.719] but show us the evidence. If you make a
[01:34:56.719] you make an amazing claim, you should
[01:34:58.800] have the evidence to back it up. So
[01:35:01.760] don't come to me when you've got a claim
[01:35:03.840] and say I can't tell you because it's
[01:35:05.760] classified or you get sick when we we
[01:35:09.040] invite you into a skiff or we fly 1500
[01:35:12.480] miles to interview and now you get
[01:35:14.639] squirly on us. Look
[01:35:17.360] >> if you you believe in something share
[01:35:19.520] with us. You know, we're I hope we all
[01:35:23.520] are in a search for the truth and we
[01:35:26.320] shouldn't let the truth, you know,
[01:35:28.560] intimidate us, intimidate us or scare
[01:35:30.880] us. We want to know the truth. I look at
[01:35:33.520] it as a, you know, as a a retired
[01:35:36.239] marine, as an intel officer. I'm
[01:35:38.320] concerned about the national, you know,
[01:35:40.320] security
[01:35:41.840] issue here. I something we don't
[01:35:44.080] understand that's operating, you know,
[01:35:47.199] in close proximity to sensitive
[01:35:49.360] locations or operational forces. I want
[01:35:52.000] to know what the hell it is
[01:35:54.080] >> because we don't and we need to
[01:35:55.679] >> because we don't and it's a concern and
[01:35:58.960] maybe next time we get together we'll
[01:36:00.719] we'll start on that. But I'm going to
[01:36:02.560] lose you on the power. All right.
[01:36:04.239] >> Hey, it's been great. I I hope you got
[01:36:06.159] enough to, you know, edit this and put
[01:36:08.800] put something together.
[01:36:10.320] >> Oh, don't worry. I definitely did, Tim.
[01:36:12.400] Um, so we will uh we we'll we'll talk
[01:36:15.520] soon and um again, you're you're a
[01:36:17.360] patriot and again, you know, I think uh
[01:36:20.400] we need not surround ourselves in echo
[01:36:22.560] chambers and um we need to talk to
[01:36:25.120] people that you know are skeptical and
[01:36:27.520] have opposing views to to my own and
[01:36:29.920] you've been in the official capacity.
[01:36:31.760] So, thank you for your service, Tim. Um
[01:36:34.239] and thank you everyone for being here.
[01:36:36.000] Tim, you can get out of here. Uh I know
[01:36:38.000] your battery is going to die. Um that
[01:36:40.400] was uh Tim Phillips, everybody. Um
[01:36:44.320] former acting director of Arrow um and
[01:36:49.920] now retired uh looking for his next uh
[01:36:53.920] adventure. So uh with that being said,
[01:36:56.719] make sure to like, share, subscribe, and
[01:36:59.280] if you want to be able to watch early
[01:37:01.119] access to these episodes, please become
[01:37:03.920] a member um and help support the show.
[01:37:06.560] it is not free to run this kind of
[01:37:08.560] program. Um, and it is not easy. So,
[01:37:12.719] with uh with all that, I love you guys
[01:37:15.119] and uh I'll see you on the other side.
[01:37:22.012] [music]
[01:37:27.907] [music]
[01:37:37.077] >> [music]
[01:37:46.247] [music]
[01:37:51.487] [music]
[01:37:51.600] >> Heat. Heat.
[01:38:00.002] >> [music]
[01:38:06.552] [music]