Tim Phillips on Mick West (June 2025)

Source: YouTube, Mick West, "Tim Phillips - Former Deputy Director of AARO." Published: 2025-06-17. Duration: 1:42:44. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wztninfsqu0. Extraction: YouTube English auto-captions via youtube_transcript.py --timestamps. Captured: 2026-08-27. Machine transcription may contain minor errors. This is the earliest located public account by Phillips of the claimant later identified as Whistling Mike. Analysis: ../../sources/whistling-mike-contractor-claimant.

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[00:00:00.400] Welcome to Tales from the Rabbit Hole.
[00:00:02.000] I'm your host, Mick West. My guest today
[00:00:04.240] is Tim Phillips. Tim is the former
[00:00:06.560] deputy director of Arrow, the Pentagon's
[00:00:08.400] all domain anomaly resolution office,
[00:00:10.880] the Pentagon's UFO Investigation Office.
[00:00:15.120] Uh we're going to talk about a variety
[00:00:16.640] of uh UFO/UAPP
[00:00:18.800] related topics and we're going to touch
[00:00:20.560] on the Wall Street Journal's recent
[00:00:23.039] article which uh made some interesting
[00:00:25.119] claims about how uh EMP tests were
[00:00:28.480] responsible for some UFO sightings and
[00:00:31.359] how a program called Yankee Blue is also
[00:00:34.880] responsible for a lot of people
[00:00:36.079] believing that the government has uh UFO
[00:00:38.960] technology. This is a fairly technical
[00:00:42.320] uh uh podcast. I'm just going to quickly
[00:00:44.559] go over a few abbreviations that get
[00:00:46.480] used. Uh the first one is ISR. An ISR
[00:00:50.160] system is an intelligence surveillance
[00:00:52.160] and reconnaissance system. Just
[00:00:53.840] something like a surveillance drone,
[00:00:55.360] something that flies around uh
[00:00:57.039] surveilling or looking for things. Then
[00:00:59.440] we have uh Wasp W, which is a wide area
[00:01:03.199] surveillance payload, which essentially
[00:01:05.280] is just the camera on a surveillance
[00:01:07.360] drone or a camera system and other
[00:01:09.760] sensors on a surveillance drone. It's
[00:01:11.600] also the name for some specific types of
[00:01:14.240] ISR system uh including one that was
[00:01:16.960] developed by DARPA which was uh a small
[00:01:20.799] uh kind of uh tube launched uh system
[00:01:24.159] which uh might have been responsible for
[00:01:26.479] some UFO sightings in the past. Then we
[00:01:29.280] have the uh SAP. SAP is a special access
[00:01:32.560] program. This is a top secret program
[00:01:34.159] that requires specific access on a kind
[00:01:36.479] of a need to know basics. It's uh it's
[00:01:38.560] kind of like almost above top secret and
[00:01:40.720] it's limited to a certain number of
[00:01:42.240] people who need to know and that's
[00:01:45.200] managed by what's called a SAP co. Uh
[00:01:48.000] SAPCO is a special access program
[00:01:49.840] central office which is the office
[00:01:51.600] within a department and there's also one
[00:01:53.920] at a higher level at the DoD level and
[00:01:56.240] at various intermediate levels. This is
[00:01:58.000] the office that kind of manages the um
[00:02:01.439] special access programs and uh these are
[00:02:03.840] just things that come up in conversation
[00:02:05.280] and I wanted to make sure everyone was
[00:02:07.119] on the same page uh when we got to that
[00:02:09.119] point. So here's Tim Phillips. Yeah,
[00:02:12.400] obviously I'm talking to you like after
[00:02:14.160] you like uh you had a conversation with
[00:02:16.959] uh uh Steven Greenreet uh from the New
[00:02:19.920] York Post uh kind of a followup to the
[00:02:23.840] Wall Street Journal article which was
[00:02:25.680] kind of like an interesting uh
[00:02:27.520] revelation. Uh and my interest here is
[00:02:30.879] you know I uh I do a lot of
[00:02:33.920] investigation on my own of uh of UFOs uh
[00:02:37.120] UAP uh and trying to resolve those and I
[00:02:40.720] develop the tools uh sitre uh which some
[00:02:44.000] people use for investigating. So I've
[00:02:46.239] got you know kind of a deep personal
[00:02:48.000] interest in in the subject uh and in
[00:02:50.879] kind of resolving these things. So, uh,
[00:02:54.160] let me start out just kind of asking you
[00:02:55.680] about like the, uh, the Wall Street
[00:02:57.519] Journal, uh, article.
[00:03:00.080] Um, what do you think about kind of the
[00:03:01.680] overall accuracy of that? Cuz it's kind
[00:03:03.120] of like got a lot of criticism, uh,
[00:03:05.280] from, I guess, the UFO community, uh,
[00:03:09.120] what's your kind of like feeling as to
[00:03:10.720] how on the nose it is. I thought it was
[00:03:14.959] uh, fairly accurate. Um, it was a long
[00:03:17.680] uh, discussion that we had, almost three
[00:03:19.440] hours. Um,
[00:03:22.560] I thought he captured uh, you know, the
[00:03:24.879] important parts of the discussion. Uh,
[00:03:27.599] there was one thing that I I don't think
[00:03:29.440] he got correct. I haven't talked to
[00:03:31.120] Steve about it, but I haven't personally
[00:03:34.239] witnessed the black triangle uh,
[00:03:36.720] incidents that we have. Um, okay. it
[00:03:39.200] came out that I had I hadn't I have seen
[00:03:42.720] um a lot of the reports
[00:03:45.440] but as far as you me you know being
[00:03:47.920] physically uh present when there was an
[00:03:50.560] incident and that never occurred. Oh
[00:03:53.280] yeah that's interesting because it did
[00:03:54.640] kind of sound like you did from the from
[00:03:56.080] the interview mode of just the way it
[00:03:57.200] was kind of uh edited. Um yeah, so
[00:04:01.040] that's you kind of I think what people
[00:04:03.599] are interested in, what I'm interested
[00:04:05.120] in is you know the actual evidence and
[00:04:07.439] the nature of the evidence and how it
[00:04:10.000] gets analyzed um with things like the
[00:04:12.720] the black triangle. Can you like
[00:04:14.799] characterize like what the actual uh
[00:04:19.280] evidence is that that kind of exists for
[00:04:23.040] you the the best the best cases where a
[00:04:26.720] black triangle is involved?
[00:04:29.199] Sure. Um we talked to some of the cases
[00:04:31.759] um as you know that Arrol does have a
[00:04:34.320] bias in its collection and analysis
[00:04:36.720] concerning the cases that we actually
[00:04:38.960] open and investigate. So, you know, one
[00:04:42.160] of AROD's mission is prevent
[00:04:43.919] technological and operational supplies.
[00:04:46.400] So, when we have something that's not
[00:04:48.320] identified or understood in close
[00:04:50.080] proximity to critical infrastructure,
[00:04:52.400] operational forces, it's going to get
[00:04:54.240] our attention. Um, at the sites that we
[00:04:56.960] wish to defend, something we want to
[00:04:58.960] secure and protect, we're going to have
[00:05:00.880] trained force protection personnel and
[00:05:02.720] sensors in place. Um now that um
[00:05:07.199] reporting the retention of uh data and
[00:05:09.919] evidence um is dictated within the
[00:05:13.360] department of defense when they have an
[00:05:15.199] incident at a sensitive site uh arrow
[00:05:17.759] will be contacted and Arrow will rapidly
[00:05:20.639] try to close on the incident and get our
[00:05:23.360] personnel to the site with some
[00:05:25.360] hyperspectral imaging equipment to try
[00:05:27.840] to capture uh whatever the incident is
[00:05:31.120] to uh debrief and interview the
[00:05:33.280] witnesses that were there and uh quickly
[00:05:36.160] identify any possible evidence or sensor
[00:05:39.360] data that could be available to help us
[00:05:42.000] analyze and understand what occurred. So
[00:05:44.800] that's what happened. So the the data
[00:05:46.720] that we get uh comes from the force
[00:05:49.199] protection personnel um at these
[00:05:51.440] installations.
[00:05:53.840] So it's uh primarily it's you know it's
[00:05:56.479] trained observers a lot of uh security
[00:05:59.039] personnel um from both the intelligence
[00:06:02.720] committee and the department of defense
[00:06:04.319] and their contractors and a lot of DoD
[00:06:07.360] ISR equipment that is installed you know
[00:06:10.400] trying to provide um you know force
[00:06:13.120] protection and security at these
[00:06:14.479] sensitive locations.
[00:06:17.199] So you say you you go there with the
[00:06:19.120] personnel uh with hyperspectral imaging
[00:06:22.240] uh like kind of after the fact uh after
[00:06:25.199] the fact and in some cases we actually
[00:06:28.000] work with them you know trying to
[00:06:30.160] provide um adequate uh surveillance
[00:06:33.759] equipment in place um and we advise
[00:06:37.440] quite often on how they can protect
[00:06:39.280] their installation and we cooperate very
[00:06:41.759] very closely with the PEO for the the
[00:06:45.199] counter UAS community and then with the
[00:06:48.080] latest change and I think it's going to
[00:06:49.759] be in the 25 uh defense authorization
[00:06:52.639] act they're actually going to um mandate
[00:06:55.759] it's going to be part of the law that
[00:06:57.360] arrow will be a mustcoordinate office
[00:06:59.759] when it comes to counter UAS right um
[00:07:02.800] operation activities and solutions so
[00:07:05.759] arrow is part of that community often um
[00:07:08.720] when we detect something that shouldn't
[00:07:11.360] be there often we resolve that as a UAS
[00:07:14.800] well if we detect that we need to pass
[00:07:16.880] that to that commander that they have an
[00:07:19.440] issue at the at their location. We're
[00:07:21.840] not the, you know, Arrow is not the UAS
[00:07:24.400] place. We're looking for UAPs. Yeah.
[00:07:26.720] Yeah. I was just talking to someone. We
[00:07:28.240] do cooperate. And what Arrow is going to
[00:07:30.319] try to do is use all available sensor
[00:07:32.800] data, national or it could be, you know,
[00:07:35.599] organic to that location to try to
[00:07:38.479] establish a track so we can understand
[00:07:40.560] and validate the behavior pre and post
[00:07:43.599] incident. So we can understand what
[00:07:46.319] happened when it happened and the the
[00:07:48.400] characteristics of that entity either it
[00:07:50.400] be in a maritime environment or the air
[00:07:52.240] environment. Yeah. I was just talking to
[00:07:54.400] someone in the counter UAS space and uh
[00:07:57.120] he was telling me there's you know
[00:07:58.400] there's quite a lot obviously of kind of
[00:08:00.400] misidentifications
[00:08:02.000] of uh of UAS themselves uh like you know
[00:08:05.680] things like like planes and things like
[00:08:07.360] that get identified. Is that something
[00:08:10.080] that you've seen kind of change uh over
[00:08:12.400] the recent years? because it seems like
[00:08:14.319] you there to a degree there's been some
[00:08:16.560] stigma associated with reporting like
[00:08:18.720] UAPs. Uh that's I think doesn't seem to
[00:08:22.479] be any stigma in reporting of UAS or
[00:08:24.879] what the public called drones and it
[00:08:26.879] seems to be episodic. So you saw a lot
[00:08:30.479] of reporting up in New England um you
[00:08:32.959] know New Jersey, New York City area and
[00:08:34.800] a lot of that was resolved as authorized
[00:08:37.120] activity of UAS is actually flying at
[00:08:40.159] night or the misidentification of
[00:08:42.719] commercial um air traffic seen by
[00:08:45.920] civilians that looked up and realized
[00:08:48.240] there was something in the sky. um one
[00:08:50.800] of my last trips to the UK um received a
[00:08:53.760] very very good brief from them as they
[00:08:56.080] analyzed uh UAS incidents that occurred
[00:08:59.680] a lot of the bases the joint US UK bases
[00:09:03.440] um and they saw something very very
[00:09:05.279] similar but we do have a proliferation
[00:09:08.000] of UAS's um that fly in our space
[00:09:11.040] sometimes lawfully sometimes not um
[00:09:14.800] Arrow actually has done some pattern
[00:09:17.279] alive surveillance operations where
[00:09:19.600] We've uh been asked to put our gremlin
[00:09:22.399] system in place at uh various DoD
[00:09:25.680] installations and do you know up to a
[00:09:28.160] yearong surveillance operation to try
[00:09:30.240] and understand what is normal and what
[00:09:31.920] is the baseline and in doing so we've
[00:09:35.040] actually detected UAS's um flying in
[00:09:38.160] restricted airspaces in violation of
[00:09:40.240] local regulations. So we have done that.
[00:09:43.760] Um we've actually uh have worked quite
[00:09:46.320] closely with the Northern Command. Um
[00:09:49.600] the centers that we have um tend to be a
[00:09:52.560] little bit higher fidelity. Most of your
[00:09:54.560] counter UAS systems tend to be point
[00:09:56.959] defense. Um we tend to be looking at
[00:10:00.080] hundreds of square miles, if not
[00:10:01.760] thousands of square miles, um trying to
[00:10:04.160] detect uh a phenomena uh that we don't
[00:10:08.399] quite understand. Um, if we pick up UAS,
[00:10:12.000] we kind of understand that and there's a
[00:10:14.240] lot of good work being done within
[00:10:16.640] Department of Defense DITRA and being
[00:10:18.880] done within the IC to be able to um
[00:10:22.320] quickly identify the the different types
[00:10:25.440] of UAS's by their physical
[00:10:27.440] characteristics or signatures um that
[00:10:30.720] they that they can record. So we take
[00:10:33.200] that um we use that hopefully um as we
[00:10:37.519] get more uh machine processing and
[00:10:40.959] application AIS and in fact algorithms
[00:10:44.160] to try to detect that and understand and
[00:10:47.440] identify at the edge at at the sensor
[00:10:50.000] edge there um and then only send back um
[00:10:53.839] you know for the the heavy processing by
[00:10:56.079] the team in DC uh the true you know UAS
[00:11:00.000] uh phenomena you know we don't want to
[00:11:02.079] be spending a lot of the taxpayers money
[00:11:04.399] moving images of birds and stars around.
[00:11:06.800] Yeah, indeed. Yeah. The gremlin system
[00:11:09.839] uh something that I think we first heard
[00:11:11.839] about about a year ago when you did the
[00:11:13.839] uh the media engagement uh like last
[00:11:16.560] March. Yeah. I believe it was in
[00:11:18.800] February
[00:11:20.480] almost two years ago when we had a press
[00:11:22.399] conference Pentagon and I had mentioned
[00:11:24.720] it. Okay. Uh and that's like fully
[00:11:27.120] operational now. Is this something? It's
[00:11:28.560] fully operational. Um, actually we were
[00:11:31.279] inspired by a group of scientists up in
[00:11:33.839] New York and Long Island that published
[00:11:35.920] a book where they had a uh an RV and
[00:11:39.920] they put a bunch of sensors on it and
[00:11:42.079] recorded equipment and out there on Long
[00:11:43.920] Island Sound. Um, kind of got our
[00:11:47.519] scientists and our operators to think,
[00:11:49.360] you know, how could we have a more agile
[00:11:52.079] um mobile response, a quicker agile,
[00:11:54.399] quicker response to these incidents. the
[00:11:57.040] uh gremlin equipment was packaged in,
[00:11:59.760] you know, 40 foot mill vans and took you
[00:12:02.560] know commercial truck transport to get
[00:12:04.480] to a site. Um what we were trying to do
[00:12:07.120] is come up with a trailer or mobile
[00:12:09.360] system where we could have the sensors
[00:12:11.200] permanently um you know installed with
[00:12:14.800] critical power and with uh you know
[00:12:17.279] recording and comms devices so we could
[00:12:20.160] have those pre-staged across the you
[00:12:22.240] know United States so we could close on
[00:12:24.320] an incident much quicker. There was some
[00:12:27.040] other initiatives where we're actually
[00:12:28.800] buying equipment for the base the base
[00:12:32.560] the commanders the the test sites so
[00:12:35.200] they would have some of this handheld um
[00:12:38.079] you know hyperspectral imaging equipment
[00:12:40.560] teach them how to use it so those first
[00:12:42.639] responders would have um the ability to
[00:12:46.160] record in near real time to help our
[00:12:48.160] scientists understand what the phenomena
[00:12:51.120] is. Another thing we're trying to do is
[00:12:53.120] standardize tools. um we actually
[00:12:55.760] evaluate and know some of the analysts
[00:12:57.440] and arrow actually use some of the tools
[00:12:59.120] that you created on some of our cases.
[00:13:02.000] So right we do believe that the US
[00:13:04.560] government doesn't have a you know a
[00:13:07.040] monopoly on our understanding um and
[00:13:09.600] there's some great trades craft out
[00:13:11.440] there with a bunch of uh new AAP
[00:13:13.440] advocacy groups um that have are really
[00:13:17.040] applying hard sciences you know
[00:13:18.959] peer-reviewed science legitimate work
[00:13:21.440] trying to understand this phenomena and
[00:13:23.760] I know that when I left Errol was more
[00:13:26.800] open to um you know engaging these
[00:13:29.600] groups and organization debate able to
[00:13:32.240] leverage what they know. Another
[00:13:34.480] initiative I thought that was really
[00:13:36.240] important was um you know speaking at
[00:13:39.200] the state fusion center conferences
[00:13:41.120] because if there is a UAP encounter most
[00:13:45.600] likely in North America it's not going
[00:13:47.440] to be on federal property. It's going to
[00:13:48.959] be a state local and tribal incident. So
[00:13:52.000] what we need to do is educate the same
[00:13:54.720] way that within the department of
[00:13:56.320] defense and the IC we have mandatory
[00:13:58.480] requirements for the reporting and
[00:14:00.000] retention of data is solicit and educate
[00:14:05.199] mentor and help state local tribal
[00:14:07.680] officials primarily their law
[00:14:09.279] enforcement. So when they have an
[00:14:11.600] incident, provide them with best
[00:14:13.920] practices, investigative practices. Um
[00:14:17.120] and also help educate, you know, the the
[00:14:21.199] state, local, tribal, you know,
[00:14:23.040] authorities that we want people to
[00:14:24.959] report. Um we did work and I've met with
[00:14:27.760] some excellent um you know,
[00:14:29.279] professionals from Unhidden, a group
[00:14:31.519] there in the UK that was working with us
[00:14:35.440] trying to remove the stigma of UAP
[00:14:38.480] reporting. I think that's really really,
[00:14:40.800] you know, important when people see
[00:14:42.639] something to report, you know, what
[00:14:44.639] they've seen in the past and, you know,
[00:14:47.279] within the military and with the IC and
[00:14:49.839] you could jeopardize your security
[00:14:51.760] clearances in your job if you have
[00:14:53.839] reported this in the past. I think we've
[00:14:55.839] come a long way and allowing our
[00:14:58.240] officers to report what they see and we
[00:15:00.079] do believe what they see. Um, and I I've
[00:15:03.440] actually had elected officials in
[00:15:05.360] Congress, you know, question, why don't
[00:15:06.880] you believe the aviators? what we do.
[00:15:08.959] Yeah. Yeah. But there's limitations, you
[00:15:11.600] know, to the, you know, the human
[00:15:13.760] sensatory abilities, the eyeballs to be
[00:15:16.720] able to judge speed, you know, mass,
[00:15:20.320] velocity while you're moving at 300
[00:15:22.480] knots. Yeah, there's a lot of science
[00:15:24.720] there. And and I am not a science, you
[00:15:27.279] know, scientist. I'm a in I'm an
[00:15:29.680] intelligence officer and I got a quite a
[00:15:32.000] background in technical collection. Um,
[00:15:34.639] and I'm a marine officer. I'm I'm a
[00:15:36.240] retired marine officer. So, I'm somewhat
[00:15:38.800] I was when I was asked um to take on
[00:15:42.160] this responsibility as a deputy of
[00:15:44.000] Barrow, you know, I didn't ask for it.
[00:15:46.959] Um I was asked to do it and I
[00:15:48.720] volunteered. Um I knew nothing about
[00:15:51.040] UAPs and I the last 20 years I've been
[00:15:53.759] involved um and you know, Middle East
[00:15:56.480] and South Asia, you know, the war on
[00:15:58.320] terrorism and counterp proliferation
[00:16:00.240] operations and that was my background.
[00:16:02.880] So, and I'm not an analyst, you know,
[00:16:05.199] I'm an operator and I I help um you
[00:16:08.480] know, do technical collection and try to
[00:16:10.240] solve hard problems. And I think when
[00:16:12.320] you know, Sean interviewed me, that was
[00:16:14.240] one of the things that helped in my
[00:16:16.240] selection is I actually saw UAP
[00:16:19.360] investigation as a hard problem. And I
[00:16:21.519] thought we needed to to approach, you
[00:16:24.000] know, this phenomena as we would
[00:16:25.759] anything else. You know, often we get
[00:16:28.800] partial signatures, we get reports of
[00:16:30.800] something new or uh we see uh
[00:16:34.399] technologies or performance
[00:16:36.480] characteristics that we can't correlate
[00:16:39.199] or with a known fielded system. So
[00:16:42.639] someone had some type of breakthrough
[00:16:44.320] and we need to understand more. we need
[00:16:46.399] to do is tailor our collection, you
[00:16:48.480] know, to try to understand
[00:16:50.880] um that event or that technology that
[00:16:54.320] has been detected by operational forces
[00:16:56.480] somewhere in the world. Yeah. So you I
[00:16:59.440] guess the thing that people are very
[00:17:01.759] interested in um you there's lots of
[00:17:03.759] aspects of it. This there's the the uh
[00:17:05.919] security aspect with kind of known
[00:17:07.679] technology and then there's the the
[00:17:08.880] unknown aspect. What does that
[00:17:10.880] represent? So like is it like partly
[00:17:12.959] human failings, technological failings,
[00:17:14.720] like systemic failings or does it what
[00:17:17.360] percentage of that actually represents
[00:17:18.959] something uh new uh and unknown? Um like
[00:17:24.319] in in your your your interviews before
[00:17:26.720] you said that you know there's obviously
[00:17:28.079] a percentage of uh of things which you
[00:17:30.720] consider to be kind of true UAPs like
[00:17:32.960] these genuine unknowns. Um, what actual
[00:17:37.760] data do we have on these these best
[00:17:39.919] cases, these genuine UFOs? like you do
[00:17:42.160] we have video combined with another
[00:17:45.120] sensor on something where we can
[00:17:46.720] actually determine that it's got a
[00:17:49.039] certain velocity with with a a degree of
[00:17:51.600] certainty or or all these things kind of
[00:17:54.240] like
[00:17:55.600] it's a little bit of the you know
[00:17:56.880] there's I can't mention the actual
[00:17:59.360] numbers of like Arrow has um you know
[00:18:02.160] the when it comes to public disclosure
[00:18:04.720] you know they don't like us to give hard
[00:18:06.480] numbers so it's less than about 2,000
[00:18:08.480] cases that airlines open is is currently
[00:18:11.039] working of that there's probably around
[00:18:13.919] 40 cases where there's phenomena that
[00:18:17.200] has been detected various means you know
[00:18:20.000] it could be uh observation of you know
[00:18:22.559] of security personnel it could be a
[00:18:24.320] sensor an active radar or a passive
[00:18:26.640] system that has detected something that
[00:18:28.720] we don't understand
[00:18:31.440] that is a true anomaly that that's what
[00:18:34.320] we're
[00:18:36.160] um you know in law tked to do is to
[00:18:39.120] solve these really hard problems
[00:18:41.360] Um, and they're very very rare. they
[00:18:44.559] don't occur, but the fact that they've
[00:18:47.440] been detected um at very sensitive
[00:18:50.320] places um gets, you know, really uh
[00:18:56.080] elicited a response that, you know, we
[00:18:58.160] do everything we can to to solve them,
[00:19:00.640] to work with the local commanders or
[00:19:02.240] installation uh managers to equip them
[00:19:05.679] with both technologies and tradecraft um
[00:19:08.960] to try to detect this in their real time
[00:19:11.760] and then be able to pass uh indications
[00:19:14.640] of warning to somebody with the
[00:19:16.480] responsibility to deal with that. Here
[00:19:18.960] in North America, especially or, you
[00:19:20.880] know, restrict control airspace, you
[00:19:23.120] know, that's basically a trespassing
[00:19:25.840] um violation. often when we've had UAP
[00:19:29.200] cases um and there was claims of
[00:19:32.559] physical evidence that had to be
[00:19:34.000] processed and we would work with the
[00:19:35.760] local FBI field offices if we couldn't
[00:19:38.480] close on it quickly um because we wanted
[00:19:41.520] to curate any any material any any data
[00:19:45.840] uh any physical evidence um used in
[00:19:48.960] Department of Justice rules for the
[00:19:51.520] curation evidence so that evidence could
[00:19:53.600] be used in court someday. So we're very
[00:19:56.880] very careful on how we treat um it's not
[00:20:00.880] a crime site but an incident site to
[00:20:03.760] make sure that we we use best
[00:20:06.160] investigative practices. So later on um
[00:20:09.520] when people evaluate our work and
[00:20:11.440] there's a lot of people um that evaluate
[00:20:14.160] the work that Arrow does and our
[00:20:15.840] scientific evaluations and we're open to
[00:20:18.480] criticism but we we also learn from
[00:20:21.120] every case that we have. Um,
[00:20:24.960] you know, the people that Sean hired, I
[00:20:27.919] hired, or John hired, you know, we
[00:20:30.320] wanted people that were open-minded,
[00:20:32.799] that we're not hard over either way. In
[00:20:36.080] some case, the belief in the
[00:20:37.679] supernatural, you know, they will
[00:20:39.440] automatically jump that when there's a
[00:20:41.840] an anomaly or something they don't
[00:20:43.520] understand, there's a supernatural cost
[00:20:45.360] to it. Um, that's probably not a person
[00:20:49.200] that we'd want on a staff because of
[00:20:50.960] that inherent bias. On the same hand,
[00:20:53.679] you got somebody who says it's
[00:20:55.120] impossible and extraterrestrials, you
[00:20:58.320] know, could never uh exist to the, you
[00:21:00.960] know, the tyranny of time and space. Um,
[00:21:04.240] we don't want closed minds either. So,
[00:21:06.159] one of the things that we always did is
[00:21:08.080] we as we hired staff and the staff that
[00:21:10.880] Arrow had came from throughout the
[00:21:13.120] government. Um we had um active, you
[00:21:16.640] know, federal law enforcement, military
[00:21:18.720] officers, credentialed scientists,
[00:21:20.960] people came from the military and
[00:21:22.559] national labs, from the department of
[00:21:24.640] energy, um from some of our leading um
[00:21:28.640] academic institutions were all part of
[00:21:31.120] the ARO staff. The core ARO staff, the
[00:21:34.080] government bureaucrats who worked there,
[00:21:36.000] there were only four permanent bells.
[00:21:38.960] Everybody else was there on a joint duty
[00:21:41.440] assignment, a snee or a detail to the
[00:21:44.480] organization. So, Arrow intentionally
[00:21:47.200] was designed to be small but have really
[00:21:49.520] really wide reach and have access to any
[00:21:53.679] information, any data at any
[00:21:55.919] classification level that was related to
[00:21:58.799] UAP. And that was very very important.
[00:22:01.919] you know, I've been um you know, a
[00:22:04.159] military officer or a member of the
[00:22:06.320] intelligence community on the 5th of
[00:22:09.840] July of this year for 45 years service
[00:22:13.360] and I'm and I'm in what's called the
[00:22:15.120] deferred resination program. So, I'm in
[00:22:17.840] an admin status and then I'll be retired
[00:22:20.159] from federal service on one October. But
[00:22:23.760] I was astonished
[00:22:25.919] um by
[00:22:28.080] support from elected officials, you
[00:22:30.320] know, in Congress, from our oversight,
[00:22:32.480] there's 12 oversight committees that
[00:22:34.640] Errol reported to to um Senate confirmed
[00:22:39.360] political appointees who are the deputy
[00:22:41.679] secretaries and secretaries
[00:22:43.919] um of organizations, you know, in our
[00:22:47.120] government. um their tasking to us to
[00:22:51.840] seek the truth. And if we had someone
[00:22:54.480] who attempted to obscure or block or
[00:22:59.760] refuse to give us access in one of our
[00:23:02.240] investigations for us to report that
[00:23:04.159] back and I I was just amazed at the
[00:23:08.640] access that we had. Um the SAP coast and
[00:23:12.880] capos in the community were outstanding
[00:23:15.120] as far as reading us on giving us access
[00:23:17.679] to these highly compartmentalized
[00:23:19.600] programs. The one time where we had a
[00:23:22.240] director of a three-letter agency was
[00:23:24.640] reluctant um to share information. We we
[00:23:28.480] wanted a image of an advanced capability
[00:23:31.679] the United States fielded to demonstrate
[00:23:34.559] to oversight at the TSSEI SAP level how
[00:23:39.600] our technologies could be uh
[00:23:42.559] mispersceived as something you know um
[00:23:45.760] provided or alien tech or something that
[00:23:47.919] came from another world. Yeah. um when
[00:23:50.880] we would have um reports, we'd get
[00:23:53.520] referrals or uh people would come to us
[00:23:57.120] through our secure reporting mechanism
[00:23:59.200] that's on the Arrow website.
[00:24:02.000] They would report astonishing things of
[00:24:05.039] our government, you know, uh reverse
[00:24:07.280] engineering or testing alien technology.
[00:24:10.080] So, we would get their reports. Um, we
[00:24:12.960] would remind them of the lifelong
[00:24:14.799] obligation that they signed with that
[00:24:17.039] non-disclosure agreement after we
[00:24:18.799] debrief them. And then we would go to
[00:24:21.360] the test directors, the agency, the test
[00:24:23.600] sites, look into the archives and try to
[00:24:26.320] understand what is it these witnesses
[00:24:28.640] saw. And these were people that were
[00:24:30.240] legally present but may not have been
[00:24:32.159] witting or written in or actually read
[00:24:34.640] into those programs. What we found is
[00:24:37.679] that their descriptions were very
[00:24:39.120] accurate. M you know these are rational
[00:24:42.080] knowledgeable educated people who saw
[00:24:44.400] something not sure of what it was but
[00:24:47.120] based off their worldview and education
[00:24:49.360] or experiences you know they may assume
[00:24:53.039] or assess that you know that was
[00:24:55.919] technology that you know it's not from
[00:24:57.919] this world and when we looked at some of
[00:25:01.679] these uh test objects absolutely
[00:25:04.320] astonishing what we saw but in every
[00:25:07.440] case you know these were things that
[00:25:09.679] were invented, you know, manufactured,
[00:25:11.840] secured, tested, and flown by us or our
[00:25:14.880] allies, right? So, it's just people
[00:25:18.080] didn't understand the advanced
[00:25:19.919] technology of the US possesses, tested
[00:25:23.120] or has fielded. And you know, I had a an
[00:25:27.200] experience in the early 80s as a marine,
[00:25:30.799] you know, work working in the deserts of
[00:25:32.880] Arizona out there by the chocolate uh
[00:25:35.520] mountains where we actually in during
[00:25:37.600] one of our operations had actually
[00:25:39.679] detected and and taped. We had filmed
[00:25:42.799] one of the new stealth um fighters, the
[00:25:45.520] F17. We didn't know what it was. It
[00:25:48.159] wasn't invisible.
[00:25:50.080] But later on during the mission debrief,
[00:25:52.240] we were asked if we saw anything unusual
[00:25:54.720] and when the um hawk battery uh
[00:25:58.720] personnel reported that they, you know,
[00:26:00.880] they couldn't get on radar, but they
[00:26:02.559] taped it, you know, they were asked to
[00:26:04.159] turn over the video. Right. Interesting.
[00:26:06.640] We knew enough there was something that
[00:26:08.240] we weren't read in. We had no need to
[00:26:10.000] know and we were told to forget about
[00:26:12.080] it. Now later on when that became public
[00:26:14.480] during the Gulf War, everybody
[00:26:15.840] understood that capability. But the fact
[00:26:17.919] that the Air Force and the US government
[00:26:20.240] were able to minimize exposure to the
[00:26:22.159] F-17 program for many many years and I
[00:26:25.919] know that when we were in the UK, uh we
[00:26:29.039] had looked at some of their um reporting
[00:26:32.080] very very similar to the historical
[00:26:33.919] report that we had to do and they
[00:26:36.240] attributed a lot of the UFO reportings
[00:26:39.520] during that time were actually US
[00:26:42.480] aircraft being detected by their
[00:26:44.640] citizens before they came out and became
[00:26:47.760] public. That's interesting. It reminds
[00:26:49.679] me of the the Nimttz incident. Uh you
[00:26:51.679] there's lots of stories around that and
[00:26:53.440] one of them is that uh you after the the
[00:26:57.120] encounter with David Fraver uh people
[00:26:59.760] came in uh and you know various people
[00:27:03.440] give different accounts like it was the
[00:27:04.960] the Air Force, some people say it was
[00:27:06.400] DARPA uh came in and uh and and took the
[00:27:09.440] tapes of the incident. Uh is is is there
[00:27:13.440] going to be any more resolution in the
[00:27:15.520] public uh for the Nimttz incident? There
[00:27:18.799] I know that the uh the Navy had uh
[00:27:21.679] completed their investigation and shared
[00:27:23.840] it with Arrow hasn't gone public yet. Um
[00:27:27.600] we continue to investigate that case.
[00:27:30.559] The challenge we had that happened back
[00:27:32.480] in 2004 and that was before there was
[00:27:35.760] guidance from the department of defense
[00:27:38.000] to the operational forces to report and
[00:27:41.039] retain data. However, at the time of the
[00:27:44.480] Nimmits workup, so the Nimmits was in an
[00:27:46.799] exercise and you know they they're being
[00:27:49.360] assessed for the readiness to deploy to
[00:27:51.200] the Gulf during you know the operation
[00:27:54.320] Iraqi freedom I believe it was. Um third
[00:27:58.080] fleet had a flag plot. They were on
[00:28:00.080] board. They understood that there were
[00:28:02.240] some unusual things being detected by
[00:28:05.279] the spy one radar on the Princeton and
[00:28:08.240] they actually directed that uh the radar
[00:28:11.200] tapes be preserved. They actually sent
[00:28:13.600] people to the Princeton. Okay. To uh
[00:28:16.399] record get recordings of what the
[00:28:18.480] Princeton had detected. We knew we do
[00:28:21.039] know that that data made it back to
[00:28:23.039] Third Fleet headquarters in San Diego.
[00:28:25.840] um they don't have they did not have the
[00:28:28.000] the technical ability to exploit that.
[00:28:30.000] So I had to go to dog Virginia is where
[00:28:32.559] the lab was. So we know it physically
[00:28:34.880] went back to dog run. Um working with
[00:28:37.360] the Navy and and the ONAF staff you know
[00:28:39.600] we did two physical searches trying to
[00:28:42.159] find that data. We could not find that
[00:28:44.000] data and it was somewhat of a challenge
[00:28:45.760] that happened 20 years before. Um,
[00:28:48.960] another thing that was curious, um, not
[00:28:52.720] sure if it was intentional or just
[00:28:54.399] incompetence, but the flight journals,
[00:28:56.880] the logs, the operational, you know,
[00:28:59.279] journals that are maintained by
[00:29:01.039] warships, um, that normally goes into
[00:29:04.080] the archives and we went back trying to
[00:29:07.360] find um, you know, the records of what
[00:29:10.080] happened during that workup so we could
[00:29:12.399] attempt to correlate you know, some of
[00:29:14.480] the witness statements.
[00:29:16.640] We could not find those journals
[00:29:19.679] and we just we we could not find them.
[00:29:21.760] The Navy could not find them and that's
[00:29:23.440] in the you know in a report that will
[00:29:25.600] eventually become public. Um, we also
[00:29:28.559] found out and it was very very uh
[00:29:31.760] curious how this happened, but uh one of
[00:29:34.480] our officers on the aeros staff was at a
[00:29:36.960] cocktail party in Oldtown Alexander and
[00:29:40.880] ran into the former director of DARPA
[00:29:44.080] and they started talking about working
[00:29:46.799] at Arrow and he had mentioned that he
[00:29:49.360] had been out there um during that
[00:29:51.679] Nimtt's workup and DARPA was um working
[00:29:56.399] with the Navy. Not everybody was uh was
[00:29:59.440] vetted, but they had a new lightweight
[00:30:01.919] ISR system that that battle group was
[00:30:04.399] going to use during its deployment.
[00:30:07.760] Um there was a report from a Navy chief
[00:30:10.159] who had worked in the combat um
[00:30:12.640] information um you know center on the
[00:30:15.120] Princeton CIC that reported about this
[00:30:18.240] mysterious helicopter with people
[00:30:20.000] dressed in black who had gone out to the
[00:30:22.320] Princeton had gone into the captain's
[00:30:25.120] stateateroom which is very unusual on a
[00:30:27.679] warship underway and then um departed
[00:30:31.279] with a bunch of materials.
[00:30:34.159] Right. So that you think that's related
[00:30:35.919] to the ISR system like that's what we
[00:30:39.200] found out when we we actually talked to
[00:30:41.520] this executive from DARPA that was
[00:30:43.840] actually them that was actually DARPA
[00:30:45.760] personnel that actually gone out there
[00:30:48.159] and some of them were wearing you know
[00:30:50.080] dark you know uh black jumpsuits
[00:30:53.760] and that's what the crew observed
[00:30:55.679] according to the testimony that we
[00:30:57.760] received.
[00:30:59.279] And then what we were trying to do is
[00:31:00.960] get the the operational the flight
[00:31:03.760] journal the log of who landed at when
[00:31:06.880] the tell number of the aircraft so we
[00:31:09.279] could validate that report that we had
[00:31:11.039] received from the witness and we were
[00:31:12.559] unable to find that journal to be able
[00:31:14.720] to validate that that claim. But we did
[00:31:18.640] look we did look into the nature. I
[00:31:20.559] believe it was a Wasp was the ISR system
[00:31:23.120] and it it's come out. It's it's public
[00:31:25.360] now. But I believe um the Princeton may
[00:31:29.200] have detected that with its sensor at
[00:31:31.279] Spy One radar. We do not believe the
[00:31:33.520] F-18s at high altitude would have been
[00:31:37.039] able to detect it due to the clutter and
[00:31:39.120] the fact it operated right at the
[00:31:40.880] wavetops. Right. Um but a lot of the
[00:31:43.760] reports that occurred out there um and
[00:31:46.640] we believe them. Are we ever going to
[00:31:48.640] have um the data to understand what
[00:31:51.039] happened? Not after 20 years. Now I I
[00:31:54.399] would volunteer if it happened again
[00:31:56.080] today due to the instruction from the J3
[00:32:00.000] and the joint staff to the operating
[00:32:01.840] forces um and the services themsel you
[00:32:05.840] know provide an instruction to their
[00:32:07.600] forces that we would report that
[00:32:11.039] immediately and then we would retain the
[00:32:13.360] data so arrow or the services themselves
[00:32:16.880] could analyze what happened in the world
[00:32:19.360] it's way too dangerous of a place to
[00:32:21.279] have something we don't understand
[00:32:22.960] operate in close proximity to
[00:32:24.799] operational forces and I I think we
[00:32:27.840] understand the national security aspect
[00:32:30.159] of the UAP um phenomena and that's
[00:32:33.840] something that's what attracted me um
[00:32:36.799] you know I wasn't looking for you know a
[00:32:39.600] sentient intelligence from another world
[00:32:42.080] I saw it as a national security issue
[00:32:44.159] I'm not sure what it was and I really
[00:32:46.480] didn't care you know I wanted to be able
[00:32:48.880] to detect it in real time get sensors on
[00:32:51.440] it and turn that over to a commander
[00:32:53.679] with the responsibility to mediate and
[00:32:56.159] deal with it. You know, if we look at
[00:32:58.880] the development of uncrrewed systems in
[00:33:02.080] both the maritime and in the air
[00:33:04.640] domains, if you look at the the conflict
[00:33:06.880] between Russia and Ukraine, what's been
[00:33:09.519] going on in, you know, between Iran and
[00:33:12.480] Israel, the advancement in autonomy and
[00:33:15.200] lethality and lethality is just amazing.
[00:33:18.559] And we need to prepare for this. And I
[00:33:20.320] and I believe there could be some, you
[00:33:22.320] know, some breakthroughs and propulsion,
[00:33:24.559] stealth, energy, um, that we may not be
[00:33:27.519] aware of. And surprise is not a good
[00:33:29.760] thing when it comes to national
[00:33:31.679] security. And that was an important part
[00:33:34.080] of what Arrow's role was. And that's why
[00:33:36.480] it was so important for Arrow to be
[00:33:39.120] involved in some of these UAS incidents
[00:33:41.679] like we had at Langley. You know, we we
[00:33:44.080] were embarrassed at what happened at
[00:33:46.000] Langley. and Arrol was asked to come in
[00:33:48.880] and try to um re you know reconstruct
[00:33:52.720] the the radar tracks. You know there
[00:33:54.720] were there was a lot of equipment and
[00:33:57.200] kit that was rapidly sent to Langley to
[00:33:59.679] try to understand you know during that
[00:34:01.679] 10day period where we had UAS both fixed
[00:34:04.080] wing and rural wing operate unimpeded
[00:34:07.519] for a long period of time at a at a
[00:34:09.440] national site. Um but what we found is a
[00:34:13.280] lot of the systems that the Department
[00:34:15.760] of Defense
[00:34:18.480] had established when we actually had an
[00:34:20.320] inventory, you know, they were designed
[00:34:22.320] to detect, track and finish, you know,
[00:34:26.480] recording data so it it could be um
[00:34:30.720] curated with the rule of federal rules
[00:34:32.480] of evidence so it could be used in a
[00:34:34.320] court of law against somebody that
[00:34:37.040] violated a federal, you know, flying
[00:34:39.119] restrict and tresped on a federal eneral
[00:34:41.119] that wasn't part of the design
[00:34:42.960] requirement of these systems and we saw
[00:34:45.280] where we had sensors
[00:34:47.599] one night had actually detected a UAP
[00:34:50.079] incident or or UAS incident and then the
[00:34:53.359] next day they recorded over that same
[00:34:55.119] media. Oh wow. So, we worked very very
[00:34:58.160] closely with Lincoln Labs who with the
[00:35:00.640] British helped invent tactical radars,
[00:35:03.280] you know, trying to rebuild um radar
[00:35:06.079] tracks so we could give that to the law
[00:35:08.079] enforcement task force so they knew
[00:35:10.079] where to begin their investigations and
[00:35:12.160] start knocking on doors on where these,
[00:35:14.720] you know, UAS's, you know, started, you
[00:35:17.839] know, where the ingress and where the
[00:35:19.119] egress and what was their interest on
[00:35:21.599] Langley. So we would take it if we don't
[00:35:24.960] know what it is, it's a UAP until we
[00:35:27.040] confirm what it is, right? And that's
[00:35:29.280] why we work so closely with the force
[00:35:32.079] protection, the base commanders um and
[00:35:34.800] the the different program managers in
[00:35:37.119] within the army and within the
[00:35:38.880] department of defense that were
[00:35:40.800] developing sensors to try to detect and
[00:35:43.680] deal with UAS's. If we could take their
[00:35:46.800] data and incorporate it with what we
[00:35:49.040] had, we'd have a a more complete
[00:35:51.680] understanding of, you know, radar tracks
[00:35:54.480] or detections that we have. And it's one
[00:35:56.240] of the things I I did want to mention
[00:35:57.760] that Arrol did. You know, Arrol is able
[00:36:00.079] to leverage Title 50 um and and Title 10
[00:36:03.760] because the deputy came from the
[00:36:05.599] national intel world. The deputy was,
[00:36:07.680] you know, selected by the director
[00:36:09.680] national intelligence and reported to
[00:36:11.599] the the principal deputy director. Um
[00:36:14.400] and then we had a credential scientist
[00:36:16.800] who was the director of there you know
[00:36:18.800] that was selected by the secretary and
[00:36:20.480] worked for the principal um or the
[00:36:23.200] deputy secretary of defense you know
[00:36:25.440] it's how that's the the governing
[00:36:27.599] structure we have today and that worked
[00:36:29.280] very very well where was able to
[00:36:31.599] leverage you know the authorities the
[00:36:33.760] capabilities of both the department of
[00:36:35.839] defense and the intelligence community
[00:36:38.400] and we reported back you know monthly at
[00:36:41.839] one time it was every two weeks our
[00:36:43.839] findings and our investigations up both
[00:36:45.839] chains of command. And another thing I I
[00:36:48.960] wanted to mention is the fact that we
[00:36:51.680] had almost a full-time GAO audit staff
[00:36:55.760] that worked within Arrow.
[00:36:58.800] So we were completely transparent. You
[00:37:01.599] know, it's a congressional oversight. We
[00:37:03.440] reported to 12 uh committees. There were
[00:37:06.160] some things that we were instructed to
[00:37:08.240] report back to Congress immediately if
[00:37:11.119] we had found certain criteria or certain
[00:37:13.280] threats were detected by Arrow and both
[00:37:15.680] Sean and I did that. Um, you know, there
[00:37:18.160] were some things that we found that were
[00:37:19.680] very disturbing and we didn't understand
[00:37:21.680] and we did report that both up our
[00:37:24.160] executive, you know, governance chains a
[00:37:27.040] command and to our congressional
[00:37:29.040] oversight. So Errol was empowered by
[00:37:34.240] Congress and by the executive you know
[00:37:37.200] to seek the truth. Both our cressal
[00:37:41.040] oversight and you know uh the people we
[00:37:44.240] work for within the department of
[00:37:45.920] defense and the intelligence community
[00:37:48.160] were adamant that we report anybody who
[00:37:51.839] attempted you know to impair our
[00:37:54.640] investigations. I was often asked by
[00:37:57.920] principles, is there anything I can do?
[00:37:59.920] Are you do you have what you want? And
[00:38:02.320] I'm going to say Errol was gifted, you
[00:38:04.880] know, we had incredible um a budget to
[00:38:07.839] operate with. Um you know, we uh
[00:38:11.760] published a very very detailed uh
[00:38:15.200] program objectives, milestones. We made
[00:38:18.320] that available. We were transparent to
[00:38:20.400] the appropriations committee up on the
[00:38:22.160] hill about how we spent taxpayers money.
[00:38:26.079] I'm I'm a kid from Tucson, Arizona. And
[00:38:29.520] I I was very very aware that we were
[00:38:32.240] stewards of the American people's, you
[00:38:34.880] know, sweat and the taxes that they were
[00:38:38.000] paying. And we were transparent. We were
[00:38:39.920] honest. Um we did our best to try to be
[00:38:43.760] as transparent as possible. It's
[00:38:46.400] difficult with the process that you have
[00:38:49.680] to have both to do security reviews and
[00:38:52.720] declassification
[00:38:54.320] and then be able to seek permission to
[00:38:56.560] do public disclosure. They're they're
[00:38:59.040] different things. Arrow is not
[00:39:02.079] originating classification authority.
[00:39:04.480] The president is. Many cabinet
[00:39:06.800] secretaries are, but Arrow is not. We're
[00:39:09.440] a derivative classification authority.
[00:39:12.079] we use someone else's authority to
[00:39:14.560] classify things. The fact that Arrow det
[00:39:17.839] has you know detected anomaly or a UAP
[00:39:20.720] that is not a classified event. Where
[00:39:23.520] and how
[00:39:25.359] could be. Yeah. Um there was some you
[00:39:27.920] know frustration with um elected members
[00:39:30.960] of Congress that wanted had access to um
[00:39:35.119] very sensitive developmental SAP level
[00:39:38.560] um sensors that were being developed um
[00:39:41.280] by the air force for their aircraft. the
[00:39:44.000] fact that they had detected a UAP that
[00:39:46.880] wasn't classified the details about the
[00:39:50.240] sensor and how they operated was
[00:39:53.359] um right and for some members of
[00:39:56.160] Congress who wanted to have permission
[00:39:57.839] and want to get we worked with the DoD
[00:40:01.200] SAPco um to provide you know a one-time
[00:40:05.440] readon so they could understand what we
[00:40:07.599] were doing and the technologies that we
[00:40:09.920] were working with but the decisions on
[00:40:12.720] who was granted access did not come from
[00:40:15.359] Arrow, you know, that came from
[00:40:17.040] leadership within the House itself or
[00:40:19.200] within the Senate.
[00:40:21.359] Yeah, I heard some like criticism like
[00:40:24.079] of Arrow uh from some of the members of
[00:40:26.480] Congress saying that you're not open
[00:40:28.160] enough uh and there was some suggestion
[00:40:31.280] that uh I don't know how serious it was
[00:40:34.160] that you arrow be replaced by the FBI uh
[00:40:37.680] working group. Do you know anything
[00:40:39.440] about this this FBI group? I have I have
[00:40:41.760] heard some comments by the you know
[00:40:43.680] departments of uh or by members of
[00:40:47.040] Congress and some of the committees
[00:40:48.560] which were not any of the 12 oversight
[00:40:50.720] committees that Errol reported to. And I
[00:40:53.359] did make a comment um
[00:40:56.400] I think I read today in in the New York
[00:40:58.960] Post a response I made to to comments by
[00:41:02.880] uh Congresswoman Luna. So I I did
[00:41:05.760] respond back and an email back to a
[00:41:08.000] report around that and I saw that had
[00:41:09.520] been published today. But um yes, I
[00:41:12.560] actually uh remember being in the skiff
[00:41:15.119] with members of the UAP caucus um along
[00:41:18.560] with the uh Department of Defense, Air
[00:41:21.760] Force Major General Fighter Pilot who
[00:41:23.839] was the SAPO, the special access program
[00:41:26.079] management for um office secretary of
[00:41:28.800] defense. And um the reason that the
[00:41:32.560] members of the UAP caucus were not read
[00:41:34.880] into the SAP programs was because their
[00:41:37.520] leadership denied. Arrol requested, the
[00:41:40.720] SAP code, the DoD SAP code requested it.
[00:41:43.599] Um and those requests were turned down
[00:41:46.880] by their own leadership. They felt they
[00:41:49.040] did not have a need to know. the uh the
[00:41:51.839] governance authorities, the committees
[00:41:53.760] that we reported to um were
[00:41:55.760] knowledgeable and understood what we
[00:41:57.200] were doing and they were satisfied with
[00:41:59.119] Errol's response. So, you're saying the
[00:42:01.599] leaders in Congress uh denied it? Okay.
[00:42:04.400] Yes. It wasn't Department of Defense,
[00:42:07.200] right? That's interesting. Uh I guess
[00:42:10.480] they got someone different to complain
[00:42:11.760] about then. Uh it's and they were told
[00:42:14.720] that. Yeah. Yeah. I'm sure they they
[00:42:17.040] would know that. Not happy with that
[00:42:18.880] answer.
[00:42:20.960] Yeah. Uh what what do you think the the
[00:42:24.079] UAP caucus? Um have they been useful in
[00:42:28.640] promoting things or have they been a
[00:42:30.000] hindrance in some ways?
[00:42:32.480] To tell you the truth, I really haven't
[00:42:34.880] uh followed a lot of um their social
[00:42:37.119] media posts. I never was a UAP, you
[00:42:41.440] know, um groupy. I you know, I I was an
[00:42:45.119] intel professional. Um, I really didn't
[00:42:48.240] follow a lot of social media. Um,
[00:42:52.880] if I was frustrated by some of the
[00:42:56.800] claims made by witnesses um to members
[00:43:00.000] of Congress. I I know that we had people
[00:43:03.440] referred to us. Um, one particular
[00:43:07.440] individual um we thought he was
[00:43:10.079] extorting us. you know, we we were going
[00:43:12.079] to uh uh pay him for his knowledge or
[00:43:16.319] his materials or he was going to take it
[00:43:18.079] to a foreign country. It sounded like
[00:43:20.560] extortion to us and reported it to our
[00:43:22.880] FBI counterparts. And by the way, we
[00:43:25.359] actually had at various times FBI um you
[00:43:29.280] know, agents or analysts who were part
[00:43:31.680] of the ERO staff. So we did work very
[00:43:34.400] very closely with the FBI. Um, so so
[00:43:38.800] that was some like physical material
[00:43:40.480] that he had that uh it was it was and I
[00:43:44.640] well actually went back to members of
[00:43:46.400] the of this uh member's staff saying
[00:43:49.920] they should you know they they should
[00:43:51.920] protect the member from this individual.
[00:43:54.880] It it wasn't fair to him um to give him
[00:43:57.359] an audience. I I did, you know, I I am
[00:43:59.760] not a medical professional. Um but what
[00:44:02.800] I heard um based off common sense, I
[00:44:06.480] wouldn't want him around my family. How
[00:44:08.800] did he even get into the position to be
[00:44:10.960] able to approach you with this type of
[00:44:13.200] thing? Well, we he was referred to us by
[00:44:15.760] uh members of this uh
[00:44:18.880] members uh staff. It came to us. Okay.
[00:44:23.680] All right. And we were we were asked to
[00:44:25.200] interview and we did. and then there was
[00:44:27.359] concern that uh some of the materials
[00:44:30.319] that uh he possessed
[00:44:33.440] um could compromise actual programs of
[00:44:36.640] record. Um
[00:44:38.720] when um I actually met with the chairman
[00:44:41.440] over this issue, uh he had asked me if I
[00:44:44.240] had been actually visited to the Nevada
[00:44:47.520] test site um and I had personal
[00:44:50.319] knowledge of some of the technologies
[00:44:52.400] that were being tested out there and I
[00:44:54.560] told him no, I haven't. Um and he uh
[00:44:58.720] highly recommended that I get out there
[00:45:01.359] um you know get read in and understand
[00:45:03.440] what was going on because he was afraid
[00:45:06.160] that uh you know programs could be could
[00:45:08.960] have been um compromised. So that's one
[00:45:11.760] reason you know I went out to the Nevada
[00:45:14.000] test site. Was that helpful perspective
[00:45:16.800] on existing cases? It absolutely was um
[00:45:19.760] to go out there to uh meet with the
[00:45:22.560] commanders um to look at the uh you know
[00:45:26.240] the test articles um and you have a much
[00:45:29.280] better understanding why rational people
[00:45:32.240] who are not reading to the the
[00:45:34.720] technology could actually think that
[00:45:37.599] this was derived or reverse engineered
[00:45:39.839] from you know an alien you know
[00:45:44.079] u ET type entity
[00:45:47.920] Yeah. Yeah. You you mentioned once I
[00:45:49.440] think a a Cllingon battleship. Uh yeah,
[00:45:52.319] I think I think I said that ship. Yeah.
[00:45:54.720] I was when I looked at that video, it
[00:45:56.480] was late at night and we had been
[00:45:57.760] talking for many many hours. I had a
[00:46:00.319] little bit too much body movement there,
[00:46:01.680] but it's getting excited. But it the
[00:46:04.640] technology is amazing. And that's one of
[00:46:06.960] the things I I I do want to go back and
[00:46:09.119] hammer on a bit is these people that
[00:46:11.760] report um what they saw
[00:46:15.599] when we go back and we see the you know
[00:46:17.920] videotapes of the test
[00:46:20.480] their accuracy is just amazing. It
[00:46:22.880] actually is scary is you know how they
[00:46:26.560] accurately convey what they saw to us
[00:46:28.480] and we look at it and we understand what
[00:46:30.560] it is. We we do understand the
[00:46:32.400] technology and they're right. It's
[00:46:34.960] amazing. But it came, you know, it was
[00:46:37.440] invented by us and flown by us and we
[00:46:40.640] want to preserve, you know, um the
[00:46:43.920] security of these programs and that's
[00:46:45.520] why we go through such great lengths to
[00:46:47.599] vet people and have such
[00:46:49.200] compartmentalization and we test in such
[00:46:51.359] a remote place, you know, to protect
[00:46:53.599] these systems as they're being
[00:46:54.880] developed. Yeah. So these these systems
[00:46:56.800] that uh you know people have kind of
[00:46:58.480] mispersceived as something amazing are
[00:47:00.880] they actually that amazing or is it just
[00:47:02.480] the the kind of the perspective from
[00:47:04.240] which they they viewed it or the the
[00:47:06.319] lack of context that makes them seem
[00:47:07.839] amazing? Are there actually like kind of
[00:47:09.520] new developments in technology or or
[00:47:12.160] even you know physics? It's it's not
[00:47:15.119] what you'd expect from any type of
[00:47:16.960] aircraft you've seen before.
[00:47:20.079] Fascinating. Well, I suppose you can't
[00:47:21.280] actually tell me what it is. But I'm I'm
[00:47:25.200] bound by that lifelong NDA self. Yeah.
[00:47:28.319] Well, it sounds fascinating though. It
[00:47:29.680] must have been a great uh been very
[00:47:32.160] interesting for you to see these things.
[00:47:34.480] Oh, it is. You know, it it really was.
[00:47:37.280] Um, and to go back and see the the
[00:47:40.560] historical development of the TESS
[00:47:43.200] artic, you know, there's almost like a a
[00:47:45.760] museum out there of artifacts that are
[00:47:48.720] no longer being flown, but they they
[00:47:50.640] have things going back 20 30 years and
[00:47:53.119] you can see the progression and that is
[00:47:55.440] that is very very interesting. Yeah. You
[00:47:58.079] mentioned test objects uh earlier. Is
[00:48:00.400] that going to imply that some of these
[00:48:01.520] are not actually things that are being
[00:48:02.640] flown? things like maybe radar
[00:48:04.800] cross-section test objects and things
[00:48:06.480] like that. Exactly. Uh all of the above.
[00:48:09.520] You probably have seen the comments
[00:48:11.680] about the alien eggs, the metal spheres.
[00:48:15.520] Well, they actually do drop a lot of
[00:48:18.000] very very precise metal spheres from
[00:48:21.680] altitude and they use them to calibrate
[00:48:24.400] their sensors.
[00:48:26.720] If you're out there on the range and you
[00:48:28.800] see things glitting, often it's these,
[00:48:31.359] you know, some some very large mental
[00:48:33.440] balls.
[00:48:37.119] Yeah, they use them to uh test the
[00:48:39.119] sensors. They're um they understand the
[00:48:42.559] characteristics of them very very well.
[00:48:44.720] They're precision. They're very mil with
[00:48:47.599] precision. Um so they understand what
[00:48:50.480] the radar cross-section is and they drop
[00:48:53.280] them to calibrate before a test. These
[00:48:55.520] things are dropped and they're they're
[00:48:57.440] tracked to ensure that our sensors are
[00:49:00.880] calibrated correctly. You'll see these
[00:49:03.440] throughout the range and you I I've seen
[00:49:05.280] some stories about alien eggs and but
[00:49:08.240] those are test objects that we use to
[00:49:10.640] calibrate. Are they big like you know 10
[00:49:14.079] feet? You know they they can in feet you
[00:49:16.079] know a couple feet in diameter of
[00:49:17.760] course. They're not not like you know 30
[00:49:20.400] 40 feet or anything like that. I I
[00:49:22.160] didn't see anything that large. No.
[00:49:24.000] Right. Yeah, because there's a famous
[00:49:26.160] video of uh a eggshaped thing being
[00:49:29.839] picked up by a helicopter which was
[00:49:31.440] supposedly leaked. I think Ross Kart uh
[00:49:34.400] one of the UFO journalists um saw that
[00:49:37.359] shared it. Uh that's actually online and
[00:49:40.800] it just looks like a kind of a large
[00:49:42.559] Well, you can't tell how big it is. It
[00:49:44.000] looks like an egg in a sling.
[00:49:48.640] If that could be any type of uh you know
[00:49:50.880] kind of radar target or something like
[00:49:52.800] that. It could be. Yeah. Um like just
[00:49:57.920] just real quick going back to the
[00:49:59.520] Langley incident. Um now you said like
[00:50:02.880] you there was a sustained period of uh
[00:50:06.160] drone incursions
[00:50:08.160] uh both fixedwing and uh quadcopter.
[00:50:12.640] Yeah. Rocopter roing. Um
[00:50:16.880] that seems like a very serious incident.
[00:50:19.520] And was was there any resolution as to
[00:50:23.520] who was flying these or and was there a
[00:50:27.280] a high degree of certainty as to the the
[00:50:30.000] number of drones uh versus the number of
[00:50:33.359] possible misidentifications?
[00:50:36.000] Now I I was part of the uh the the task
[00:50:38.880] force under the J3 that under their own
[00:50:42.480] leadership and initiative put it
[00:50:44.079] together to try to understand what
[00:50:46.160] happened. Um I would probably leave uh
[00:50:50.480] any characterization or you know summary
[00:50:53.200] or to the FBI and the Department of
[00:50:55.599] Defense on that. Um with high confidence
[00:50:59.520] um there were a number of things we
[00:51:02.480] without authorization that violated the
[00:51:05.440] flight restrictions that you know had
[00:51:07.599] gone on to Langley for for over a week.
[00:51:10.800] Um different descriptions identified by
[00:51:13.200] different people. Um as a result of that
[00:51:16.160] though I I I believe the department of
[00:51:18.400] defense in our country as a as you know
[00:51:20.880] whole all the whole um you know
[00:51:23.280] department of uh homeland security
[00:51:27.839] department of justice kind of understood
[00:51:29.839] the potential um security risk and what
[00:51:33.520] could happen the fact that you know for
[00:51:35.839] a period of time flight operations for
[00:51:38.400] the F-22 was shut down had to be
[00:51:40.319] relocated now that's that had an
[00:51:42.800] operational impact You know, there's
[00:51:44.640] also a NASA facility out there. Now,
[00:51:47.599] what was the target of the surveillance
[00:51:49.599] op? I don't know, but something did
[00:51:53.119] happen and there was a uh an attempt by
[00:51:56.880] the government to solve it quickly. Um,
[00:52:00.240] and it was all of the above. It was the,
[00:52:02.240] you know, DHS, the government, FAA all
[00:52:04.559] working together. But as a result of
[00:52:06.880] that, I think the government understands
[00:52:09.680] the potential threat and now the
[00:52:12.640] departments of homeland security, the
[00:52:14.880] FAA, the Department of Transportation,
[00:52:17.520] DoD, and the IC have made huge
[00:52:20.319] investments and improvements in
[00:52:21.920] government and to have that inter agency
[00:52:24.319] response to those threats. I know uh one
[00:52:27.200] of the last uh TDY I did um would been
[00:52:32.559] in 24, I was down in the El Paso area
[00:52:35.680] and I actually had worked with um the
[00:52:38.960] debt commander for um CBP
[00:52:42.400] and you know there was getting a a brief
[00:52:45.040] on the UAS threat from the Mexican
[00:52:49.040] cartels, how basically they have set up
[00:52:52.240] a drug anal drug, you know, delivery
[00:52:55.599] system where you can go out, you can
[00:52:57.680] place an order and they will fly the
[00:53:00.079] drugs to you by UAS up to 100 kilometers
[00:53:04.000] from the US southern border, you know,
[00:53:06.720] where they would actually have them tops
[00:53:08.880] of commercial buildings, what I would
[00:53:11.119] call a a forward refueling and army
[00:53:13.440] site, a FAR site where they could come
[00:53:15.200] in, recharge or put in new batteries to
[00:53:17.680] continue that delivery service. That's
[00:53:19.680] crazy. Um, we better get this serious
[00:53:21.839] because what goes on in Mexico is not
[00:53:24.720] going to stay in Mexico. And there are
[00:53:27.599] numerous stories of cartels using um UAS
[00:53:32.960] for kinetic strike. You know, they've
[00:53:34.640] moved from ISR to logistics delivery of
[00:53:38.800] product to actually doing arm strike.
[00:53:42.000] Um, when you have advancement in
[00:53:43.839] technology, those things uh tend not to
[00:53:47.760] stay localized. they proliferate and
[00:53:49.599] they're copied by others. So that would
[00:53:51.680] be a concern that I have and I think in
[00:53:53.760] the next conflict we have as we saw with
[00:53:56.800] some of the brilliant uh initiatives um
[00:54:00.319] that Ukraine did against Russia. I I
[00:54:03.119] think you know we have that potential
[00:54:05.040] here in the homeland of being threatened
[00:54:07.200] by these same technologies for many many
[00:54:09.599] years. We are protected by friendly
[00:54:11.839] neighbors and very large oceans. Yeah.
[00:54:14.079] Yeah. you know, with the advancement in
[00:54:16.960] this US UAS technology, um, you know,
[00:54:20.240] our homeland is vulnerable. Yeah. No,
[00:54:22.800] definitely. And I know we've invested a
[00:54:24.559] lot and, you know, from my days, you
[00:54:27.680] know, and military schools and I can
[00:54:30.640] remember reading dead Germans that to
[00:54:32.480] defend everything, defend nothing. And
[00:54:35.119] we're going to have to be very strategic
[00:54:37.280] on how we tar um critical
[00:54:40.880] infrastructure. And we provide counter
[00:54:42.720] UAS detection and mediation capabilities
[00:54:45.839] to protect our vital infrastructure. We
[00:54:48.160] need to do that. Yeah. Know that's
[00:54:50.000] something I always talk about when
[00:54:51.280] people ask me like why I look into UAPs
[00:54:53.839] is because there are real security
[00:54:55.920] implications of it as well as the the
[00:54:57.920] simple interest of you know what these
[00:54:59.359] things are and especially now with
[00:55:01.280] drones obviously with UAS it's uh it's a
[00:55:04.480] very very real issue. I thought where
[00:55:06.480] the new administration was talking about
[00:55:08.480] the uh golden uh dome and then I forgot
[00:55:12.240] the other they changed the name of it
[00:55:14.000] but you know they're looking at some
[00:55:15.839] type of uh airspace defense system here
[00:55:18.720] in America. Um
[00:55:22.240] there there is a lot of uh surveillance
[00:55:25.359] data as we look at um space surveillance
[00:55:27.839] data, we look at uh navigation aids, um
[00:55:34.319] air traffic control radar, you know,
[00:55:36.240] approach radars, maritime radars. We
[00:55:39.200] have a lot of sensor data available that
[00:55:42.000] could be exploited. And I know that
[00:55:44.400] there were some great initiatives to be
[00:55:46.640] able to um build like watch boxes where
[00:55:50.319] you would take all available data over a
[00:55:52.880] vulnerable area or a place that we
[00:55:54.559] wanted to protect and in near real time
[00:55:57.359] where you build algorithm looking for
[00:55:59.359] those UAP anomalies. The flight
[00:56:01.599] characteristics could be counter UAS or
[00:56:04.079] it could be counter UAF or UAP and then
[00:56:07.280] when you get an incident you start
[00:56:10.000] building that track and then near real
[00:56:11.920] time you provide indications and warning
[00:56:15.040] you know to some type of command center
[00:56:16.720] to deal with it to have that operational
[00:56:18.720] response to mediate it. um we're going
[00:56:21.520] to get better at that. And I I think
[00:56:23.359] that this administration's you know um
[00:56:28.400] understanding of the vulnerability when
[00:56:30.160] we don't have point air defense systems
[00:56:32.000] in our country. I I think trying to
[00:56:34.319] combine all the available data sensor
[00:56:37.200] data with some type of um operational
[00:56:40.079] response is going to make safer in the
[00:56:42.000] future. Right.
[00:56:44.079] Do you feel like the the Golden Dome
[00:56:45.599] initiative is uh perhaps a little bit
[00:56:47.839] unbalanced in that it's focusing more on
[00:56:51.200] on missile countermissile technology? Um
[00:56:54.960] I think I think the detection could be
[00:56:56.640] all of the above. Um due to the the
[00:56:59.760] geographic, you know, size of our
[00:57:01.520] country, it'd be very very um expensive
[00:57:04.319] to provide uh countermeasures
[00:57:06.640] everywhere. I I think that we have to do
[00:57:08.799] a triage. We've got to rack and stack.
[00:57:11.040] We've got to look at critical
[00:57:12.240] infrastructure and what you know what is
[00:57:15.440] our center of gravity how do we you know
[00:57:17.440] how do we um defend and protect that and
[00:57:20.960] that's where we're going to have the
[00:57:22.079] counters but I think for surveillance we
[00:57:24.400] want to be able to detect a threat as
[00:57:26.640] far away as possible so you can build
[00:57:28.799] that track so you can provide that
[00:57:30.240] indications and warning you know one of
[00:57:32.400] the initiatives that Arrow was
[00:57:34.559] researching when I left is a lot of our
[00:57:37.280] active radars were all groundbased
[00:57:40.640] Um and then we would leverage NTM and
[00:57:43.280] air traffic control radars trying to
[00:57:45.440] complete the pictures. But when we
[00:57:47.359] visited um the Mid-Atlantic Air Defense
[00:57:50.240] Sector Command,
[00:57:52.240] um we actually had asked them, you know,
[00:57:54.400] on the National Capital Regions, we have
[00:57:56.400] concentric rings of sensors and kinetic
[00:57:59.440] abilities to protect the capital. And I
[00:58:02.640] asked them, I said, you know, we've been
[00:58:04.079] doing this for about 20 years, you know,
[00:58:05.760] since 911. I said, do you have UAP? if
[00:58:08.799] you have anomalies that you don't
[00:58:11.040] understand. And they came back and said,
[00:58:12.960] "No." He says, "When we have a track, we
[00:58:15.599] have an incident, um, we will continue
[00:58:18.559] to throw sensors at it, you know, trying
[00:58:21.440] to, you know, increase our knowledge
[00:58:23.359] where they can actually intercept it.
[00:58:25.920] They can be using, you know, the dolphin
[00:58:28.000] helicopters. You know, they can go after
[00:58:29.839] it with F-16s or what we discovered,
[00:58:33.520] they have their own UAS's, the group one
[00:58:35.599] and two UAS, these low and slow flyers
[00:58:38.079] that could go out and intercept and get
[00:58:40.640] some type of, you know, eyes on the
[00:58:43.599] target so they can they can classify it.
[00:58:45.680] They can understand what it is. And I
[00:58:47.280] think ERA was actually looking at the
[00:58:49.599] use of um ISR systems, airborne system
[00:58:53.599] to help them in the detection and
[00:58:56.720] identification of UAPs, you know, to
[00:58:59.359] have our own um you know, counter UAS
[00:59:03.200] system with an active radar that could
[00:59:04.799] help us detect these things. So there's
[00:59:07.839] that's very interesting because it's
[00:59:09.119] like, you know, they're very sensor
[00:59:10.400] dense in a very security uh heightened
[00:59:13.119] area, you know, around the capital. And
[00:59:15.599] you say that they've had no UAPs.
[00:59:18.480] There's nothing that they couldn't
[00:59:19.520] actually identify. Like everything gets
[00:59:21.359] tracked down. Correct. And so it's kind
[00:59:24.000] of like the uh you know I talk about the
[00:59:25.599] low information zone. Um this would be
[00:59:28.319] the the high information zone like
[00:59:30.319] around the capital and you know when you
[00:59:32.799] actually get that particular area. Um
[00:59:35.440] coming up on the hour like do you have
[00:59:37.040] more time to to talk? I I have more
[00:59:39.119] time. Um I've got about I've got another
[00:59:42.160] 15 minutes before I have to run. I've
[00:59:43.920] I've got an appointment.
[00:59:46.240] All right. Uh well, I I need to ask you
[00:59:48.079] like uh about a couple of my favorite
[00:59:50.000] cases. First of all would be the the
[00:59:52.319] gimbal case. Uh if you did you did you
[00:59:55.040] work on that at all and do you know what
[00:59:56.400] the kind of the current worked on it? Um
[00:59:59.520] I thought we had uh uh analysis and a
[01:00:03.839] solution that was going to go public. Um
[01:00:05.760] I haven't been to the website to see
[01:00:07.359] what's been published. A lot of those
[01:00:09.520] cases are going back. Um I think the
[01:00:12.160] gimbal was off the Virginia Capes
[01:00:14.400] incident. Yeah. Yeah. Um again we're
[01:00:17.200] looking at uh incomplete data again
[01:00:20.880] because the Department of Defense in
[01:00:22.880] this case the the Navy uh did not have
[01:00:25.520] operational direction to preserve that
[01:00:27.359] data. It's on the initiative of the
[01:00:28.960] aviators that captured it. But the data
[01:00:32.000] bricks that come off the aircraft when
[01:00:34.000] they download it during their mission
[01:00:35.599] debriefs now we would get that data back
[01:00:39.119] then you know that data was being
[01:00:41.280] uploaded you know in an email or put on
[01:00:43.280] the internet so we don't have the
[01:00:46.000] original data to go back and analyze um
[01:00:48.960] and I'm a little bit frustrated I know
[01:00:51.200] those were um you know part of the
[01:00:53.920] cannon of this UAP gospel but we wanted
[01:00:58.160] to look at current cases national
[01:01:00.559] security cases um that present a threat
[01:01:03.359] today. And as an intel guy, a national
[01:01:05.760] security guy, that that was always my
[01:01:07.359] bias. Um there was criticism of the
[01:01:10.400] historical report that we had published.
[01:01:13.599] Um, we did that in response to the
[01:01:15.920] direction of the law and Congress's
[01:01:18.079] concern that there was unauthorized
[01:01:22.400] expenditures of funds to pursue uh, UAP
[01:01:26.480] recovery and reverse engineering um,
[01:01:29.119] programs that that were not authorized
[01:01:32.240] or not briefed to Congress. And that was
[01:01:34.880] really the focus of what we did. It was
[01:01:36.799] a very very um, massive undertaking with
[01:01:40.799] a relatively small staff. um we had to
[01:01:44.000] publish it quick about a year to do the
[01:01:45.920] research um and go through the editing
[01:01:48.640] process and go through the coordination
[01:01:51.280] um to actually be able to share that
[01:01:53.440] with the public um until you've been in
[01:01:56.160] the government and you've worked at the
[01:01:58.000] cabinet level and you understand you
[01:02:01.599] know the the six months it will take to
[01:02:04.640] have to share a you know public release
[01:02:07.839] a document with the you know to the
[01:02:09.920] American people the coordination that
[01:02:12.720] takes is extensive and it it will go
[01:02:16.799] back through government council you know
[01:02:19.440] review four or five times as we get new
[01:02:21.920] addition so it can be very frustrating
[01:02:23.760] it's very slow and but there was every
[01:02:27.920] every attempt to share as much as we
[01:02:30.559] could with the American public now there
[01:02:33.520] are different versions of that report
[01:02:35.839] there is the unclassified there's a
[01:02:38.319] TSSCI version and then there's a SAP CAP
[01:02:42.319] version of that report. That one's brief
[01:02:44.480] to oversight and those within executive
[01:02:47.119] need to know. So, fascinating. Yeah.
[01:02:49.760] what the public read um it it probably
[01:02:52.799] had 80% 90% of what was in the the more
[01:02:57.440] sensitive versions of that brief, but
[01:02:59.760] there was nothing there where Arrow was
[01:03:02.000] trying to protect um you know some type
[01:03:05.040] of covert program where we were reverse
[01:03:09.119] engineering you know alien you know
[01:03:11.920] technology. And then I did want to make
[01:03:14.400] a a quick comment for the cases we had
[01:03:17.760] where Arrow was given physical material
[01:03:20.799] to analyze and we would do blind tests
[01:03:23.599] with the national labs and we work very
[01:03:26.559] closely with the department of energy
[01:03:28.720] and we would provide these materials and
[01:03:31.359] ask them to do a material analysis. In
[01:03:33.839] every case those materials were you know
[01:03:38.160] assessed by experts some of the the best
[01:03:40.319] physicists in the world that those
[01:03:42.400] materials originated on our planet in
[01:03:44.720] our solar system. Okay. And we haven't
[01:03:46.799] found anything that our scientists could
[01:03:50.079] assess came from a different you know
[01:03:53.119] galaxy. That's a shame.
[01:03:56.000] We would love to I'll I'll tell you our
[01:03:57.839] scientists you know they would love you
[01:04:00.000] know to earn a Nobel Peace Prize you
[01:04:01.920] know wonderful you know for a new you
[01:04:04.400] know discovery um
[01:04:06.720] you know they're they're they're very
[01:04:09.200] curious they're open-minded um they will
[01:04:12.799] you know follow the best scientific
[01:04:14.960] practices what they do is re you know
[01:04:18.000] peer-reviewed
[01:04:19.680] um and extensively
[01:04:21.920] um you know audited by people within the
[01:04:24.720] government to make sure that we're
[01:04:26.160] following best practices and we don't
[01:04:28.720] have biases. Um when it comes to our
[01:04:31.280] analytic processes and we actually
[01:04:33.599] follow IC analytic guidelines as you
[01:04:37.280] know um analytic integrity the law you
[01:04:41.119] know as we give our assessments and the
[01:04:45.680] confidence in our assessments. you know
[01:04:47.920] what we do is um comment to the IC and
[01:04:52.400] we do not allow um interference of an
[01:04:55.760] interested party or even elected
[01:04:57.599] official to interfere with the work that
[01:04:59.119] Errol does and I'll say with confidence
[01:05:01.359] we have not had any of that um
[01:05:04.240] interference to my knowledge. Um I I
[01:05:07.520] can't think of one incident where we had
[01:05:09.440] a an elected official or a government
[01:05:11.520] bureaucrat that attempted to um
[01:05:14.319] interfere with what we were doing. We
[01:05:16.400] had nothing but cooperation. You know,
[01:05:19.200] people um and even private sector, they
[01:05:22.720] they were eager to work with us. Um they
[01:05:25.760] open things up to us. I will, you know,
[01:05:29.119] I will explain that trying to do blue
[01:05:31.440] force deconliction could be very very
[01:05:33.839] difficult. So when we have an incident,
[01:05:36.480] one of the things we have to ask is it
[01:05:38.559] one of ours? Yeah. And you have to be
[01:05:42.079] very careful of who you ask and the
[01:05:44.240] question that's asked because they're
[01:05:45.680] not going to afford anything. Yeah. And
[01:05:48.559] we've actually had incidents where we've
[01:05:50.559] talked to the S&T community but not the
[01:05:53.680] operator not the operators and found out
[01:05:56.079] that the operators were using foreign
[01:05:58.640] tech. You know that could not be
[01:06:00.880] attributed to us if it had been
[01:06:02.799] compromised or lost. So you you have to
[01:06:05.280] be very very thorough um when you go
[01:06:07.920] back and you do your coordination within
[01:06:09.920] the you know inter agency process to
[01:06:12.640] understand all the capabilities that may
[01:06:15.119] be fielded by our government uh during
[01:06:17.359] an operation. So that takes a lot of
[01:06:20.319] time but the the trust that we were
[01:06:22.799] given the access to the programs that we
[01:06:25.039] were given was absolutely amazing. They
[01:06:27.599] open up. Sounds like it. And we since
[01:06:30.559] you know there were a lot of claims or
[01:06:32.400] made under oath, witnesses before
[01:06:34.400] Congress um about um advanced alien
[01:06:38.000] technologies being hid or being you know
[01:06:40.559] developed at um different locations such
[01:06:42.799] as Wright Patterson or out there what
[01:06:45.039] they call Area 51. And we were out there
[01:06:47.599] multiple times um working with
[01:06:50.000] facilities managers going into the
[01:06:52.400] building records attempting to go
[01:06:54.480] underground, you know, to research these
[01:06:56.319] claims.
[01:06:57.839] Yeah. There and I will tell you that
[01:07:00.079] everybody was open to it. Um they didn't
[01:07:02.880] try to us or hide things from
[01:07:05.200] us. Um they just opened it up and we did
[01:07:08.799] everything we could to research these
[01:07:10.400] claims. Yeah. Yeah. Um, just one real
[01:07:14.079] quick step back to gimbal. Uh, is there
[01:07:18.720] more data than what is seen in public?
[01:07:21.119] Like all we see of gimbal right now is
[01:07:22.960] that one video. Uh, I think it's about
[01:07:24.880] 30 seconds long. Do you have more video
[01:07:27.520] or do you have radar data? I don't only
[01:07:31.599] thing we had was that video. We did not
[01:07:33.200] have raw radar data. And our science
[01:07:35.119] that's what our scientists would want.
[01:07:36.559] They'd want the raw data to be able to
[01:07:38.559] analyze the event. So you're just
[01:07:40.240] working with the the I guess the
[01:07:42.319] eyewitness account. Did eyewitness
[01:07:44.559] account and the videos that relate to
[01:07:46.559] the internet is what we were working
[01:07:48.000] with. Do you know if you actually talked
[01:07:49.440] to the pilots who who took who were on
[01:07:51.440] the plane that took the video
[01:07:54.559] in in almost in every case we attempted
[01:07:57.520] to do so. Uh I know there were a couple
[01:08:00.079] of cases I think it was on the go fast
[01:08:02.799] um multiple attempt trying to get to the
[01:08:04.720] pilot who was who was operational
[01:08:06.480] because we wanted to know the heading
[01:08:08.000] and speed the time that video was taken.
[01:08:10.640] Um and I don't think we were successful
[01:08:12.559] in ever closing that but there was good
[01:08:15.119] cooperation but we're going back uh to
[01:08:18.000] an operational unit um where we've had a
[01:08:21.600] complete turnover in personnel 20 years
[01:08:23.520] ago. Right. Is that because you couldn't
[01:08:26.000] you couldn't find the pilot or or did he
[01:08:28.080] not I don't think we were ever I I think
[01:08:30.640] we had a name. I don't think we were
[01:08:32.560] when I was there I don't think we our
[01:08:34.480] investigators were ever able to
[01:08:35.920] interview him. I I think we just were
[01:08:38.799] ever able to connect to do so. Okay.
[01:08:42.880] Yeah. Because I know Ryan Graves says he
[01:08:44.799] knows the pilot. Oh, I then I'm sure
[01:08:48.960] that if Ryan would contact uh you know,
[01:08:51.759] Commander Graves would contact Arrow and
[01:08:53.679] give him the pilot's name and you know,
[01:08:55.440] maybe an email account, they'd be more
[01:08:57.279] than happy to set up an interview. Yeah.
[01:08:59.600] Well, that'd be great. But I mean, I'm
[01:09:01.440] surprised that wouldn't have been done
[01:09:02.560] already if uh uh that and it may have um
[01:09:07.120] you know, there were thousands of cases
[01:09:09.120] and um I wasn't the chief analysis, so I
[01:09:13.279] would I would hand that over to our
[01:09:14.719] chief analysis. All right. On on the
[01:09:16.880] steps that they had taken. Well, I guess
[01:09:18.400] there's there's going to be a a report
[01:09:21.279] coming out on Gimble fairly soon then.
[01:09:22.799] If not already, I guess heard of it. We
[01:09:25.759] had uh for the historical report, we had
[01:09:28.239] new findings. Um um completing the work
[01:09:32.480] that we had started in that initial
[01:09:34.000] report um due to the change over
[01:09:36.960] administrations since there's a a new
[01:09:39.839] political staff we had to work with um
[01:09:42.239] that coordination process had to start
[01:09:43.920] over.
[01:09:45.520] So, and since I'm no longer in the
[01:09:47.920] government, I'm not sure where that was,
[01:09:50.080] but we were trying to get it out um in
[01:09:53.120] front of the public so we could tell
[01:09:54.800] them what has developed since that first
[01:09:57.199] report. Yeah. Was released, but there
[01:09:59.840] was some new information. Um there was
[01:10:02.560] some great work by um Archifist um in
[01:10:05.520] the military services. We were able to
[01:10:07.199] go back uh to some of the original
[01:10:10.239] documentation. I know that Errol's um
[01:10:13.120] actually had worked with a studio in
[01:10:15.760] California. There was some 70 and 30 mm
[01:10:19.520] um video or not video, it's actually
[01:10:21.520] film of I think it was an Atlas missile
[01:10:24.159] test that occurred at Cape Canaveral.
[01:10:25.760] No, it was um
[01:10:29.360] it's not Cape Canaveral. It's out there
[01:10:30.960] on the west coast. Um yeah, Vandenberg
[01:10:33.600] Vandenberg uh missile test range out
[01:10:36.400] there with and we were able to go back
[01:10:39.199] and uh reconstruct
[01:10:42.320] uh the Kremlin film to actually um
[01:10:47.120] provide a video clip of what was being
[01:10:50.080] tested. So there was uh claims that an
[01:10:53.360] alien spaceship had interfered and
[01:10:55.520] destroyed a missile that was being
[01:10:57.280] tested out there at Vandenberg. Um
[01:11:00.480] actually in fact it was a countermeasure
[01:11:02.800] test being done by our scientists. Okay.
[01:11:05.120] And we were able to get the original
[01:11:06.960] films and reports of that. I think
[01:11:08.880] that's going to be in the next version
[01:11:10.159] of the aerial test. There was some uh
[01:11:12.719] work done with the national labs dealing
[01:11:15.520] with the cascading transformer failure.
[01:11:18.800] One of the missile ranges that was
[01:11:20.560] another uh you know one of the base you
[01:11:23.840] know baseline stories about alien
[01:11:26.480] involvement in nuclear weapons. And I
[01:11:28.719] think they have some stories on that. U
[01:11:31.040] there could be some u new, you know, new
[01:11:34.000] data, new facts about the Nimix case
[01:11:36.400] that Errol is able to research and
[01:11:38.400] confirm and will publish. So I'm sure
[01:11:40.560] that Errol is working very very hard um
[01:11:42.960] to get that out uh you know to both
[01:11:46.400] Congress and the American public. Yeah.
[01:11:49.120] Talking about the cascading transformer
[01:11:50.880] failure, I imagine that refers to the
[01:11:52.719] the Molstrom incident with the going off
[01:11:56.480] site. Uh now there's a big thing in the
[01:11:59.280] in the Wall Street Journal uh article
[01:12:01.520] about that uh story and there was a
[01:12:04.480] theory that was repeated in the in the
[01:12:07.520] article that it was actually an EMP test
[01:12:10.800] uh and that was responsible for uh you
[01:12:13.360] know both the sighting of a UFO with a
[01:12:15.760] red glowing orb and then the the uh the
[01:12:18.560] electrical failure. But there's been
[01:12:20.239] quite a bit of push back uh on that
[01:12:22.640] because the the EMP test uh equipment,
[01:12:26.880] the TEMP uh transportable EMP thing only
[01:12:30.719] came into operation in 72 and this
[01:12:34.159] sighting was in um ' 67 or ' 68. Um do
[01:12:38.640] you do you have any knowledge about that
[01:12:40.719] particular theory and about where it
[01:12:42.480] came from? Not about being an MP test.
[01:12:45.120] Um what we were what I'm um privy to is
[01:12:48.960] the fact that uh the missile silos were
[01:12:52.080] actually connected to the commercial
[01:12:54.080] grid for power. They did have their
[01:12:57.040] critical power. They had their own
[01:12:58.560] generators but um for cost savings they
[01:13:02.159] were connected to the commercial grid.
[01:13:04.960] They they had you know dual fire uh
[01:13:08.080] feeds. There was a electrical
[01:13:10.320] disturbance. There was some, you know,
[01:13:11.920] some storms and the filtering the
[01:13:15.679] capacitors that would have shielded the
[01:13:18.400] critical systems and the missile silos
[01:13:20.560] from a from a energy surge coming
[01:13:23.760] through the commercial grid failed and
[01:13:26.080] actually took some of the m the missile
[01:13:28.719] silos down. That would have been very
[01:13:30.800] very embarrassing
[01:13:32.960] to the Department of Defense and it was
[01:13:35.360] a vulnerability of our nuclear
[01:13:36.880] deterrent. That's it. And I do know that
[01:13:40.000] um the Air Force spent a lot of money
[01:13:42.000] working with national labs trying to
[01:13:44.320] duplicate the failure so they could
[01:13:46.000] understand it and re-engineer a
[01:13:48.000] solution. And that was the work that
[01:13:51.040] Arrow had discovered in the archives and
[01:13:54.000] actually got all the test results. And
[01:13:56.320] the ENTP is something I'm not aware of.
[01:13:59.199] I I did read it in the press, but that
[01:14:02.159] that's not the story that Arrol was
[01:14:05.199] pursuing when I was still there. Okay.
[01:14:07.440] Yeah. I guess those tests would have
[01:14:08.880] been after the fact as well because if
[01:14:10.640] this this original story came from this
[01:14:13.600] uh electrical grid disturbance causing
[01:14:16.400] the uh the initial failure, then they
[01:14:18.880] would have been doing tests down the
[01:14:20.320] line to
[01:14:22.159] mitigate that and also harden it against
[01:14:24.560] uh EMPs. And it's absolutely vital that
[01:14:28.000] we protect against EMP. And I I can
[01:14:30.960] remember my days where we had to test uh
[01:14:33.360] you know Tempest hardened facilities,
[01:14:35.920] you know, to keep that that stray energy
[01:14:38.560] from getting into our electronic devices
[01:14:40.960] and destroying them. Then the other
[01:14:43.199] thing in the the Wall Street Journal
[01:14:44.560] article was uh this this Yankee Blue um
[01:14:48.719] hazing. Very familiar with that. Okay.
[01:14:51.199] And that that's that's like a you know a
[01:14:53.679] real thing that uh absolutely it was
[01:14:56.719] actually uh according to the air force
[01:14:59.520] inspector general was actually
[01:15:01.199] established as a training tool
[01:15:05.520] because you know you have um management
[01:15:08.880] of uh department uh special access
[01:15:11.520] programs. So add an insulation as you
[01:15:15.760] have a need to know you're read into
[01:15:17.280] these programs and you're understood the
[01:15:19.600] measures protect the programs what you
[01:15:22.159] can discuss about the programs and we
[01:15:23.920] read people off. So they needed a tool
[01:15:27.199] to train people you know how to minister
[01:15:29.920] and how to read people in. Um they had
[01:15:33.040] an amazing uh brief about um Yankee Blue
[01:15:37.040] and it's some type of anti-gravity motor
[01:15:39.840] that was developed and the the image on
[01:15:43.360] the brief was your classic 1960s flying
[01:15:46.880] saucer. Um the triraph, the measures,
[01:15:50.400] everything about it was correct.
[01:15:53.520] So you had these managers, these clerks,
[01:15:57.120] these people, administrative people who
[01:15:59.120] worked in the special access program,
[01:16:01.600] management offices,
[01:16:03.920] um, use this as a training tool.
[01:16:06.400] However, it went rogue. It got out into
[01:16:09.280] the wild and for multiple decades, it
[01:16:14.000] was being briefed as a legitimate
[01:16:17.199] program of record, an actual SAP.
[01:16:20.719] And we were told um by the Air Force
[01:16:25.040] that this was hazing. It was, you know,
[01:16:27.520] they just did it as a joke. Yeah. Um,
[01:16:32.000] when I briefed it, we became, you know,
[01:16:34.159] we were very concerned about incidents
[01:16:36.320] of hazing in the DoD and we thought this
[01:16:38.560] is something that we had to report and I
[01:16:40.640] was the acting director at the time and
[01:16:42.640] we did report it to Congress and we did
[01:16:44.400] report it to, you know, our command and
[01:16:46.480] control both depth and to the uh the DNI
[01:16:49.840] about what we had discovered. Um the DNI
[01:16:52.719] had actually asked a very very good
[01:16:54.800] question uh because it was so realistic
[01:16:57.600] and she had asked if this could be the
[01:17:00.159] basis for this persistent urban myth
[01:17:02.960] that the government has recovered and
[01:17:05.120] reverse engineered alien technology
[01:17:07.520] because it was so well done and we knew
[01:17:10.239] had gone wild and had been out um in the
[01:17:13.920] services for decades. and she had asked
[01:17:16.640] had we completed a damage assessment and
[01:17:19.360] how many people you know were exposed to
[01:17:22.159] this and we were not the be the office
[01:17:26.000] that would do that investigation and
[01:17:28.640] come back with an assessment. We did
[01:17:30.800] request that it be done.
[01:17:33.440] However, we assessed just due to the
[01:17:35.840] turnover, the typical tour of the
[01:17:38.320] service members about 2 to 3 years max
[01:17:41.280] that there would be potentially um you
[01:17:43.760] know thousands of people who had been
[01:17:46.159] read into this program and believe it to
[01:17:48.080] be true. I mean that seems kind of crazy
[01:17:50.560] really. I mean it seems like well it is
[01:17:53.520] it it was something that was developed
[01:17:55.920] for a legitimate purpose and then was
[01:17:58.159] misused and got wild and then we also
[01:18:00.560] became concerned it that had got outside
[01:18:03.760] of the air force. There were other
[01:18:05.280] services
[01:18:06.880] wow that had basically used you know a
[01:18:09.760] derivative of that or expanded upon that
[01:18:12.159] and had got outside the air force appco
[01:18:14.719] Canadian as well. So it's one of the
[01:18:16.960] things that Arrol did discover during
[01:18:18.640] its investigation.
[01:18:20.800] I mean you think of the historical
[01:18:23.040] report. Do you think there will be
[01:18:24.320] repercussions for this? Because it seems
[01:18:26.080] like you know there's been a failure of
[01:18:28.400] management at some level uh to allow it
[01:18:30.719] to get talking about we're going you're
[01:18:32.800] going back decades now. Are those people
[01:18:35.520] are no I'm sure they're no longer in
[01:18:37.199] uniform. But it's if it's still was it
[01:18:39.840] still being used as a No, not at all. Um
[01:18:43.760] when it was discovered, DoD rapidly put
[01:18:46.560] out instructions to stop it. Now it it
[01:18:48.880] stopped. But when when did it stop? Um
[01:18:52.239] when we reported it. So like in a couple
[01:18:54.960] of years ago. A couple of years ago DoD
[01:18:58.080] quickly took action and I I know that uh
[01:19:01.360] at the highest levels in the department
[01:19:03.360] it was embarrassing and it was a
[01:19:04.719] violation you know of I don't know a law
[01:19:08.960] but a regulation. You don't haze and
[01:19:13.440] Have you come across people that uh you
[01:19:16.159] think have been directly influenced by
[01:19:17.760] this program and that's why they I
[01:19:19.840] personally haven't I'm I'm sure that if
[01:19:23.280] the services you know wanted to do that
[01:19:25.199] damage assessment they they will fine
[01:19:27.120] I'm sure that could be a simple
[01:19:28.560] solicitation
[01:19:30.480] we we estimated just look at every base
[01:19:34.000] you know that has SAP programs has a SAP
[01:19:36.239] co
[01:19:38.239] so you're you're you're talking and then
[01:19:40.560] say a third of them turn over every year
[01:19:43.679] and you've been doing it for 20 years,
[01:19:46.159] we're talking thousands, if not tous
[01:19:48.080] thousands of people that have been um
[01:19:51.199] inexposed to this. And then we had other
[01:19:53.679] incidents of hazing um or using
[01:19:58.159] unauthorized uh different disinformation
[01:20:01.120] campaigns, you know, to obscure and to
[01:20:04.320] hide legitimate government programs.
[01:20:07.920] And I I know one of the things that I
[01:20:10.080] saw when I flew out to uh you know the
[01:20:14.159] Nevada test site and I get off the plane
[01:20:16.080] and I I meet the wing commander. I look
[01:20:18.560] over on the on the the taxi way and
[01:20:22.239] there's the classic 1950s UFO and
[01:20:26.800] aluminum metal parked there really. And
[01:20:29.760] I just kind of point my finger and ask
[01:20:31.520] the colonel. I said, "What's that?" And
[01:20:33.920] he says, 'Well, you know, we're in a
[01:20:35.440] remote location and we have a UFO
[01:20:37.679] parade. That's one of the parade.
[01:20:40.480] You know, you know, people are bored and
[01:20:42.640] that's what they do in their spare time
[01:20:44.000] out there in the high desert. But if you
[01:20:47.120] look at the images, those parade
[01:20:49.679] vehicles are strategically parked around
[01:20:52.880] the installation where the UF, you know,
[01:20:55.280] UAP and UFO believers can, you know,
[01:20:59.440] observe them with their optics. So, it's
[01:21:03.120] kind of feeding the beast here. Indeed.
[01:21:05.199] Indeed. When you do that, um there were
[01:21:07.840] reports and um of even security
[01:21:10.400] personnel wearing alien masks, rubber
[01:21:12.400] masks as they're out there in their, you
[01:21:14.719] know, their sport utility vehicles
[01:21:16.560] protecting the insulation. Now, that's
[01:21:18.880] anecdotal. I never witnessed that. Um,
[01:21:21.360] but we did have reports of I remember we
[01:21:25.040] had a delegation going through one of
[01:21:27.120] the sensitive site and as they walked by
[01:21:30.640] there was a gurnie with a white you know
[01:21:33.920] sheet over it and there's this weird
[01:21:35.760] looking rubber you know alien arm
[01:21:37.600] hanging out and they quickly go back and
[01:21:40.000] shut the door and tuck the arm in. So
[01:21:41.600] there a lot of joking. It was a lot of
[01:21:43.920] joking going on and you see that if you
[01:21:46.320] were to go to say Nellis Air Force Base
[01:21:48.880] and go to the PX on the gift shop,
[01:21:51.040] you'll see all type of alien
[01:21:52.800] paraphernalia.
[01:21:54.560] Yeah. Cuz they know there's a whole
[01:21:56.080] business about this. Yeah. It's a bit
[01:21:58.639] like Denver airport has like uh uh
[01:22:01.360] things about aliens because there's
[01:22:02.639] rumor to be an alien base underneath
[01:22:04.320] Denver airport. So they played into it.
[01:22:06.800] Uh but it's you described it as hazing
[01:22:09.360] but and people have said like hazing is
[01:22:11.120] illegal. It is illegal. It's prohibited
[01:22:14.480] by I I know that it's prohibited by DoD
[01:22:17.120] instructions. I I I don't know the legal
[01:22:19.199] aspects of it. I'm sure under the UCMJ
[01:22:22.080] there's probably an article that makes
[01:22:24.320] it a crime. I wonder where what's the
[01:22:26.880] the line between joking and and hazing.
[01:22:30.400] I suppose if it's institutionalized and
[01:22:32.320] something that comes from higher up, it
[01:22:33.920] would be behazing.
[01:22:36.800] It looks like um this was again a
[01:22:39.520] legitimate it started off as a
[01:22:41.920] legitimate training effort and then just
[01:22:44.000] went rogue. Yeah, it's really misused.
[01:22:46.719] Pretty wild. But uh it is. And the fact
[01:22:50.000] is, you know, these people, you know,
[01:22:53.040] who are who are indoctrinated and
[01:22:55.440] understand how to properly handle uh
[01:22:58.320] classified materials, you know, when
[01:23:00.560] they're read out, Yeah. Yeah, they
[01:23:02.320] signed that NDA. You know, they never
[01:23:06.000] knew that that was not legitimate
[01:23:08.480] program. That's the end of it.
[01:23:11.040] Yeah. But they still have the knowledge
[01:23:12.960] that the US government had, you know, a
[01:23:18.080] anti-gravity motor, you know, derived
[01:23:20.320] from, you know, extraterrestrials. And I
[01:23:23.440] I don't believe in the um the
[01:23:26.320] description or the the copy that I saw
[01:23:28.719] there was any reference to UFO in the in
[01:23:32.239] the entire thing. It was implied but it
[01:23:34.320] wasn't there. So it's just but when you
[01:23:36.960] see the image and it's a you know it's
[01:23:39.600] your typical um you know 1950s60s shiny
[01:23:43.920] you know titanium or aluminum UFO flying
[01:23:46.960] craft. All right. So it's not they
[01:23:49.440] weren't saying it was an alien
[01:23:50.719] technology reverse engineering program.
[01:23:52.480] They were just kind of hinting at it by
[01:23:54.719] saying we have anti-gravity looks a bit
[01:23:56.800] like a flying saucer. Yeah. Interesting.
[01:23:59.679] Did Did you or Arrow talk to like David
[01:24:02.239] Grush about u you know in a way that
[01:24:05.280] would like imply that this type of thing
[01:24:07.360] has influenced his thinking? We we don't
[01:24:10.000] comment on people we interview or come
[01:24:12.480] in. Um I believe there is a foyer uh
[01:24:15.760] reading room out there that details
[01:24:18.239] Arrow's involvement with Mr. Bush. Okay.
[01:24:21.920] uh you know I'm a government bureaucrat
[01:24:23.840] uh he's an American citizen you know
[01:24:26.480] he's free to believe what he wants to
[01:24:28.239] believe. Yeah. Uh well just more more
[01:24:31.600] broadly then you know have there been
[01:24:34.880] people that you have interviewed that uh
[01:24:38.239] it this has been a significant part of
[01:24:40.800] of what they you could have said that
[01:24:43.440] earlier that there are people who have
[01:24:45.679] come in who believe it and they did they
[01:24:48.159] they believe that their their lives are
[01:24:49.679] in danger. I think that was some people
[01:24:51.520] said that, you know, they thought that
[01:24:53.040] they might be under death penalty if
[01:24:55.440] they revealed this. We never could find
[01:24:59.040] that. No one brought in an NDA
[01:25:02.400] um during our investigation threatening,
[01:25:04.320] but under title 18 for the espionage
[01:25:07.920] as a violation of the of the federal
[01:25:11.040] code, the death penalty is part, you
[01:25:14.320] know, of that code for violating. One of
[01:25:17.520] the potential um penalties.
[01:25:21.360] I I do know from, you know, personal
[01:25:23.440] experience there was a legitimate fear
[01:25:26.480] um by many witnesses.
[01:25:29.360] I think in the past um DoD and, you
[01:25:32.719] know, their commanders were quite
[01:25:34.719] creative and the construction of NDAs,
[01:25:38.400] they've been standardized, but not
[01:25:41.280] often. A lot of the NDAs were
[01:25:43.920] established and written up locally at
[01:25:46.639] the local commander discretion and based
[01:25:49.679] off the comments from individuals we we
[01:25:52.400] interviewed or attempted to schedule an
[01:25:54.239] interview. There's a legitimate fear
[01:25:57.520] that if they were to share information
[01:25:59.840] about, you know, UAPs or UFOs and
[01:26:02.080] aliens, you know, they could be subject
[01:26:04.000] to harm. And we did see that in people.
[01:26:07.040] I I can remember uh trying to convince
[01:26:09.760] an individual to to meet with us and
[01:26:13.440] he he was legitimately, you know,
[01:26:14.960] afraid, scared of his life. He he did
[01:26:17.440] not want to he he was very concerned
[01:26:19.840] about those, you know, that that that
[01:26:22.239] cabal of uh people trying to protect
[01:26:24.400] this illicit government program that
[01:26:26.320] harm him. Yeah. So, kind of leading on
[01:26:28.960] from that, like one one last
[01:26:30.639] question/topic,
[01:26:32.159] uh, what do you think of the the UAP
[01:26:34.719] Disclosure Act that, uh, Mike Rounds is
[01:26:37.440] promoting? Do you think it would be a
[01:26:39.520] good idea or It's hard enough trying to
[01:26:41.760] do secure review and disclosure being in
[01:26:43.840] the system. Um, I think it it could
[01:26:47.199] work. Uh um
[01:26:50.159] I think having a third party maybe
[01:26:52.960] outside of the executive
[01:26:55.199] um would be useful, but you have to work
[01:26:58.560] within the department to be able to
[01:27:01.120] assess the national security impact of
[01:27:04.000] declassification or public disclosure
[01:27:06.480] just due to the sensitivity and the fact
[01:27:08.560] that you only have one opportunity to do
[01:27:10.320] it right. And that was a great challenge
[01:27:12.960] in what we were trying to do because
[01:27:15.440] especially with the older cases um that
[01:27:18.800] could be in Iraq or Afghanistan um
[01:27:21.520] trying to find who was the commander at
[01:27:23.600] at that FOB that that Ford operating
[01:27:25.840] base at the time to track them down and
[01:27:28.800] then sit down with them on the you know
[01:27:31.120] on the video to determine if there was a
[01:27:33.120] compromise any operational security
[01:27:36.239] concerns that we need to be and then
[01:27:38.400] going to that components
[01:27:41.360] um classification authority to get a
[01:27:44.239] classification review and declassify it
[01:27:47.280] very bure bureaucratic intentionally so
[01:27:50.880] um and arrow is not an original
[01:27:53.440] classifier we have to go to the to the
[01:27:56.000] office or the organization that
[01:27:57.920] originally classified it to have them do
[01:28:00.320] that declassification so I I think
[01:28:03.840] additional sunshine
[01:28:06.320] um is good I I know in the law in 2024
[01:28:09.440] before um the government, you know,
[01:28:11.920] Congress dictated that all of the UAP
[01:28:14.400] UFO material um had to be forwarded to
[01:28:18.480] the National Archives. The DoD um CIO uh
[01:28:23.040] attached Arrow to do the um collection
[01:28:26.320] and the curation um start the security
[01:28:29.199] view of all the classified UAP UFO
[01:28:32.719] material. And when I left Arrow, I think
[01:28:35.360] we had almost 10 um uh security
[01:28:38.400] declassifiers on the staff we hired. And
[01:28:40.560] that's your full-time job is just to go
[01:28:42.880] through this material and work with the
[01:28:44.960] agencies or the organization that
[01:28:47.040] classified to do a security review and
[01:28:49.440] where possible declassify
[01:28:51.840] declassify this and then push this to
[01:28:53.840] NAR so to be part of the archive and NAR
[01:28:57.120] could expose and share it with American
[01:28:58.719] public. So, are we going to be seeing
[01:29:00.400] kind of a a constant stream of
[01:29:02.800] declassified documents coming out? It it
[01:29:05.520] already happened. Um I know that uh I
[01:29:09.280] believe uh the first documents were
[01:29:11.920] transferred to NAR I think back in uh
[01:29:14.480] February and March of this year is when
[01:29:17.280] the the transfer of documents actually
[01:29:19.280] worked. So, it was actually a thorough
[01:29:22.320] search both online and physical because
[01:29:25.040] remember a lot of the materials are not
[01:29:27.600] digitized.
[01:29:28.960] Yes. So, we have to go into the archives
[01:29:31.040] to find this material. Um, and and then
[01:29:33.840] forward it to Nara. So, that's ongoing.
[01:29:35.840] And I I think that is a a great effort
[01:29:39.280] to to kind of demystify,
[01:29:42.480] you know, give give the facts to the
[01:29:44.880] American people, let them decide what
[01:29:46.639] they believe about this phenomena. You
[01:29:48.880] know, maybe we can as we get more
[01:29:50.719] material declassified, more sensor data,
[01:29:53.280] maybe it can go to other people with the
[01:29:55.120] skills and the interest for them to do
[01:29:57.440] their analysis. You know, I'm a great
[01:29:59.920] believer that the US government does not
[01:30:02.000] have a monopoly, you know, on
[01:30:04.719] understanding of this phenomena. And I
[01:30:06.560] think there's some very very capable
[01:30:08.960] people out there, you know, you and what
[01:30:11.199] you've done with the tools that you
[01:30:12.639] filled, you know, could help us
[01:30:14.239] understand. And I know that uh the
[01:30:16.960] current director had actually had
[01:30:19.199] research maybe trying to do a a UAP uh
[01:30:22.880] challenge where we could have a non you
[01:30:25.679] know classify where we can get data put
[01:30:28.480] it out there. Um, and I think we
[01:30:30.639] actually got this idea from NASA. And as
[01:30:33.600] you know, we do work with NASA and they
[01:30:35.199] do that where they now put out science
[01:30:37.520] challenges to the public. And I know
[01:30:39.760] that John was looking at trying to get
[01:30:41.679] some cases that have no national
[01:30:44.560] security concerns that we could put out
[01:30:46.719] there and say, can you help us? You
[01:30:48.400] should you should do that. I mean, and I
[01:30:51.280] again, we're going through a new
[01:30:52.639] administration. This is new. we have to
[01:30:54.639] go through the secretaries and we have
[01:30:57.120] to you know address their concerns on
[01:30:59.600] public disclosure. Um, I think that
[01:31:02.560] transparency and that willingness to
[01:31:04.480] work with others and I think that's what
[01:31:06.080] you saw in Arrow, you know, when when I
[01:31:08.480] was the acting, we had more engagement
[01:31:10.960] with the interest groups that that did
[01:31:13.520] legitimate science. Mhm. You know, that
[01:31:16.320] did peer-reviewed scientists. I remember
[01:31:18.159] I think it was SCU um forwarded some uh
[01:31:21.760] PhD dissertations
[01:31:24.320] um where people had gone back into the
[01:31:26.560] archives and done some data mining on
[01:31:28.960] government uh data on UFOs historically
[01:31:32.560] and had come up with some patterns of
[01:31:34.400] life and some findings that we thought
[01:31:37.360] that was excellent trade craft. Yeah.
[01:31:40.239] you know, I I would hire them on my
[01:31:41.920] staff, you know, when I was working, you
[01:31:43.760] know, counterp proliferation. They did
[01:31:45.840] some great work, I think. I think and
[01:31:48.080] there's a lot of people like that.
[01:31:49.440] There's a lot of expertise I think we
[01:31:51.120] need to tap into. And that's why I was
[01:31:53.360] so excited about our initiative to try
[01:31:56.159] to bring in uh state, local, tribal law
[01:31:58.800] enforcements to give them best um you
[01:32:02.239] know, best practice and tools because
[01:32:05.040] they're the first responders. you know,
[01:32:06.800] the federal government is a small player
[01:32:08.400] in this, but we've got state and local,
[01:32:10.400] you know, governments everywhere uh come
[01:32:13.040] exposure, you know, are exposed to these
[01:32:15.199] things. We would love to have them
[01:32:17.600] report in near real time. I think that
[01:32:20.000] would probably best go to the air
[01:32:21.679] maritime operations center that CDP
[01:32:24.400] operates out there at Riverside. you
[01:32:27.120] know that that's homeland security or
[01:32:29.199] DHS have them curate coordinate with the
[01:32:32.080] state fusion centers you know put
[01:32:34.480] together a network of sensors law
[01:32:36.880] enforcement investigators you know so we
[01:32:39.440] can get a better understanding of this
[01:32:41.120] UAP phenomena one of the things that
[01:32:43.040] frustrated uh myself Sean and John is
[01:32:46.080] that we had a real collection bias
[01:32:48.480] because we tended to put sensors and
[01:32:50.320] analyze cases of national security
[01:32:52.800] concern but what was going on at places
[01:32:55.679] we didn't have that you know out in the
[01:32:58.639] deserts or the high plains you know the
[01:33:00.960] forest in the northeast what's the
[01:33:03.199] baseline and we like AB comparisons
[01:33:06.560] exactly you know what's going on the
[01:33:08.320] baseline and I know some of the the work
[01:33:10.080] you know John coming from NSA and he's
[01:33:13.199] guy's a quantum physic expert you know
[01:33:15.600] actually um going into FAA's radar data
[01:33:20.560] yeah you know I'm saying maybe go over
[01:33:22.800] um a test site someplace and go back
[01:33:25.679] over a period of 10 years and say are
[01:33:28.400] there anomalies we don't understand and
[01:33:30.320] recon and actually reconstruct the
[01:33:32.239] tracks.
[01:33:33.760] Is that being done with FA? That is
[01:33:35.440] being done. It's actually being done. um
[01:33:38.239] that we we had some amazing uh the
[01:33:40.880] Department of Navy gave us an incredible
[01:33:44.159] um senior executive that it used to be
[01:33:46.719] um you know the one of the IC CIOS um
[01:33:51.440] actually worked and we we leveraged I
[01:33:53.600] think it was um one of the web services
[01:33:56.800] one of the Intel agencies to give us
[01:33:59.040] that back office web support um and then
[01:34:02.400] start bringing in uh advanced analytics
[01:34:04.800] and AI because if you start looking at
[01:34:07.920] the quality of this data. It's huge.
[01:34:10.880] It's huge. Um and then we work very very
[01:34:13.600] closely with a lot of um state level,
[01:34:16.960] you know, um academic uh or universities
[01:34:21.280] um to help us analyze the data. And I
[01:34:23.280] think there's more that we could do and
[01:34:24.880] share and partner um with state, local,
[01:34:28.000] tribal to get a better understanding and
[01:34:30.480] more more timely response so we can
[01:34:33.280] understand um UAPs. You know, I I
[01:34:36.800] believe that this is security incident.
[01:34:39.920] Um I also believe that where I never saw
[01:34:43.199] anything supernatural,
[01:34:45.520] you know, that there could be another
[01:34:47.199] dimension
[01:34:48.880] that if that could exist out there that
[01:34:52.480] physics as we know it can explain the
[01:34:54.719] activity. We never witnessed it. We
[01:34:56.880] didn't measure it. But we do know
[01:34:58.800] there's a small percentage of cases that
[01:35:00.880] we can explain.
[01:35:05.199] How far outside of the norm are these
[01:35:06.800] cases? These ones that you can't
[01:35:08.239] explain?
[01:35:10.400] A little bit of everything, you know,
[01:35:11.760] the appearances, performance
[01:35:13.280] characteristics, uh the locations. Um
[01:35:17.520] I I think there'll there'll be more um
[01:35:20.960] discoveries as we start operating in
[01:35:24.000] space. You know, they are the all domain
[01:35:25.679] anomaly resolution office and as you
[01:35:28.000] know, we have a lot of space
[01:35:29.520] surveillance data. Um, we actually had
[01:35:32.159] worked with the community to define
[01:35:34.480] Arrow's role and define UAP in space.
[01:35:37.840] And wouldn't it be great if we could
[01:35:39.920] detect an anomaly as a dis as a
[01:35:42.159] de-orbitant come into the atmosphere,
[01:35:44.800] build a track and watch where it goes?
[01:35:46.960] Yeah. I mean, that's what you are
[01:35:48.239] alienating going to be coming in from
[01:35:50.480] outside. We could well, but you you
[01:35:52.800] have, you know, we do space weather. You
[01:35:54.400] know, NASA's operating up there. We do
[01:35:56.880] preserve our infrastructure in space. We
[01:35:59.120] do have a lot of sensors up there. Are
[01:36:01.040] there things we don't understand? Well,
[01:36:02.960] actually we do have some uncorrelated we
[01:36:05.120] have track uncorrelated tracks that have
[01:36:07.440] been deemed not to be a threat. You
[01:36:09.440] know, we have things in space vaults.
[01:36:11.120] You know, we have we have different
[01:36:12.880] databases that we track everything in
[01:36:14.800] space and paint chips, you know, to um
[01:36:17.920] you know, for you know, space
[01:36:20.239] capabilities, spacecraft. How do you how
[01:36:22.000] do you deem something not to be a threat
[01:36:23.440] if it's an uncorrelated track? I mean,
[01:36:25.360] does it just mean it's like a rock in
[01:36:26.639] space or it could be it could be a piece
[01:36:28.960] of debris, but if you know our the
[01:36:33.040] Department of Defense deems something
[01:36:34.639] not to be a threat, their analysis stops
[01:36:37.840] at that point, right? Well, maybe
[01:36:40.320] there's cases there, maybe there's
[01:36:42.159] anomalies that Arrow,
[01:36:45.280] you know, could research and work with
[01:36:48.400] the academic and the S&T community to
[01:36:50.800] understand what these are. Yeah. Yeah,
[01:36:52.880] and I think that's where a lot of the
[01:36:54.400] cooperation, you know, working with the
[01:36:56.320] NASA of the world, working with
[01:36:57.760] Department of Commerce, working with
[01:36:59.840] international partners, you know, could
[01:37:02.000] bring some horsepower and capability to
[01:37:03.920] look at this. You know, I think that
[01:37:06.639] Arrow um, you know, needs to leverage,
[01:37:10.239] you know, all data, you know, all
[01:37:12.639] analytic capabilities and I think we can
[01:37:14.719] federate some of this. I would love to
[01:37:17.040] instrument, you know, areas of the world
[01:37:20.080] and we're not going to defend
[01:37:21.119] everything, but there's there's things
[01:37:22.480] that are vital to our security and I
[01:37:24.960] think we need to use existing sensor
[01:37:27.360] data,
[01:37:28.880] apply some AI and some computing power
[01:37:31.520] against it and be able to provide real
[01:37:34.000] time indications of warning the same way
[01:37:37.040] NORAD works, right? and we're looking at
[01:37:39.840] threats, you know, you know, foreign
[01:37:42.639] either, you know, air breathing threats,
[01:37:44.719] space threats, aircraft, UAS's.
[01:37:47.840] Um, we could federate this, we can
[01:37:51.040] automate this. And I also think it
[01:37:53.600] really aligns well with the Golden Dome
[01:37:56.159] initiative because we're all leveraging
[01:37:58.480] some of the same data. Yeah. Yeah.
[01:38:01.600] Fascinating. And I I think just the the
[01:38:04.239] same way that we worked with um NORAD um
[01:38:07.920] and their sensor data things that we
[01:38:10.000] really wanted to protect and we asked
[01:38:11.760] the questions do you have anomalies or
[01:38:13.679] tracks you don't understand they said no
[01:38:16.159] if we could just try to expand that
[01:38:18.159] wider beyond the national capital region
[01:38:20.880] or a missile field somewhere to
[01:38:23.199] understand what's going on what is the
[01:38:25.040] baseline of activity do you think they
[01:38:27.199] might be saying no because they just
[01:38:29.199] ignore things that uh that don't fit the
[01:38:31.520] I'm proud. It's not with intermission
[01:38:33.360] set. That's why Arrow exists. Aeros
[01:38:35.600] could probably sponsor that help come up
[01:38:38.960] build an architecture, you know, field
[01:38:40.960] equipment. Um work with um Uarks and uh
[01:38:46.000] different research and scientific
[01:38:48.560] academic centers um to be able to uh
[01:38:52.080] work some of these cases to have a
[01:38:53.840] better understanding of the phenomena.
[01:38:56.320] Yeah. Well, this has all been
[01:38:57.760] fascinating. taking up a lot of your
[01:38:59.360] time and uh thank you very much for for
[01:39:01.679] doing this. Is there anything else you'd
[01:39:03.119] like to to get out or clarify? Uh no,
[01:39:06.400] not at no. I I I think we need to
[01:39:08.719] demystify this. Um you know, where
[01:39:11.600] there's phenomena we don't understand,
[01:39:13.360] admit it. You know, if there's not a
[01:39:15.360] national security concern, um and then
[01:39:18.080] leverage those with expertise and data
[01:39:20.960] to help understand it. Yeah, that sounds
[01:39:23.760] good. Yeah, you're doing uh very
[01:39:25.600] interesting work. And it's uh you know
[01:39:27.920] obviously very important work but you
[01:39:30.400] were you've done a bunch of important
[01:39:32.719] work and thank you for that. Uh and I'm
[01:39:35.520] looking forward to seeing some of the
[01:39:36.960] results of that work coming out over the
[01:39:39.840] the next months and years. Uh and you
[01:39:42.560] know I'm very much in favor of this uh
[01:39:44.800] this UAP identification contest. So if
[01:39:48.320] you got any sway you know you should
[01:39:50.080] tell tell them to to get on that and uh
[01:39:52.560] do that. And it's it's yeah if we have
[01:39:54.239] like a scientific challenge and put it
[01:39:56.960] out there I think you'd be surprised how
[01:39:59.280] quickly some of these things will will
[01:40:00.719] get solved if you if you give sufficient
[01:40:02.880] uh data. We know that NASA had a lot of
[01:40:06.400] experience success doing this and I
[01:40:08.239] think there there's room for this in the
[01:40:09.760] UAP field and I hope that we can get
[01:40:12.400] authorization and kick something off.
[01:40:14.560] And another thing I I think that we need
[01:40:16.400] to do is we need to federate and build
[01:40:20.800] uh state local tribal UAP uh reporting.
[01:40:25.440] You know we have we've invested in state
[01:40:27.600] fusion centers and we need to leverage
[01:40:30.080] that command and control that we have
[01:40:32.159] and it needs to be all a government
[01:40:33.920] approach to be able to understand detect
[01:40:37.920] track and report UAPs. Yeah. And you
[01:40:40.719] want it standardized as well. So you got
[01:40:42.480] kind of certain uh standard reference
[01:40:45.760] type of data rather than just these uh
[01:40:48.560] anecdotes and uh different data sources.
[01:40:54.000] All right. Well, thank you very much uh
[01:40:55.520] Tim. That's been uh been fascinating. Um
[01:40:58.080] is there anything that you don't want me
[01:40:59.679] to uh repeat or or share from this this
[01:41:04.000] recording? No, I I I did my best, you
[01:41:08.239] know, not to really feel anything
[01:41:09.920] sensitive, you Yeah, I'm still under a
[01:41:13.440] um you know I'm bound by my NDAs. Um but
[01:41:17.280] I do not speak for the government. I am
[01:41:18.880] a private citizen now. Okay. Um and I
[01:41:22.159] the one thing I I do when I'm going to
[01:41:23.840] try to convince the American people, you
[01:41:25.760] know, Congress and the executive did
[01:41:27.840] their best, you know, when they stood as
[01:41:30.080] their own organization to try to
[01:41:31.920] understand the phenomena. They really
[01:41:34.000] did. They weren't trying to deceive or
[01:41:35.760] hide things from the American people.
[01:41:37.920] and the if you look at the diversity
[01:41:40.320] where we were able to seek expertise
[01:41:43.280] um that joined Arrow I I think Sean did
[01:41:46.239] an excellent job an outstanding job on
[01:41:48.960] st standing up that organization
[01:41:52.000] um and I know John is has continued that
[01:41:54.960] tradition um and I hope that Arrows
[01:41:58.320] continues to be supported. I think they
[01:42:00.719] could help um be part of uh this Golden
[01:42:04.320] Dome uh initiative. you know, they I
[01:42:06.880] know that the law is going to allow them
[01:42:08.560] to um be part of the solution for this
[01:42:11.679] counter UAS challenge that we face, just
[01:42:14.560] not in the United States, but globally.
[01:42:17.040] And working together, I think we're
[01:42:18.560] going to be able to make a little bit of
[01:42:19.600] progress to understand uh UAP. and maybe
[01:42:24.320] in in attempting to detect UAPs and then
[01:42:27.440] if we discover UAS's then we're at
[01:42:30.480] mission speed we're able to pass that
[01:42:32.400] track and provide indications and
[01:42:34.400] warning to somebody who cares. Yeah,
[01:42:36.880] sounds uh sounds great. All right, well
[01:42:39.760] thank you very much and uh you have a
[01:42:42.159] good rest of your day.