Judicial Watch — David Grusch interview (2026)

Source: Judicial Watch (YouTube), "UAP Whistleblower David Grusch on 'Non-human' Biologics & Craft." Published: 2026-05-05. Duration: 1:14:26. URL: https://youtu.be/Q3BpTZXmDns Extraction: youtube_transcript.py (timestamps; >> marks a turn — interviewer vs. Grusch inferred from context), captured 2026-06-05. Verbatim auto-transcript. Key content: Immaculate Constellation discussed (~55:53) — Grusch affirms it as "an old NSC activity," explains the non-covert-action White House SAP oversight-evasion loophole (50 USC 3093), and the Presidential Records Act records-gap. Analysis: ../../sources/grusch-career-and-claims, ../../sources/immaculate-constellation.

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[00:00:00.160] I'm Chris Ferrell and this is on watch.
[00:00:13.280] Welcome to On Watch everybody. The
[00:00:14.799] Judicial Watch podcast where we go
[00:00:17.119] behind the headlines to cover news and
[00:00:18.800] information that the old mainstream
[00:00:21.520] legacy media really does not want you to
[00:00:24.400] know about. We try to recover some lost
[00:00:26.880] history and explain the inexplicable.
[00:00:29.519] Both of those things I think are going
[00:00:31.199] to be very interesting to explore with
[00:00:34.000] today's guest. It is David Grush. He is
[00:00:37.600] a former US Air Force intelligence
[00:00:39.920] officer who spent time at both the
[00:00:42.079] National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
[00:00:44.559] and the National Reconnaissance Office.
[00:00:47.520] Um he is a whistleblower who blew the
[00:00:51.760] whistle on activities concerning what
[00:00:54.960] used to be called UFOs, now called UAPs.
[00:00:58.079] We'll talk about what that means um and
[00:01:01.840] some of the program issues around that.
[00:01:04.080] And then as a whistleblower, he provided
[00:01:05.920] testimony in front of Congress. And
[00:01:09.600] speaking of Congress, he is currently a
[00:01:12.320] special adviser to Congressman Berles,
[00:01:15.280] uh Congressman from Missouri, who's been
[00:01:17.840] very vocal concerning issues about UAPs
[00:01:21.280] and aliens and what the government's
[00:01:22.960] hiding or not hiding. And so please uh
[00:01:26.640] I'm looking forward to this conversation
[00:01:29.119] and welcome David Grush. Welcome David.
[00:01:32.640] >> Thanks Chris for me.
[00:01:34.159] >> It's great to have you join us. This
[00:01:36.079] seems to be a topic that you know if you
[00:01:39.280] go back a few years people would kind of
[00:01:41.840] hit it and then move off of it as a
[00:01:43.680] topic or it would kind of bubble up in
[00:01:46.079] the news cycle and then fade out. But my
[00:01:50.320] impression is that in the last I'm going
[00:01:53.280] to say 6 to 8 months, you know, UFOs,
[00:01:57.200] UAPs, aliens,
[00:02:00.000] that has been a drum beat pretty
[00:02:02.320] consistently in the news media
[00:02:05.119] with a lot of sort of speculative gee,
[00:02:07.759] something's going to break any minute
[00:02:09.440] kind of uh tone or feeling about it. Uh
[00:02:14.640] so first of all, what's your assessment?
[00:02:16.319] Am I accurate about that? and then we'll
[00:02:18.000] we'll go further a field.
[00:02:20.319] >> Yeah, I would say last several years
[00:02:22.160] this this issue's become more and more
[00:02:24.080] of a permissive, less stigmatized topic
[00:02:25.840] to talk about. And that was one of the
[00:02:28.239] the reasons I came forward when I did is
[00:02:30.239] I I realized it was the right public
[00:02:32.239] environment for me to kind of break the
[00:02:34.319] seal on some of the more uh verboten
[00:02:37.519] type things to to talk about as it
[00:02:40.080] relates to the US government's knowledge
[00:02:41.680] on this. And I I do agree with you.
[00:02:43.599] President Trump does seem to be
[00:02:45.040] accelerating the timetable on uh his
[00:02:47.680] administration uh addressing this issue
[00:02:50.319] and that's certainly something I applaud
[00:02:52.160] and I applaud the president uh uh taking
[00:02:54.800] this very seriously and promising the
[00:02:56.800] public um some sort of disclosure. So,
[00:02:59.760] your military service as an intelligence
[00:03:01.680] officer, uh, I know because I used to be
[00:03:04.319] one too, but over on the army side of
[00:03:06.000] the house, you had you were briefed on
[00:03:08.640] or you were read on to all sorts of
[00:03:11.840] special access programs and
[00:03:14.000] >> yeah,
[00:03:14.400] >> what's sometimes people will hear about
[00:03:16.239] a skiff, sensitive compartment of the
[00:03:18.080] information facility, but the real kind
[00:03:20.080] of crown jewels of secrets, both the the
[00:03:23.760] substance, the content of the secrets,
[00:03:26.400] but also the sources and methods of how
[00:03:28.640] we obtain uh classified information and
[00:03:32.560] both of those things are treated they're
[00:03:35.440] related obviously but they're treated
[00:03:36.879] differently and so you've had access to
[00:03:39.040] all kinds of SAPs or special access
[00:03:40.959] programs you've you've been steeped in
[00:03:43.840] that kind of stuff
[00:03:45.920] and I guess as a correlary to that or as
[00:03:48.799] an outcome of that you decided to become
[00:03:51.680] a whistleblower can you kind of walk us
[00:03:53.840] through the progression on that
[00:03:56.799] >> yeah certainly Chris yeah I have I've
[00:03:58.400] had a clearance for 21 years. I was in
[00:04:00.080] the intelligence community about 14- 15
[00:04:02.000] years both as an Air Force intel
[00:04:03.599] officer. I was also a GS-15 civilian at
[00:04:06.159] NGA. So I had a parallel civilian
[00:04:08.640] career. So earlier on my career, I was
[00:04:11.120] brought into a part of the Air Force
[00:04:13.040] cloally named you know the green door
[00:04:14.879] side of the Air Force uh in the special
[00:04:17.359] access program environment. Um, from an
[00:04:20.479] early age, even into my 20s, I was, you
[00:04:22.639] know, selected kind of above my pay
[00:04:24.960] grade to te tackle some national issues,
[00:04:26.960] briefing the National Security Council
[00:04:28.560] on space issues, etc. And, um, I did
[00:04:31.919] have a parallel career both in the Air
[00:04:33.520] Force and also as a GS-15 civilian um,
[00:04:36.400] at at NGA. And I ended up advising the
[00:04:39.759] Joint Chiefs on sensitive hard targets.
[00:04:42.160] I had access to the entire black budget
[00:04:44.080] of the Department of Defense. I was, you
[00:04:46.080] know, hard briefed to 85 90% of all
[00:04:49.120] special access programs in the DoD and
[00:04:51.199] had and had hundreds of programs on the
[00:04:53.680] IC because I was kind of the go-to guy
[00:04:55.520] for peer adversarial uh hard target
[00:04:58.000] analysis for the for the J2 staff of the
[00:05:00.720] joint staff.
[00:05:01.440] >> So, let me let me hit the brakes there
[00:05:02.880] for a second.
[00:05:03.680] >> Yeah,
[00:05:04.080] >> because our listeners and our viewers
[00:05:07.280] uh what you just said was very
[00:05:08.800] significant and I want them to
[00:05:11.039] comprehend. Sometimes
[00:05:14.000] military folks will talk in acronyms and
[00:05:15.840] stuff and ordinary folks are like, "What
[00:05:17.919] the hell was that?" [laughter]
[00:05:19.680] >> Yeah.
[00:05:20.400] >> So So you talked about So you talked
[00:05:22.000] about near peers and hard targets. So
[00:05:25.360] just back up and and and
[00:05:27.759] uh and explain in regular English what
[00:05:31.039] you're talking about when you talk about
[00:05:32.560] that kind of level or type of
[00:05:34.160] information.
[00:05:35.440] >> Yeah. So I was uh the lead uh science
[00:05:37.600] and engineering technical advisor for
[00:05:39.520] something called the joint service
[00:05:41.680] counter C4 ISR initiative and that's
[00:05:44.400] looking at how do we break uh
[00:05:46.560] adversarial kill chains from sensor to
[00:05:48.960] shooter and for our peer adversaries I
[00:05:51.600] was the chief architect looking across
[00:05:54.240] the department of defense black program
[00:05:56.320] enterprise at any classification level
[00:05:58.960] pre you know giving an assessment to the
[00:06:00.720] combatant command commanders and the
[00:06:02.800] joint staff here's what we have here's
[00:06:05.360] what my percent kill uh effectiveness
[00:06:08.000] assessment is and and here are the gaps
[00:06:10.479] in our architecture that we're missing
[00:06:12.479] uh to prosecute certain uh operations
[00:06:14.880] plans that a combatant command would
[00:06:17.440] execute. And also at the NRO uh in my
[00:06:20.240] military capacity, I was the the
[00:06:21.919] presidential daily brief handler and
[00:06:23.520] coordinator and I briefed the director.
[00:06:26.000] And so I also had the the same access uh
[00:06:28.960] the president of the United States, you
[00:06:30.160] know, has in terms of um the briefings
[00:06:32.639] he gets uh from ODNI, the the
[00:06:34.639] presidential uh daily brief. So I was
[00:06:37.039] well positioned. I understood that
[00:06:39.280] ecosystem of secrecy. Um I know how they
[00:06:42.080] they hid programs from ODNI. I know how
[00:06:45.039] they hid programs from the Senate and
[00:06:47.759] and the House Intelligence Committees
[00:06:49.360] and Armed Services Committees on just um
[00:06:52.479] prosaic issues, not necessarily UAP. So
[00:06:55.440] I was well positioned to kind of
[00:06:57.039] understand um the ecosystem of secrecy
[00:07:00.240] that kind of thrives on obuscation,
[00:07:02.720] misconduct. Uh something that Judicial
[00:07:05.039] Watch obviously uh has spent decades,
[00:07:07.360] you know, with lawfare breaking that
[00:07:09.120] open. So I I had great position, access,
[00:07:12.319] trust at the highest levels, you know,
[00:07:14.720] you know, walking the West Wing of the
[00:07:16.160] of the White House and knowing those
[00:07:17.759] kind of senior folks over the years at
[00:07:19.759] an early age. You know, I'll be 40 next
[00:07:21.680] year. I'm a younger guy, but I I had a
[00:07:23.680] very precocious career. And I normally
[00:07:25.919] don't talk about myself like that, but I
[00:07:28.000] think just to uh my credentials for your
[00:07:30.639] audience, I was going to say that I
[00:07:32.639] think that's very it's very important to
[00:07:34.400] establish that because
[00:07:36.080] >> yeah,
[00:07:36.400] >> we're unfortunately we're used to all
[00:07:38.319] sorts of people running around
[00:07:40.160] pontificating and you say, "Well, wait a
[00:07:41.919] minute. What have you actually done?"
[00:07:45.039] >> Right? There's all sorts there's all
[00:07:47.199] sorts of experts, but it's like that's
[00:07:48.880] wonderful that you have that opinion,
[00:07:50.000] but what is it based on? And so, uh, I
[00:07:52.880] think the the the great thing, even the
[00:07:55.440] takeaway for people who may not be
[00:07:57.599] necessarily familiar with the ins and
[00:07:59.360] outs of DoD andor the intelligence
[00:08:02.479] community
[00:08:03.599] >> is that, you know, it isn't even talking
[00:08:05.759] about the specific secrets themselves or
[00:08:09.759] even the collection platforms or
[00:08:11.919] techniques.
[00:08:12.960] >> Yeah.
[00:08:13.599] >> Themselves. I think the takeaway for the
[00:08:16.240] average viewer listener to this podcast
[00:08:18.400] is that you understood the system,
[00:08:21.680] right? How it works, how the big green
[00:08:25.680] or blue or you know DoD purple machine,
[00:08:29.440] how it operates, how it processes and
[00:08:31.840] uses information, who controls what
[00:08:34.800] compartments of things. And knowing how
[00:08:37.919] to navigate that is incredibly important
[00:08:42.000] more so even than the substance of
[00:08:43.599] individual programs or secrets or uh or
[00:08:47.040] platforms. It's it's how the game is
[00:08:49.760] played, how
[00:08:51.360] >> the process kind of churns along and
[00:08:54.160] that's the great insight that you bring
[00:08:55.839] to this.
[00:08:56.800] >> Yes sir. Yes sir. And I was uh you know
[00:08:59.040] a part of the security mafia as well um
[00:09:01.680] and understood how those games are
[00:09:03.120] played in terms of access
[00:09:04.240] determinations. I was a special access
[00:09:06.640] program management officer for the NRO
[00:09:08.480] for about a year when there was a gap of
[00:09:09.920] leadership, you know, and I was the one
[00:09:11.839] who was, you know, briefed to more
[00:09:13.200] programs than the NRO director. And I
[00:09:15.120] had to go up and go, "Hey, ma'am, Betty
[00:09:16.720] Sap signed this NDA. You're not briefed
[00:09:19.440] to something. You're going to go uh, you
[00:09:21.200] know, TDY with General Raymond and and
[00:09:23.920] also for large portfolios of DoD special
[00:09:26.640] access programs. I was the uh uh the
[00:09:29.760] PSO, you know, personal security officer
[00:09:32.640] administering that. I like to think I
[00:09:34.240] was a benevolent security professional,
[00:09:36.399] but I saw how the security mafia would
[00:09:38.640] treat people and even people higher
[00:09:41.200] ranking, you would you would think,
[00:09:42.480] well, I should be briefed to X. I would
[00:09:44.640] know everything because of my rank and
[00:09:46.399] and duty title. As you know, Chris,
[00:09:48.720] that's not how it works. It's a rice
[00:09:51.200] bowls patriarchal type of uh big boy
[00:09:54.640] club type stuff and you're not read in
[00:09:57.360] if they don't believe you have a need to
[00:09:58.800] know versus your your rank and duty
[00:10:00.720] title. And that's especially poignant uh
[00:10:03.360] to political appointees. I know a lot of
[00:10:05.279] the political appointees [laughter]
[00:10:06.800] out there, several in this
[00:10:08.399] administration um and they complain that
[00:10:10.800] they're not getting cleared to certain
[00:10:12.000] things from certain cabinet agencies.
[00:10:13.600] And it's, you know, to my point
[00:10:15.760] >> or it's a situation where you say,
[00:10:17.120] "Well, I can tell you about it, but I'm
[00:10:19.120] not going to tell you what it is."
[00:10:20.399] Right? There's a there's a big
[00:10:22.079] difference between a general description
[00:10:24.240] about the certain activity, but the the
[00:10:26.560] particulars it's not a free-for-all.
[00:10:28.880] It's not
[00:10:29.360] >> and that's what I found. Yeah, on this
[00:10:31.279] issue is uh there's the the FMA FME
[00:10:35.200] foreign material exploitation
[00:10:36.959] acquisition program as it relates to the
[00:10:38.720] UAP subject was essentially hidden in
[00:10:41.200] plain sight which is a tradecraftraft
[00:10:42.800] technique and so you'll get a placemat
[00:10:46.240] chart on a certain black program oh it
[00:10:48.399] does this well that's the day job and
[00:10:50.800] there's other offbooks um activities
[00:10:53.120] that it does and I was on programs where
[00:10:55.360] we had offbooks activities we were not
[00:10:57.200] briefing to OD and I when I worked for
[00:10:59.360] particularly intelligence agency I can't
[00:11:01.120] acknowledge you know my relationship
[00:11:02.480] with and I thought that was you know
[00:11:05.360] immoral but once again I'm just the
[00:11:07.120] peeon uh but but even uh normal
[00:11:10.000] day-to-day stuff whether it be covert
[00:11:11.600] actions and other things that I've seen
[00:11:13.519] in my career of we we've hidden offbooks
[00:11:16.160] activities uh from leadership let alone
[00:11:18.880] uh you the subject of my infamy
[00:11:21.120] >> and so this is the point where we enter
[00:11:25.040] into whistleblower land
[00:11:27.680] >> whistleblower is a technical legal term
[00:11:29.920] term. A lot of people whip it around or
[00:11:31.760] use the expression basically to mean uh
[00:11:35.680] if I'm cynical, any disgruntled
[00:11:37.600] employee, and I don't mean it that way
[00:11:39.120] in your case, but that's what people
[00:11:41.040] say. They just think it's a thing. You
[00:11:42.480] can say I'm a whistleblower and you may
[00:11:44.560] not actually be a whistleblower because
[00:11:46.079] there's an actual technical legal
[00:11:48.240] requirement to even use that term. But
[00:11:50.480] you were a whistleblower based upon what
[00:11:52.800] we've just talked about, this knowledge
[00:11:55.040] of particular programs
[00:11:57.519] and how things were kind of being hidden
[00:12:00.320] in an unlawful or improper way. And why
[00:12:03.200] don't you walk us through that because I
[00:12:05.040] think it's the foundation piece for why
[00:12:07.360] we're even having this podcast today.
[00:12:09.920] >> Yeah, certainly to become a lawful
[00:12:11.440] whistleblower, you have to follow
[00:12:12.959] something called an urgent concern and
[00:12:14.880] in the intel community that's under
[00:12:17.040] PPD19. Uh and then of course you
[00:12:19.600] whistleblow uh to the intelligence
[00:12:21.279] committee inspector general. And I was
[00:12:23.519] lucky in this process that the actual
[00:12:25.600] former ICIG himself uh you know Charles
[00:12:28.800] McCulla uh was my counsel on that matter
[00:12:31.200] and and continues to represent me on the
[00:12:33.760] reprisal matter as well. Uh but
[00:12:35.920] eventually so um there's a misnomer out
[00:12:38.560] there because of certain Foye DoD
[00:12:40.480] documents I somehow studied this UFO
[00:12:43.440] subject for 15 plus years. That's not
[00:12:45.279] true. and that isn't a a DODIG interview
[00:12:48.000] transcript that that that is false
[00:12:49.519] information that transcript. So maybe uh
[00:12:52.160] um somebody in the room didn't have
[00:12:53.360] enough coffee and wrote that down, but I
[00:12:54.959] just wanted to clarify the record on
[00:12:56.399] that. Um I had real no interest in this
[00:12:58.880] subject prior to me joining uh the UAP
[00:13:01.600] task force in early 2019. I certainly
[00:13:04.160] had a background. I have a degree in
[00:13:06.079] physics as well. Um I enjoyed, you know,
[00:13:09.440] space intelligence subjects and sci-fi
[00:13:11.440] and all that my personal life. So I
[00:13:13.600] certainly wanted to figure out what was
[00:13:15.200] going on because at that point you know
[00:13:17.839] a lot of uh the discussion of Navy
[00:13:19.839] videos etc were in the public domain and
[00:13:22.000] I wanted to figure out what was going
[00:13:23.920] on. Was it prosaic natural phenomenon
[00:13:26.560] misidentifying uh blue classified
[00:13:29.040] programs misidentifying red programs or
[00:13:32.000] is there some kind of unknown thirdparty
[00:13:34.000] actor there? So early 2019 I was
[00:13:36.880] recruited uh to work on it in in my uh
[00:13:40.079] my military capacity. I thought it was
[00:13:41.920] something good to add to my officer
[00:13:43.360] performance report. Uh as a reservist,
[00:13:45.600] you're always struggling to get those uh
[00:13:47.120] those bullets for your for your annual
[00:13:48.880] report. [laughter]
[00:13:50.079] And uh because I was cleared to so many
[00:13:52.639] programs and I had a technical
[00:13:54.240] understanding of a lot of those uh
[00:13:56.160] aerospace programs in question uh both
[00:13:58.639] red and blue, I was able to kind of
[00:14:00.720] provide that that you know subject
[00:14:02.320] matter expert uh support. Um but as I
[00:14:05.600] started looking at some of the data
[00:14:07.680] videos interviewing uh military
[00:14:10.000] personnel and then asking my network and
[00:14:12.720] I already kind of characterized my
[00:14:14.160] network very high reaching cabinet level
[00:14:16.399] NCS level type network um I realized
[00:14:19.519] there were there was a longer history of
[00:14:22.160] the government study in this matter and
[00:14:24.000] this and I'm not talking about blue book
[00:14:25.760] and project sun and project grudge that
[00:14:28.240] was kind of the overt I'll call it cover
[00:14:30.240] programs for what the government was
[00:14:32.240] really doing uh back in the early cold
[00:14:33.839] war in this issue. So, I was learning
[00:14:36.320] about this whole tapestry of additional
[00:14:38.800] uh history that was seldomly um briefed
[00:14:41.839] to Congress. I would find out, oh well,
[00:14:43.600] Senator X, Y, and Z was briefed during
[00:14:45.600] this time, Epoch. They were our trusted
[00:14:48.079] agent on the Senate Intel Committee, uh
[00:14:50.880] etc., etc., but then
[00:14:53.839] um
[00:14:55.360] uh colleagues of mine, you know,
[00:14:56.880] presented, you know, documentation and
[00:14:58.880] videographic and audiovisisual proof and
[00:15:01.519] oral testimony to me. uh people I've
[00:15:03.920] known for, you know, 14, 15 years in the
[00:15:05.680] intel community saying, "Dave, I need to
[00:15:07.760] tell you this. You have a lawful need to
[00:15:09.600] know because you're doing this
[00:15:11.120] investigation uh for Congress, which,
[00:15:14.079] you know, Marco Rubio and Senator Rounds
[00:15:16.720] and other folks were were champions of
[00:15:18.720] uh uh me sniffing around, so to speak,
[00:15:21.440] uh when I was doing that. So, I was
[00:15:23.040] finding this tapestry of information.
[00:15:25.279] I'm like, well, has this been reported?
[00:15:27.040] You know, does the president routinely
[00:15:28.720] know this information? Does the DNI?
[00:15:31.360] Does the DCI? does the you know etc etc
[00:15:34.480] >> and so I found essentially is um an
[00:15:39.040] offbooks you know foreign material
[00:15:41.839] acquisition and exploitation program
[00:15:44.800] akin to us recovering a Russian or
[00:15:47.440] Chinese military asset covertly or
[00:15:49.680] clandestinely you know hypothetically
[00:15:52.399] >> um let me let me pause for a second
[00:15:55.120] there
[00:15:55.600] >> sure
[00:15:56.320] >> um so you mentioned that you were
[00:15:57.839] conducting an investigation what was the
[00:16:01.120] sort of the predic or what was the what
[00:16:04.240] was the authorizing
[00:16:06.800] uh foundation for your ability to go out
[00:16:08.880] and conduct this investigation?
[00:16:11.199] Yeah, there was and I have to be careful
[00:16:13.040] because some of the the authorization
[00:16:14.959] documents are so classified, but it was
[00:16:16.880] embedded um in the the fiscal year 19
[00:16:19.839] national defense authorization act in
[00:16:22.320] the uh intelligence authorization act
[00:16:24.480] and an annex that is what to say
[00:16:25.920] non-public uh and that was the basis of
[00:16:28.399] my investigation and of course uh oral
[00:16:31.279] briefings to congress and we got some of
[00:16:33.120] those uh I'll call it opboards uh you
[00:16:35.920] know from the members themselves and
[00:16:37.759] that was the legal basis eventually
[00:16:41.120] Um the the UAP task force which started
[00:16:43.839] as a Navy task force in 2019
[00:16:46.480] >> became a DoD task force uh because we
[00:16:49.279] went to uh Trump's deputy secretary of
[00:16:51.920] defense Dave Norquist uh and he provided
[00:16:54.720] additional guidance that is still
[00:16:56.399] classified so I won't get into the
[00:16:57.839] specificity of it uh to do that.
[00:17:01.120] >> So my my my curiosity here is just that
[00:17:04.400] there had to be some sort of foundation
[00:17:06.000] or predicate. somebody somewhere had to
[00:17:07.760] sign a memo saying this group or this
[00:17:10.480] person is authorized to conduct
[00:17:13.039] investigative activities concerning X,
[00:17:15.520] Y, and Z. And so because when you show
[00:17:18.480] up, I'm sure there's some people that
[00:17:19.919] were very friendly and cooperative. In
[00:17:22.079] fact, there were volunteers coming to
[00:17:23.600] you saying, "Let me tell you all about
[00:17:25.520] what I've been doing." And probably some
[00:17:27.360] other people that were not too thrilled
[00:17:28.640] when you showed up at their doorstep or
[00:17:30.240] at their office and said, "Hi, I'm doing
[00:17:32.880] an investigation concerning whatever."
[00:17:35.440] And you know
[00:17:37.760] it wouldn't be wise but some people
[00:17:39.360] could just say drop dead and close their
[00:17:40.960] door but you have to have some kind of
[00:17:42.559] leverage some kind of foundation to work
[00:17:44.240] from. And um my other and so we've
[00:17:47.760] established that that is true and that
[00:17:49.840] was done and in some cases in a
[00:17:51.760] classified manner. Um
[00:17:55.280] and so two questions there it's a it's a
[00:17:58.000] compound question so it's dangerous. One
[00:18:00.720] is did anybody respond with a drop dead
[00:18:03.919] get out of here? I'm not going to
[00:18:04.960] cooperate.
[00:18:06.240] >> And then the other part of that is
[00:18:09.120] were there persons who you interviewed
[00:18:11.120] who elected to uh provide you a sworn
[00:18:15.039] declaration? Has anybody gone under oath
[00:18:17.200] and said yeah this is my firsthand
[00:18:19.360] experience doing AB and C?
[00:18:22.559] >> Yeah. So for the first part certainly we
[00:18:24.640] had people that were very resistive to
[00:18:26.640] providing information.
[00:18:28.272] >> [clears throat]
[00:18:28.320] >> the issue with the way they they um told
[00:18:30.640] us to investigate. Um I we weren't
[00:18:33.520] assigned any 1811 authority uh federal
[00:18:36.240] law enforcement agents. So I was not um
[00:18:39.200] able to compel testimony and a and a
[00:18:41.840] deposition if you will, only
[00:18:43.520] cooperative. Now we could report those
[00:18:46.080] uncooperative people uh to federal law
[00:18:48.720] enforcement, but they would have to have
[00:18:50.000] the appetite to do what they need to do
[00:18:52.400] to to get a deposition. A lot of it was
[00:18:55.039] cooperative. So when I did file my ICIG
[00:18:58.240] complaint, we did have uh a dozen or so
[00:19:01.120] people out of the I say core 40 people
[00:19:03.039] that were cooperative um go to the ICIG
[00:19:06.720] and provide that classified sworn
[00:19:09.120] testimony under oath. And that's even
[00:19:11.120] what I did originally it was uh sworn
[00:19:14.080] testimony under oath, raise my hand,
[00:19:16.559] etc. And then I you know for 11 and a
[00:19:19.039] half hours also briefed Congress in a
[00:19:21.120] classified setting months later uh sworn
[00:19:23.440] as well under oath.
[00:19:24.240] >> Yeah. To me, to me that's, you know,
[00:19:25.440] there's all kinds of people who say all
[00:19:26.720] kinds of things, but once you
[00:19:28.880] >> have people, you know, who are either
[00:19:31.760] the subject of or cooperating witness in
[00:19:34.000] an investigation
[00:19:35.919] and uh at the point where you because
[00:19:38.720] there's a lot of arm flapping and kind
[00:19:40.559] of misdirection and efforts to not me
[00:19:43.200] them kind of stuff. Uh once you're able
[00:19:46.880] to kind of box people in and
[00:19:50.480] okay, enough fun and games, enough
[00:19:52.160] double talk.
[00:19:53.520] >> What do you firsthand knowledge, your
[00:19:55.840] experience, have you seen, said,
[00:19:58.400] touched, spoken, tasted. I mean, it's
[00:20:01.280] got to be that level of of knowledge.
[00:20:05.520] >> To me, that's critical. And uh I'm glad
[00:20:07.600] that in your in your experience running
[00:20:10.880] this all down, you were able to do that
[00:20:14.400] level of let's nail it down kind of
[00:20:17.039] stuff.
[00:20:17.520] >> Well, yeah. And I certainly was worried
[00:20:18.960] about rumor in innuendo, you know, uh
[00:20:22.880] hazing programs that tricked people.
[00:20:24.799] There's a, you know, a narrative being
[00:20:26.559] spun in the media, Wall Street Journal,
[00:20:28.240] etc. about that kind of thing. I was
[00:20:29.760] well aware of hazing activities. I was
[00:20:32.880] guilty of said hazing activities earlier
[00:20:34.720] in my career when I was a lieutenant and
[00:20:36.159] thought it was funny to make you
[00:20:37.309] [laughter] know Reese to freak out the
[00:20:39.120] the two star general and certainly I was
[00:20:41.440] already aware of that and I was
[00:20:42.559] calibrated to you know lore in the
[00:20:44.880] community room as we say in the intel
[00:20:47.520] community right and you know hazing
[00:20:49.360] activities so the the evidentiary
[00:20:51.280] threshold was high and the people I
[00:20:54.400] brought to ICIG you know were hands-on
[00:20:56.960] they touched it they were in the
[00:20:58.240] facilities um and they you know they
[00:21:01.120] were well cleared people and they
[00:21:02.799] weren't misconstring a recovered
[00:21:05.919] adversarial aircraft for something else
[00:21:09.520] and some of that gaslighting that's been
[00:21:11.200] going on which I find honestly amusing
[00:21:13.919] to see uh certain you know former career
[00:21:16.400] bureaucrats you know use the narrative
[00:21:18.400] that it was some Yankee blue uh hazing
[00:21:21.760] uh program and those were certainly not
[00:21:23.360] the code words I you know I provided to
[00:21:25.280] the ICG and the intelligence
[00:21:27.840] communities. We know the right code
[00:21:29.280] words and we know uh which reported
[00:21:32.080] special access programs and controlled
[00:21:33.840] access programs were essentially
[00:21:36.080] covering it up in uh uh performing
[00:21:38.640] financial fraud um to hide the some of
[00:21:41.120] the paper trail, misappropriating funds
[00:21:43.120] and then taking haircuts across other
[00:21:45.679] black programs to funnel the money um uh
[00:21:50.080] to to to those kind of activities to
[00:21:52.080] keep it off books. So then so the the
[00:21:54.640] essence of of what you've talked about
[00:21:56.880] is that uh the federal government in the
[00:22:00.000] form of DoD or somebody else
[00:22:02.799] >> basically has recovered uh alien or uh
[00:22:09.280] other worldly vehicles, [snorts] let's
[00:22:11.360] put it that way. Um and not just
[00:22:14.880] vehicles or or yeah, I guess vehicles is
[00:22:17.600] the word to use. um they've recovered
[00:22:20.960] them and there's also I guess for lack
[00:22:25.360] of a better term biologics there's other
[00:22:27.919] entities associated with that
[00:22:30.720] >> and your investigative work has
[00:22:34.080] identified that and the fact that
[00:22:36.400] >> somebody somewhere some element within
[00:22:38.320] the government is furiously trying to
[00:22:40.159] hide that and keep it hidden.
[00:22:42.559] >> Yeah. Yeah. And I really like to
[00:22:43.520] characterize origin. You know, I use the
[00:22:45.360] term non-human intelligence because
[00:22:46.799] there's certainly a taxonomy of
[00:22:48.880] non-human intelligence, even though, you
[00:22:50.960] know, I'm a physics guy. I don't know if
[00:22:52.799] it's entirely extraterrestrial or um
[00:22:56.159] something else that we quite don't
[00:22:57.520] understand. And so, I leave that open
[00:22:59.840] for analysis because I never had full
[00:23:01.840] access uh to to those full technical
[00:23:04.320] findings. So, I leave it open. But that
[00:23:06.559] is true. And the government has been
[00:23:09.120] doing that you know to the chagrin of uh
[00:23:11.280] people detractors saying that uh we
[00:23:13.440] don't have anything. Uh we certainly do
[00:23:15.840] and I've talked to the highest of
[00:23:17.520] highest level sources in that regard um
[00:23:20.480] all the way up the flag pole to verify
[00:23:22.720] that.
[00:23:23.200] >> Can you give me an idea is um I'm not
[00:23:26.400] asking let me think of how to ask this
[00:23:28.640] in a generic way. So, this is not one
[00:23:32.640] event where somebody went out to a crash
[00:23:35.440] site and dragged something into a hanger
[00:23:38.080] >> and we're going to guard it forever.
[00:23:40.559] These are multiple and that just more
[00:23:43.440] than one.
[00:23:44.880] >> Yes,
[00:23:45.360] >> my guess is less than a hundred, but
[00:23:47.919] there's more than one and they're in a
[00:23:51.280] in in secure facilities
[00:23:54.080] probably managed by DoD.
[00:23:57.280] >> Yeah, certainly more than one and less
[00:23:59.120] than 100. I agree. And um the cognizance
[00:24:02.880] of who was kind of leading the program
[00:24:04.720] changed over time. Epoch and the genesis
[00:24:07.600] was was in the Truman and Eisenhower
[00:24:09.360] National Security Council and and the
[00:24:11.679] CIA Office of Policy Strategy uh back
[00:24:14.320] when that was the old name for um the I
[00:24:17.679] think the director of operations now I
[00:24:19.120] believe is what they they call it, the
[00:24:20.320] CIA,
[00:24:21.120] >> right? Uh but you know the atomic energy
[00:24:23.600] commission was involved, Department of
[00:24:25.200] Defense at the time, uh service
[00:24:27.279] elements, the CIA at the time and other
[00:24:30.720] um cabinet level agencies you would not
[00:24:33.039] think but helped with the illicit
[00:24:34.640] financing
[00:24:35.440] >> housing and urban development.
[00:24:37.840] >> Hey, you never you never know.
[00:24:40.000] >> HUD's a good place to hide things. No
[00:24:41.919] one's ever
[00:24:42.400] >> Well, I think there's the actual uh
[00:24:44.960] deputy housing urban development
[00:24:47.279] secretary under HW Bush, Katherine
[00:24:48.960] Austin Fitz, actually uh has talked
[00:24:51.760] about
[00:24:52.880] >> her finding elicit funding over in that
[00:24:54.640] budget. It's funny you say that, but
[00:24:56.080] that actually seems to be the case.
[00:24:58.720] >> I've heard about I've heard about
[00:25:00.000] automation programs uh
[00:25:02.080] >> Yeah.
[00:25:02.400] >> being buried somewhere in housing and
[00:25:04.320] urban development, so nothing would
[00:25:05.679] surprise me.
[00:25:06.799] >> Um
[00:25:07.840] >> yeah,
[00:25:08.159] >> go ahead. I'm sorry.
[00:25:09.679] >> No, certainly. And obviously there's um
[00:25:12.400] uh cover providers as we say in the
[00:25:14.159] business for activities. So you'd be
[00:25:16.159] very surprised um how that rolled out.
[00:25:19.120] But essentially as the global war on
[00:25:20.799] terror um initiated in early 2000, a a
[00:25:24.000] lot of that stuff got moved to uh the
[00:25:26.240] big defense contractors and certain
[00:25:27.919] subsidiaries to exempt it from FOYA.
[00:25:31.120] >> Sure.
[00:25:31.440] >> Uh but also congressional oversight. So
[00:25:34.080] around the 2004 time frame based on um
[00:25:37.440] individuals I know that have firsthand
[00:25:39.200] knowledge a lot of the the funding that
[00:25:41.760] they were siphoning and I can't name the
[00:25:43.919] pot of money because that's classified a
[00:25:46.159] lot of it got diverted for overseas
[00:25:48.080] contingency operations for the global
[00:25:49.919] war on terror and so uh more creative
[00:25:53.600] financing mechanisms ensued and it
[00:25:56.240] really became a more contractor operated
[00:25:58.799] and conducted activity with very little
[00:26:01.440] government oversight. There's certainly
[00:26:02.960] people still briefed um to those
[00:26:05.120] programs. I certainly know who currently
[00:26:07.440] is in access in the government at least
[00:26:09.279] you know partial access but uh the
[00:26:11.919] contractors kind of have the con so to
[00:26:13.600] speak in the modern epoch and that was
[00:26:15.760] done to essentially hide things and also
[00:26:19.120] um allow contractors to do IRAD right
[00:26:22.240] internal research and development and
[00:26:24.480] then uh use private capital to fund a
[00:26:27.279] lot of those activities since um you
[00:26:30.080] know the gravy train was was drying up
[00:26:32.320] during the W Bush administration as far
[00:26:34.400] as far as I
[00:26:36.000] That is very interesting indeed. So now
[00:26:38.799] if you go and say, "Well, listen, David,
[00:26:42.799] you you clearly know what you're talking
[00:26:44.640] about in certain areas, but maybe you've
[00:26:47.279] gone astray. Maybe maybe [laughter]
[00:26:49.679] you've maybe you've just misinterpreted
[00:26:52.640] some well-intentioned people." The
[00:26:54.640] reason I bring this up is because we
[00:26:56.320] have Sean Kirkpatrick. We have
[00:26:58.960] Representative Mike Turner. And we have
[00:27:01.520] Susan Goff who's a Pentagon
[00:27:03.279] spokesperson. All three of them say,
[00:27:06.400] "What are you talking about? We have no
[00:27:08.720] idea there. There's no such thing." So
[00:27:12.400] there these are people who have come out
[00:27:13.919] and basically to one degree or another
[00:27:16.320] and probably very carefully worded, you
[00:27:19.520] know, denials, a non-denial denial, but
[00:27:22.480] they're they're saying no, this isn't
[00:27:24.640] they have no knowledge, no experience,
[00:27:26.640] and they've looked into it, and it
[00:27:28.400] simply isn't true. So what do you have
[00:27:30.640] to say to folks like that?
[00:27:32.159] >> Yeah. So, Representative Turner, I
[00:27:33.600] certainly had a very interesting
[00:27:34.799] classified meeting with the
[00:27:36.000] representative a few weeks ago, and I'll
[00:27:37.600] leave it at that to protect, you know,
[00:27:39.360] internal congressional deliberations.
[00:27:41.520] Yeah, Susan um put out a statement, I
[00:27:43.760] believe, when another whistleblower,
[00:27:45.120] Matthew Brown, came came out and
[00:27:46.880] mentioned a particular name of a
[00:27:48.240] program, and Susan put out a statement,
[00:27:50.000] well, there there are no DoD special
[00:27:52.640] access programs by that name. That's
[00:27:54.960] actually true. What she said is
[00:27:56.720] technically true. Um, uh, that program,
[00:28:00.080] uh, was a was a, a White House program
[00:28:02.640] that was administratively delegated to
[00:28:04.480] DoD. And then Sean Kurpatre, uh, I've
[00:28:07.120] known Sean for many years. We worked
[00:28:09.039] together back in 2013. And, um, he's
[00:28:11.440] interesting character and I'll let the
[00:28:12.880] record speak for itself when Trump
[00:28:14.880] releases information and then we'll
[00:28:16.480] address Dr. Kapatrick at a later date.
[00:28:19.279] >> You know, is it really up to Trump at
[00:28:20.960] this point? That's my question. Is it
[00:28:23.600] really up to
[00:28:24.720] >> I mean, he's g this order. He said,
[00:28:26.480] "Release everything you got." Is one of
[00:28:28.320] his typical orders, right? Like he he
[00:28:30.480] ordered Yeah. release of all the JFK
[00:28:32.480] files and all the Epstein files. But you
[00:28:34.880] know, when it comes down to like where
[00:28:36.159] the rubber meets the road, there's an
[00:28:38.240] entire army of bureaucrats who find a
[00:28:40.640] thousand reasons to stall, right?
[00:28:42.960] >> There is. And the And you have to
[00:28:44.640] remember the president has original
[00:28:46.960] classification authority over what they
[00:28:48.640] call uh classified national security
[00:28:50.720] information. Sure.
[00:28:51.840] >> Under executive order 13526.
[00:28:54.399] The issue is some of this is under the
[00:28:56.559] atomic energy act in 1954 and the
[00:28:58.960] president does not have unilateral
[00:29:01.039] declassification authority. Um now he
[00:29:03.679] could argue that under unitary executive
[00:29:05.760] theory the Supreme Court he certainly
[00:29:07.760] does but if you read the statute it's
[00:29:10.080] the president in conjunction with the
[00:29:11.440] energy secretary in an obscure office in
[00:29:14.159] the national archives called the
[00:29:15.840] information security oversight office
[00:29:18.720] the ISO makes that tiebreak decision. Uh
[00:29:22.240] but certainly under UET as they say in
[00:29:24.640] legal in legal terms uh Trump can make
[00:29:27.440] that can make that declassification
[00:29:30.240] decision. And certainly I think the
[00:29:32.799] public needs a um formal disclosure
[00:29:37.440] plan. Not the JFK file dump. I mean we
[00:29:39.919] all applaud the president for releasing
[00:29:41.679] things but you know thousands upon
[00:29:43.919] thousands of documents was dumped on the
[00:29:45.840] the NAR website and was it curated? Um
[00:29:49.279] and I I think for this the expectation
[00:29:51.679] publicly is for for Trump to do that and
[00:29:54.000] and certainly Trump is very
[00:29:55.279] knowledgeable on the subject. Now, does
[00:29:57.200] he believe everything um a particular
[00:29:59.679] agency briefed him his first term before
[00:30:01.600] CO? I don't know. And I think that if
[00:30:04.240] you parse Trump's language when he says
[00:30:06.240] he's not a big believer, I really do
[00:30:08.399] think some of the things a particular
[00:30:09.919] agency uh did read him into as it
[00:30:12.159] relates to the subject and he was fully
[00:30:14.720] witting of a lot of the aspects we just
[00:30:16.480] talked about here today, Chris. Um I do
[00:30:18.960] think that um the president is not sure
[00:30:21.840] what to believe just based on a certain
[00:30:23.440] agency reputation, but certainly the
[00:30:26.080] president is knowledgeable and that's
[00:30:27.679] about as far as I'd like to go. And I do
[00:30:29.600] respect uh the president and his
[00:30:31.840] decision-m and want to give him that um
[00:30:35.039] uh bandwidth or you know to be able to
[00:30:37.760] say what he needs to say without you
[00:30:39.360] know cornering him or anything like
[00:30:40.480] that. So what do you think the sort of
[00:30:43.120] uh the driver on the the timeline is? Is
[00:30:48.399] it uh oh gee, we need to review these
[00:30:51.360] documents. Is it some other factor like
[00:30:55.760] uh you know after Trump said look we're
[00:30:58.480] going to release a lot of stuff you know
[00:31:01.440] uh why wasn't it 48 hours later that
[00:31:03.360] they started to release it instead of I
[00:31:05.760] mean it could be you know three years
[00:31:07.120] from now where as he's leaving office he
[00:31:10.000] says okay fine here's the stuff what do
[00:31:12.320] what is the
[00:31:14.399] what's the resistance or what has to be
[00:31:16.880] accomplished or overcome or achieved in
[00:31:21.039] order to open the door and let the story
[00:31:23.360] out.
[00:31:24.640] >> Yeah, I certainly even though I'm a
[00:31:26.000] former intel officer, I certainly can't
[00:31:27.919] uh parse the mind of the president know
[00:31:30.000] exactly his calculus. Uh certainly
[00:31:32.399] there's political objectives the
[00:31:33.760] midterms are coming up and certainly
[00:31:35.279] this kind of these kind of disclosures
[00:31:36.720] would help um the MAGA movement and the
[00:31:39.120] Republican party, right? Um I think part
[00:31:41.519] of it are key people within the White
[00:31:44.480] House running this and um uh certainly
[00:31:48.000] don't have a large background in the
[00:31:50.000] national security state and this topic.
[00:31:52.399] So I think they're running around uh
[00:31:54.480] trying to get these files without that
[00:31:56.799] you know full knowledge of the trade
[00:31:59.120] craft that they use and how they
[00:32:01.279] obuscate etc. And it's not a knock on a
[00:32:04.080] lot of these political appointees. they
[00:32:05.679] just don't have that experience like you
[00:32:07.279] and I have um in those communities. And
[00:32:10.880] I believe part of it, this is just a
[00:32:12.799] personal belief, is a a lot of the
[00:32:15.039] government knowledge that's been
[00:32:16.880] federated out to these contractors for
[00:32:18.880] so many years. I think there's a little
[00:32:20.480] bit of government embarrassment going on
[00:32:22.240] where we've lost the the ball on a lot
[00:32:25.039] of these holdings. Um certainly
[00:32:27.200] especially after I went to the Senate
[00:32:28.880] because I do know things were moved uh
[00:32:31.360] physical holdings wise, you know, after
[00:32:32.960] my testimony in late 2022, uh thanks to
[00:32:35.760] people I have on the inside. And so I
[00:32:37.919] think part of this is is is mapping
[00:32:40.320] everything to avoid government
[00:32:42.720] embarrassment, other whistleblowers
[00:32:44.640] coming forward and disclosing
[00:32:46.000] information that the president wasn't
[00:32:47.600] cognizant of and probably getting a full
[00:32:50.240] accounting for. and and certainly to
[00:32:52.399] execute a plan disclosing this
[00:32:54.080] information. There's certainly
[00:32:55.279] theological, socioeconomic
[00:32:58.240] um other implications. There's certainly
[00:33:00.320] um a theory called dimefill you learn
[00:33:03.039] and you know air and command staff
[00:33:04.640] college instruments of national power
[00:33:07.039] and you you definitely need to cover all
[00:33:08.960] your bases because some of this
[00:33:11.039] information and and we're seeing it in
[00:33:13.120] the news. You're seeing a lot of that
[00:33:14.559] talk about demons and other things like
[00:33:16.880] that. You know, the vice president Vance
[00:33:18.480] has mentioned that. Uh my friend, you
[00:33:20.320] Tucker Carlson has also said that too,
[00:33:22.480] and I've had private conversations with
[00:33:24.159] him about that. And I do want to address
[00:33:26.480] that really quickly. Uh both as an intel
[00:33:28.720] officer, a guy who studied physics, um a
[00:33:31.279] practicing Roman Catholic like Secretary
[00:33:33.519] Rubio and Vice President Vance. I I
[00:33:36.799] respect uh those views of spirituality
[00:33:39.360] and demonic deception. And I think we
[00:33:41.120] should be concerned about that. But I
[00:33:43.200] think it's theologically premature
[00:33:45.519] without knowing everything. Um, you
[00:33:48.080] know, equating everything to demons
[00:33:49.760] because God has created this wonderful
[00:33:52.559] visible and in, you know, invisible
[00:33:54.320] order. He's created humans, animals, uh,
[00:33:57.440] angels and other, you know, types of
[00:33:59.519] non-human intelligence. And I don't
[00:34:01.519] think us as humans we understand all of
[00:34:03.919] God's creation to kind of use a um, you
[00:34:06.080] know, theological kind of, um, right
[00:34:08.079] framework on that. And I I think that
[00:34:10.159] everybody needs to keep that in mind to
[00:34:12.000] be respectful of that. And the Catholic
[00:34:14.399] Church certainly has a long history in
[00:34:16.800] this. And there are Catholic theologians
[00:34:18.879] like the late Dr. Paul Figpen, uh Dr.
[00:34:21.679] Dina Pasulka at University of North
[00:34:23.839] Carolina, Dr. Brent Robinson at Notre
[00:34:26.399] Dame. Um they've provided a lot of that
[00:34:28.720] analysis and and and theological
[00:34:30.960] interpretation on how people can view
[00:34:32.639] this. So, uh, I see that as a big, uh,
[00:34:36.320] impass certainly, uh, because of, uh,
[00:34:38.960] the commentary that I'm hearing about
[00:34:40.399] that kind of thing. It's a, it's very
[00:34:41.919] dangerous language and I think we need
[00:34:43.919] to be more thoughtful about that. And
[00:34:45.679] I'm just happy I'm able to plug that for
[00:34:48.000] a little bit because I don't hear many
[00:34:50.159] advocates on the disclosure movement
[00:34:52.639] side really addressing that. I think
[00:34:54.800] it's a very dangerous um, mindset to be
[00:34:57.680] in if you uh, preconceive all this as
[00:35:00.400] some sort of malevolence. And I it just
[00:35:02.640] wanted to mention
[00:35:03.599] >> that's very interesting. I know that's
[00:35:04.960] an angle that I don't think gets enough
[00:35:07.760] >> exposure or discussion or if it does it
[00:35:10.240] it gets a
[00:35:12.320] uh a fear-based
[00:35:15.119] decision-making process and fear-based
[00:35:17.599] decision making is never never a winner.
[00:35:20.560] It doesn't doesn't work out well.
[00:35:22.160] >> Well, in the Air Force, I think was very
[00:35:24.560] afraid when I went public. So, uh, just
[00:35:26.880] like judicial watch conducts lawfare,
[00:35:29.520] uh, I've conducted lawfare of my own.
[00:35:31.520] Uh, there's a matter in the Virginia
[00:35:32.880] court of appeals. Um, that's very
[00:35:35.040] interesting that the the Virginia law is
[00:35:37.520] silent on, uh, you know, records release
[00:35:39.680] policy, which I could get into. Uh but
[00:35:42.400] the main one is, you know, I have a foye
[00:35:44.480] lawsuit in the Eastern District of
[00:35:45.760] Virginia because it's come to my
[00:35:48.640] attention that when I went public in
[00:35:50.880] June 2023, uh the Department of the Air
[00:35:53.680] Force filed an unauthorized disclosure
[00:35:56.240] espionage act uh complaint against me.
[00:35:59.200] Uh went to a particular office in the
[00:36:01.119] Pentagon that's in the pleadings that
[00:36:03.119] are public record. And you know, I'd
[00:36:05.520] like to see that paper trail, that
[00:36:07.119] evidentiary trail, uh, to see why they
[00:36:10.320] felt compelled to come after me because
[00:36:12.240] all my comments about UAP and even the
[00:36:14.480] comments I'm talking about here, you
[00:36:16.320] know, I still have a top secret
[00:36:17.520] clearance. I've maintained a clearance
[00:36:18.720] for 21 years. I went through the DoD
[00:36:21.200] pre-publication and security review
[00:36:22.960] process and everything I said about UAPs
[00:36:26.400] and crash retrievals and you know on
[00:36:28.400] NewsNation and in the debrief um I did
[00:36:31.119] get pre-clarance but regardless of that
[00:36:33.920] you know the govern the air force uh
[00:36:36.240] seemingly thought um that you know I did
[00:36:39.520] something you know incorrect and went
[00:36:42.400] after me and luckily uh that complaint
[00:36:44.640] was denied because of the legal
[00:36:46.880] preparatory work that I did but I find
[00:36:49.040] that very curious, you know, like you
[00:36:51.359] mentioned, you know, Susan Goff and
[00:36:52.880] other other folks. There's nothing to
[00:36:54.880] see here. You know, why was an espionage
[00:36:57.520] act complaint filed against me, and
[00:36:59.520] there's other things I'm aware of that I
[00:37:01.040] I won't talk about that the Biden
[00:37:02.560] administration was doing behind the
[00:37:04.560] scenes, key officials in the White
[00:37:06.000] House, but that's a fear-based kind of
[00:37:08.320] knee-jerk reaction, silhouetting
[00:37:10.560] themselves, coming after me as a
[00:37:12.320] whistleblower. Uh, and I'm not I'm not
[00:37:14.480] doing anything unlawful. and and I
[00:37:17.119] applaud you for the way in which you
[00:37:18.960] executed all of that because it's clear
[00:37:21.440] that you're smarter than the average
[00:37:23.280] bear when it comes to how to dot your
[00:37:25.839] eyes and cross your tees and doing this
[00:37:27.359] the correct way. Not just correct in the
[00:37:29.839] sense of, you know, legally scrupulous,
[00:37:32.800] but uh being smart about it, being very
[00:37:36.000] savvy in how you approach this whole
[00:37:37.920] thing. Because something I think our
[00:37:40.320] viewers and listeners uh may not take
[00:37:42.880] into account is that even if you do
[00:37:44.640] everything correctly and properly
[00:37:46.800] lawfully as you've just finished
[00:37:48.480] detailing
[00:37:50.000] uh you know getting the pre-publication
[00:37:52.320] review you know knowing that you've
[00:37:54.960] dotted all the eyes crossed all the tees
[00:37:57.280] there's still the whispering campaign in
[00:37:59.200] the hallway right [laughter]
[00:38:02.000] >> and sometimes sometimes the whispering
[00:38:04.560] campaign out in the hallway can be a
[00:38:06.720] hundred times worse than anything They
[00:38:08.560] would unload on you in a press
[00:38:10.320] conference, right?
[00:38:11.920] >> Oh, 100%. You know, Dave's radioactive,
[00:38:14.640] Dave is this, and there was all these
[00:38:16.720] manufactured allegations against me,
[00:38:18.960] whether from a security perspective,
[00:38:20.720] which is kind of funny because of what I
[00:38:22.320] did for a living, uh, from personal
[00:38:24.400] conduct, all that was unfounded and I
[00:38:26.800] maintained my, you know, TSSCI
[00:38:28.480] clearance. Uh, but they, you know, went
[00:38:30.320] after several people I know
[00:38:32.320] administratively. Um, even uh right
[00:38:34.960] after I left NGA, they went after my
[00:38:37.200] chief of staff, tried to revoke his
[00:38:38.800] clearance. They revoked my boss's
[00:38:40.880] clearance at the NRO and they just like
[00:38:43.599] they started like, well, who was Dave's
[00:38:45.520] enabler and who, you know, who might
[00:38:48.079] have told Dave something, right? And so
[00:38:50.240] they started potshotting people. And
[00:38:52.240] that's the insidious thing on the
[00:38:54.000] security mafia will do. It's, you know,
[00:38:56.240] your clearance is your livelihood and
[00:38:58.079] and your reputation from a conduct
[00:39:00.560] perspective. And I just know so many
[00:39:03.200] people in my orbit um that they went
[00:39:06.400] after either, you know, legally,
[00:39:08.240] administratively, ruined people's lives.
[00:39:11.119] I have friends of mine that have been
[00:39:12.720] out of work for
[00:39:14.480] >> three and a half years now. A very
[00:39:16.160] senior person in the in the SAP
[00:39:18.560] community uh was taken out and is still
[00:39:21.359] going through years of legal appeals.
[00:39:23.920] And even for my reprisal matter, you
[00:39:26.560] know, trying to prove my case on that,
[00:39:29.119] I've been seeking documents since 2022
[00:39:31.520] on that matter. I've been denied B7A,
[00:39:34.480] FOY exemption, law enforcement records.
[00:39:37.040] Well, what's going on? What what
[00:39:38.400] investigations going on that affords
[00:39:40.480] that exemption? And I'm likely going to
[00:39:42.240] have to sue those law law enforcement
[00:39:43.920] agencies like I'm doing an EDVA uh with
[00:39:46.640] with the Air Force complaint against
[00:39:48.240] myself because that's the only way I'm
[00:39:50.079] going to I'm going to get production in
[00:39:51.599] a timely fashion. And the process I feel
[00:39:54.400] is the punishment for a lot of
[00:39:55.760] whistleblowers. So there's this uh
[00:39:57.680] softmark analysis going around in the
[00:39:59.920] disclosure community. Oh well, they've
[00:40:02.000] never came after whistleblowers making
[00:40:03.920] classified disclosures to Congress.
[00:40:06.480] Well, that may be true literally on the
[00:40:08.560] books as a matter of legal record, but
[00:40:11.119] there's all these admin terrorism
[00:40:13.200] techniques they can do to you, your
[00:40:14.960] family,
[00:40:15.680] >> right?
[00:40:16.480] >> I I I've seen it all. I I've seen
[00:40:18.560] anomalous health incidents happen to key
[00:40:20.640] government officials helping me. Um,
[00:40:22.960] Akinda, I know you had Katherine Herage
[00:40:25.119] on uh a few months ago and obviously 60
[00:40:28.320] Minutes did a piece based on her work
[00:40:30.320] back in March and I' I've even seen that
[00:40:32.960] which is disgusting and sick seeing you
[00:40:35.920] know non-kinetic uh directed energy
[00:40:38.400] weapon systems used against officials
[00:40:41.280] and some of the same um medical effects
[00:40:45.119] that that Katherine in 60 Minutes has
[00:40:48.400] discussed. Um, unfortunately I have
[00:40:50.560] close friends of mine that were helping
[00:40:52.320] me in my investigation that that
[00:40:53.920] suffered as well. And all that was
[00:40:55.359] reported, mind you, to the FBI and, you
[00:40:58.319] know, counter intelligence elements, but
[00:41:00.319] there was little to no help. And um,
[00:41:03.280] it's really sad. And I think the UAP
[00:41:06.319] disclosure issue dubtales very nicely to
[00:41:08.640] the Havana syndrome, AHI. There's not a
[00:41:12.079] 100% causal relationship, mind you, but
[00:41:14.640] it's another subject that the government
[00:41:16.560] doesn't want to acknowledge. Yeah,
[00:41:18.160] >> I have a deep knowledge of that area as
[00:41:20.880] well based on my previous uh career and
[00:41:24.079] I I see the government in a pretzel in a
[00:41:26.960] similar way than they are to the UAP
[00:41:29.040] issue where you have intelligence
[00:41:30.960] community and assessment saying oh
[00:41:33.119] Havana psychosmatic nothing to see here
[00:41:37.680] none of this exists but then 60 minutes
[00:41:40.240] revealed in March oh by the way DHS
[00:41:43.359] bought a microwave weapon system off the
[00:41:46.000] Russian uh elicit army arms markets. Oh,
[00:41:48.960] by the way, there, you know, there is
[00:41:50.160] stuff floating around in that vein. And
[00:41:51.839] that's all unclassified, you know,
[00:41:54.000] public record, mind you. So, I I just
[00:41:57.040] find it's very interesting with certain
[00:41:59.119] subjects that has government culpability
[00:42:02.240] involved that the government is very
[00:42:04.720] reticent to even be even basically
[00:42:07.520] truthful on it.
[00:42:08.720] >> Right. Right. And you know the uh as
[00:42:12.560] frustrating as it is when you pursue
[00:42:16.560] a remedy whether it's administrative or
[00:42:18.800] legal
[00:42:19.839] >> you know there's a process for that even
[00:42:21.760] if it's you know largely
[00:42:24.880] chasing your own tail kind of a process
[00:42:26.800] they they try to make you crazy going
[00:42:29.119] through the process but two things pop
[00:42:32.079] out. Uh I mentioned you know the hallway
[00:42:35.200] whispering campaign.
[00:42:37.040] >> Yeah. People will say that you're nuts
[00:42:38.720] or you're a jerk or you're making stuff
[00:42:40.480] up or Yeah.
[00:42:41.680] >> you just want to write a book or get a
[00:42:43.440] movie deal or what, you know, whatever.
[00:42:44.800] There's all that kind of
[00:42:45.839] >> Yeah.
[00:42:46.160] >> whispering campaign that is a it's
[00:42:48.240] calumny. Calumny is an ancient word.
[00:42:51.280] Calumny has fallen out of style. But
[00:42:53.520] false swearing to destroy someone's
[00:42:55.200] reputation is calumny. And uh that's a
[00:42:58.640] very Catholic word by the way. I'm sure
[00:43:00.160] you'll recognize that.
[00:43:01.200] >> You know what? I have to admit, I've
[00:43:02.800] never heard that word. I have a pretty
[00:43:04.400] good vocabulary. C A L U M N Y Mike Mike
[00:43:08.400] Mike November Yankee Calumny false
[00:43:10.960] swearing to destroy someone's reputation
[00:43:13.680] >> and that certainly happened even
[00:43:16.079] publicly another good example and this
[00:43:18.319] is um uh one of the preparatory uh
[00:43:23.040] whispering campaigns that's the result
[00:43:24.880] of my Virginia Court of Appeals matter
[00:43:27.040] within nine days of me testifying in
[00:43:29.119] July 2023 to Congress um uh a reporter
[00:43:33.680] from the Intercept
[00:43:35.359] uh did a hit piece on me talking about
[00:43:37.359] my PTSD struggles, etc. And I served in
[00:43:40.480] Afghanistan. I've done a lot of
[00:43:41.920] high-risisk things um meeting sources
[00:43:44.880] while armed with body armor. I've done a
[00:43:46.880] lot of things for this country. I I
[00:43:48.800] spent some time doing doing human
[00:43:50.160] intelligence as well. And you know, work
[00:43:52.319] in the Levant I can't fully talk about
[00:43:54.079] to this day. And so, uh, on a show
[00:43:57.520] called Breaking Points, uh, Sagar show,
[00:44:00.800] he admitted to that the DoD and IC
[00:44:03.440] officers went to him and tipped him off
[00:44:06.960] on my, you know, previous PTSD
[00:44:09.359] struggles, which were were in my, you
[00:44:12.000] know, multi- agency security file. And I
[00:44:14.640] have no shame on that. A lot of veterans
[00:44:16.480] go through that. There's a big stigma
[00:44:18.079] about getting help when you have
[00:44:19.680] top-seater clearances. And it's very
[00:44:22.000] unfortunate. I know a lot of friends
[00:44:23.200] that have killed themselves. uh because
[00:44:25.040] they didn't seek help and they were
[00:44:26.400] worried about their career.
[00:44:27.599] >> It's the folks It's the folks that hide
[00:44:29.280] it.
[00:44:30.240] >> Yeah.
[00:44:30.640] >> They're that are not only at greater
[00:44:33.040] personal risk but greater professional
[00:44:35.680] risk. You're far better off to just make
[00:44:38.560] the disclosure and say, "Look, I need
[00:44:40.079] some help on this and it works out
[00:44:42.880] fine." It's when people think that they
[00:44:44.640] have to be Superman or Superwoman and
[00:44:46.400] they hide all this stuff
[00:44:47.920] >> and then they get involved in lying
[00:44:49.440] about it and then they lie about the
[00:44:51.599] lie. That's where everything unravels.
[00:44:54.000] Not when you're forthright and actually,
[00:44:56.560] you know, admit and explain what's going
[00:44:58.160] on.
[00:44:59.040] >> Oh, 100%. And when those episodes
[00:45:00.960] happened, uh, you know, there episodes
[00:45:02.880] that a lot of veterans have faced. You
[00:45:04.480] know, I reported that to security.
[00:45:05.920] Everything was adjudicated positively.
[00:45:08.160] >> Um, but they, you know, a certain agency
[00:45:10.560] leaked that and I know who it is, uh, to
[00:45:12.400] that reporter and they wanted that
[00:45:14.560] relitigated in a public fashion uh, to
[00:45:17.839] discredit the messenger, not the
[00:45:19.200] substance of my congressional testimony.
[00:45:21.200] Right. and
[00:45:22.400] >> they want to controversialize you.
[00:45:25.440] >> And by controversializing you, they try
[00:45:27.440] to make you radioactive and make you
[00:45:29.119] shut up. The other thing that's
[00:45:30.720] interesting besides the whispering
[00:45:32.079] campaign is you quickly find out who
[00:45:34.319] your real friends are, [laughter]
[00:45:36.400] >> right? So, the guy that you thought was
[00:45:38.560] your buddy and your pal and you worked
[00:45:40.560] with for x number of years, the minute
[00:45:42.640] this stuff breaks, they suddenly vanish.
[00:45:46.000] You know, there's no return text message
[00:45:48.160] about, "Hey, you want to go to lunch
[00:45:49.440] tomorrow?" poof, they're gone. So,
[00:45:52.079] that's another sort of life lesson there
[00:45:54.000] is the uh the people that suddenly no
[00:45:56.319] longer know who you are or forget your
[00:45:58.160] number.
[00:45:59.839] >> 100%. I will say the Intercept article
[00:46:02.400] did the opposite. It kind of boosted my
[00:46:04.240] credibility, allowed me to provide
[00:46:05.920] leadership on mental health, talked on
[00:46:08.000] Joe Rogan about it. Uh but it actually
[00:46:10.240] people came to help me, lawyers and
[00:46:12.480] otherwise when that came out because a
[00:46:14.720] lot of them were veterans and it
[00:46:17.040] radicalized them. But it is true.
[00:46:19.040] There's a lot of people I served with in
[00:46:21.040] the intel community. I just be became
[00:46:23.119] their radioactive friend and they kind
[00:46:25.200] of went calm silent because they didn't
[00:46:26.960] know what to think of the issue
[00:46:28.160] stigmatized or like you know did Dave go
[00:46:30.480] crazy or you know that kind of thing
[00:46:32.640] right and um but a lot of people have
[00:46:34.640] stood by me obviously you know my lawyer
[00:46:37.200] you know who is the former inspector
[00:46:38.640] general for the intelligence community
[00:46:40.480] >> that was a smart pick by the way
[00:46:41.920] >> stood [laughter] by me. Yeah. Yeah.
[00:46:43.760] Yeah. I credit him for a lot of my my
[00:46:46.480] success and and we were able to, you
[00:46:48.480] know, fend off the wolves. But it is
[00:46:50.480] true. It does get a little lonely and
[00:46:52.480] and and this subject brings out a lot of
[00:46:54.800] charlatans, a lot of people who want
[00:46:56.240] attention, a lot of people who want to
[00:46:58.160] generate certain narratives. I'm just
[00:47:00.160] here to do a job and to get this
[00:47:02.240] information out to the American public.
[00:47:03.760] And I would love to go back to my normal
[00:47:06.079] life. I live in in Colorado and I rather
[00:47:08.800] just ATV and hike with my dogs and not
[00:47:11.280] have to deal with this, you know, on the
[00:47:13.200] public stage. I never wanted to be a
[00:47:14.960] public personality. I have no book deal
[00:47:17.520] unlike other people in this space. And
[00:47:20.400] I'll write a book. I promise I'll write
[00:47:22.079] a book after this is all over. It'll be
[00:47:24.319] my leadership meditations. But
[00:47:26.960] >> we're in the middle of a battle right
[00:47:28.480] now. And we need the president uh to to
[00:47:30.960] help us win this uh win this battle of
[00:47:33.200] government transparency. So when that's
[00:47:35.040] all over, I'll I'll do some I'll do a
[00:47:37.359] media tour or something like that. But
[00:47:39.440] right now, I'm in the fight. So, I don't
[00:47:41.520] suppose that you want to tell us who the
[00:47:43.040] two people in the White House are that
[00:47:44.480] are wrestling this, do you?
[00:47:46.560] >> I do know. Uh, but I don't want to
[00:47:48.480] breach confences and I want to give them
[00:47:51.200] the space to ask. [laughter]
[00:47:53.119] >> Yeah. So, interesting interesting people
[00:47:55.599] I will say that are working on this for
[00:47:57.119] the president, but I'm seeing a lot of
[00:47:59.359] agency obuscation kind of the below the
[00:48:01.520] cabinet level, you know, and my my intel
[00:48:04.319] network that I still maintain and I see
[00:48:06.960] a lot of power plays, a lot of games, a
[00:48:09.200] lot of positioning. certain agencies are
[00:48:11.440] moving people into positions to kind of
[00:48:13.760] control the information release and that
[00:48:17.040] has not helped uh DNI Tulsi Gabbard and
[00:48:20.560] Pete Hegth and other folks because there
[00:48:22.960] are I'll call it shenanigans without
[00:48:24.559] using a bad word being being done uh
[00:48:28.000] below um the cut line and I've I've
[00:48:31.920] tried to help I certainly met with Arrow
[00:48:34.480] twice as a staff member about a year ago
[00:48:37.440] I actually offered to depose those
[00:48:40.480] hostile witnesses in front of Aero
[00:48:42.160] leadership. Uh they have yet to take me
[00:48:44.160] up on that later.
[00:48:46.319] >> That would that would really be fun. I
[00:48:47.760] mean that's like
[00:48:49.599] >> you're you're too young to remember this
[00:48:51.520] but unfortunately I'm not. So in the
[00:48:53.760] days of Watergate, you know,
[00:48:56.559] congressional hearings did not consist
[00:48:59.200] of members of Congress asking questions.
[00:49:02.000] They sat there in the peanut gallery and
[00:49:03.839] largely kept their mouths shut. What
[00:49:06.160] happened was the investigative counsel
[00:49:08.720] for the committee, that's the person
[00:49:11.359] that asked all the questions because
[00:49:13.200] normally normally they were a former
[00:49:15.040] prosecutor and so they knew how to cut
[00:49:17.280] through all the crap and ask questions
[00:49:18.720] in a way that built a foundation and
[00:49:20.480] then
[00:49:21.280] >> took off from there and answered all the
[00:49:23.440] basic interrogatives.
[00:49:25.280] And once the prosecutor went through
[00:49:27.839] this investigative counsel, the chief
[00:49:29.520] counsel, once they got done asking
[00:49:31.280] questions and and actually developing a
[00:49:34.640] logical line of inquiry with a witness,
[00:49:38.640] then at the very very end, the peanut
[00:49:41.440] gallery, the members got to ask, you
[00:49:43.200] know, they got their 10 seconds of glory
[00:49:45.119] asking something,
[00:49:46.240] >> but the act was developed by an
[00:49:48.319] attorney. And so you would have been
[00:49:50.000] great playing the role of the
[00:49:52.480] investigative council with hostile
[00:49:54.160] witnesses, you know, asking them all
[00:49:56.400] sorts of unpleasant things that they
[00:49:57.839] don't want to really talk about because,
[00:49:59.760] you know, all the magic words and the
[00:50:02.240] correct acronyms and the time sequence.
[00:50:05.040] The members of Congress, they only know
[00:50:07.119] what's put in front of them. They read
[00:50:08.480] off a piece of paper. They have no idea
[00:50:10.640] what the hell they're talking about for
[00:50:12.079] the most part. And so you would have
[00:50:14.000] been the perfect person to to to
[00:50:15.680] dismantle a lot of the obfuscation.
[00:50:18.960] >> Yeah. Yeah. Unfortunately, Arrow has to
[00:50:20.480] take me up on it. I would have had a lot
[00:50:22.000] of fun. I'm not a trained lawyer, but I
[00:50:23.920] I have interrogated uh individuals
[00:50:26.720] overseas. So, I think I could have
[00:50:28.319] dusted off that toolbox. Yeah.
[00:50:30.079] >> On behalf of the federal government and
[00:50:31.839] and had a joint congressional arrow
[00:50:34.559] thing. But it's very very curious to me.
[00:50:37.200] Um, they never took me up on it and
[00:50:40.480] certainly
[00:50:41.200] >> they're they are terrified terrified of
[00:50:44.400] having you go and be the questioner.
[00:50:47.440] They are absolutely petrified of that.
[00:50:50.559] >> I agree. And it's really a shame after
[00:50:53.119] the prior regime at Arrow, I really had
[00:50:55.280] high hopes for the current leadership at
[00:50:57.359] that office, but unfortunately maybe uh
[00:50:59.920] there's other things I'm not privy to
[00:51:01.520] and uh there the powers to be above
[00:51:03.599] them, you know, shut that down. But I
[00:51:05.599] did offer my services. because I gave
[00:51:07.040] them leads, etc. And uh actually
[00:51:10.319] Congress has been sending inter
[00:51:12.000] interrogatives uh to cabinet agencies.
[00:51:14.640] Something I touched on on Megan Kelly
[00:51:16.720] back in uh January, we actually got um
[00:51:19.920] we sent interrogatives to the CIA and
[00:51:22.880] the response uh Comr's committee gots
[00:51:26.079] was uh from the CIA was like, "We are
[00:51:28.720] not answering any of these questions.
[00:51:30.640] We'll refer you to Arrow." And I find
[00:51:32.640] that very curious. I don't know if John
[00:51:34.800] Ratcliffe and Michael Ellis knew that
[00:51:37.119] that's what CIA general counsel said
[00:51:39.359] back. Uh but CIA is unwilling to answer
[00:51:42.640] detailed questions that were obviously
[00:51:44.640] informed by my experience and we've sent
[00:51:47.200] interrogatives to other other uh uh
[00:51:50.960] services and agencies as well. And I've
[00:51:52.720] encouraged uh members to do so.
[00:51:54.720] Chairwoman Luna and Representative
[00:51:56.400] Burlson have have done a great job on
[00:51:58.319] that. obviously chair chairman comr
[00:52:00.960] recently uh did with all the missing
[00:52:02.880] scientists and whatnot and it's
[00:52:06.000] interesting the problem
[00:52:07.520] >> responses we're getting
[00:52:08.800] >> the problem with the some of our
[00:52:11.280] congress people
[00:52:13.359] uh not all of them but there are quite a
[00:52:16.079] number that never miss an opportunity to
[00:52:17.920] miss an opportunity if you know what I
[00:52:19.680] mean
[00:52:20.640] >> and so everyone should be very glad that
[00:52:22.559] I am not a member of Congress because uh
[00:52:25.680] I would sit in a skiff and debrief few
[00:52:29.200] and then I would go on the floor and
[00:52:31.359] during special orders
[00:52:33.680] uh you know using speech and debate
[00:52:36.000] clause immunity I would tell everybody
[00:52:38.319] everything and that would get a lot of
[00:52:40.880] people bent out of shape for obvious
[00:52:42.400] reasons but uh because I think the
[00:52:45.440] American people at this point feel like
[00:52:46.880] they're being jerked around like it's
[00:52:49.119] some weird little you know teasing cat
[00:52:51.200] and mice cat and mouse game
[00:52:53.599] >> we're going to tell you but we're not
[00:52:54.800] going to tell you and there's aliens but
[00:52:56.880] we're not really going to tell you about
[00:52:58.160] aliens and yeah, there's, you know,
[00:53:00.160] spaceships or interdimensional vehicles
[00:53:02.720] or whatever you want to call them, UAPs,
[00:53:05.520] UFOs, but we're not really going to tell
[00:53:07.599] you. We're certainly not going to show
[00:53:08.960] you anything. And uh or they'll dribble
[00:53:12.160] out something like uh I forget who said
[00:53:14.800] this. Somebody said, "Oh, there's one
[00:53:17.040] that they have that's absolutely
[00:53:19.119] enormous, right? It's like the size of a
[00:53:20.960] football field. We don't even know what
[00:53:22.880] to do with it or how to move it or
[00:53:24.240] whatever." I mean, dribbling that kind
[00:53:26.720] of stuff out is not doing anybody any
[00:53:28.800] favors. And I don't think that anything
[00:53:30.400] that anybody has to say is really gonna
[00:53:33.920] I mean, we'll will parts of it be
[00:53:36.000] shocking probably.
[00:53:38.079] >> Uh but I also think that people are
[00:53:40.240] remarkably resilient and telling the
[00:53:42.880] truth slowly is not a good idea. I think
[00:53:45.200] they should just get it out. And uh
[00:53:48.319] anyway,
[00:53:49.760] >> good reason why I'm not a member of
[00:53:51.119] Congress.
[00:53:52.000] >> Yeah, I think there's a responsible time
[00:53:53.440] period, but I agree with you. the the
[00:53:54.880] multi-year disclosure thing doesn't work
[00:53:56.640] because there that's high risk for
[00:53:58.079] further whistleblowers, members of
[00:54:00.400] Congress speaking outside of classified
[00:54:02.720] environments like you said and you know
[00:54:04.640] I agree saying those little things out
[00:54:06.640] in public I call it intel gain loss
[00:54:08.640] right you you say that kind of thing the
[00:54:11.359] internal folks oh I know what location
[00:54:13.599] they're talking about I'm going to
[00:54:15.520] develop a program protection strategy to
[00:54:18.800] hey when they come out for a site visit
[00:54:20.640] we're not taking them down that hallway
[00:54:22.640] and Uh certainly you can go full kimono,
[00:54:25.599] but I would say you would need in
[00:54:27.920] conjunction with Department of Justice a
[00:54:30.319] a multi-sight
[00:54:32.400] um uh you know search and seizure if you
[00:54:35.920] will uh to to maintain positive control
[00:54:38.800] over those equities because what we've
[00:54:40.559] seen in previous administrations like
[00:54:42.880] Clint people the program thought Clinton
[00:54:44.720] was going to disclose in the 90s. Well,
[00:54:46.800] there was a burn bag and shred party um
[00:54:49.520] at a particular agency in the mid 90s
[00:54:51.599] I'm aware of. And so there's historical
[00:54:53.680] records and this is the same thing with
[00:54:56.319] um the church and pike commissions. MK
[00:54:58.640] Ultra records were destroyed um you know
[00:55:01.760] tons of different mockingb bird etc. We
[00:55:04.160] don't even know the extent of mocking
[00:55:05.599] bird or MK Ultra because the CIA you
[00:55:08.240] know Angleton etc destroyed those
[00:55:10.160] records and and you're going to see the
[00:55:12.000] same thing. So, I would advise Trump to
[00:55:13.839] do a document preservation executive
[00:55:16.640] order. It could be non-public uh and and
[00:55:19.680] get all those assets secured uh before
[00:55:22.160] there's destruction of evidence. And
[00:55:24.000] we've seen that other cases that's not
[00:55:25.680] like conspiratorial at all.
[00:55:28.000] I'll give you an example of that because
[00:55:29.839] it caught my eye and it made me think,
[00:55:31.440] hm,
[00:55:32.880] >> I love
[00:55:34.800] uh unclassified nicknames for classified
[00:55:39.440] projects and even even the oneword
[00:55:42.400] nicknames for
[00:55:43.920] >> for black stuff. And so Nancy Mace very
[00:55:46.960] famously
[00:55:48.480] uh said, uh, I'm going to say it out
[00:55:51.599] loud and no one should even know it, but
[00:55:53.520] immaculate constellation. Even saying
[00:55:56.160] that could get me killed. Right. So,
[00:55:58.799] like you just said, I'm sure the minute
[00:56:00.240] she uttered the words Immaculate
[00:56:02.000] Constellation, you know, the shredders,
[00:56:05.040] you could probably hear them down the
[00:56:06.400] hall. You know, they fired up and they
[00:56:08.000] were feeding stuff into shredders or
[00:56:10.799] burn bags. Uh, are you going to tell us
[00:56:13.280] what immaculate constellation is?
[00:56:16.480] >> Well, I would imagine that some burn
[00:56:18.160] bags and shredders may have happened and
[00:56:19.920] I think a nuke went off on that. I have
[00:56:21.760] to be very careful about discussing uh
[00:56:24.799] that code word but like I said it was an
[00:56:28.079] old NSC activity right and um I know how
[00:56:31.119] it was controlled but you have to
[00:56:32.799] remember so here's one of the loopholes
[00:56:34.880] they use right so there's there's white
[00:56:36.799] house special access programs
[00:56:38.799] >> uh there was something called covert
[00:56:40.480] access programs 50 US code 3093 those
[00:56:43.839] are the programs reported the gang of
[00:56:45.440] eight gang of four you know that's like
[00:56:47.119] assassination stuff etc you know other
[00:56:49.200] things the government doesn't
[00:56:50.160] acknowledge
[00:56:51.119] But there's a, you know, a a way to
[00:56:53.359] develop a White House SAP that is
[00:56:55.119] non-covert action, you know, White House
[00:56:58.400] special access program. If you look in
[00:57:00.400] the law, there are no reporting
[00:57:02.799] carveouts or requirements to tell like
[00:57:05.920] the speaker or the majority leader or
[00:57:08.880] anything like that. And so, uh, that was
[00:57:11.599] one of the tricks of the trade, burying
[00:57:13.280] it over in the Department of Energy, but
[00:57:15.200] also keeping it in these non-covert
[00:57:16.799] action programs that like, you know,
[00:57:19.040] five people on the NYSE know about and
[00:57:20.799] the president at one time and then, you
[00:57:23.119] know, it has custodianship over across
[00:57:25.520] the battoic and MLAN. And it's very
[00:57:28.720] hard. Um, what I noticed because of the
[00:57:31.680] Presidential Records Act and and having
[00:57:33.599] seen the transitions in my career is the
[00:57:36.079] new intel director on the National
[00:57:37.760] Security Council walk in, there's
[00:57:40.000] nothing there. There's no records. The
[00:57:41.680] computers are wiped. The all the safes
[00:57:44.160] have been shredded. And so there there's
[00:57:46.720] not a lot of that hot changeover. And a
[00:57:49.119] lot of these political appointees in the
[00:57:50.720] Plumbook kind of learn as they go and
[00:57:53.200] they learn about these programs unless
[00:57:54.960] they they're a creature of that, you
[00:57:56.880] know, community. um not just some lawyer
[00:57:59.680] who you know became some NYSE wonk if
[00:58:02.720] you will
[00:58:03.520] >> and and there's also just something as
[00:58:06.079] simple as changing the unclassified
[00:58:08.880] nickname right
[00:58:10.559] >> and that's a strategy where they
[00:58:12.559] >> even that throws a curveball right so
[00:58:15.359] you know something that was joking
[00:58:18.240] originally it was jokingly referred to
[00:58:20.799] as the army of northern Virginia has
[00:58:23.280] since changed
[00:58:24.559] >> has since changed names
[00:58:26.640] >> I don't know 8 10 times whatever. So
[00:58:28.960] that's you know part of that's
[00:58:30.960] operational security or opsac part of
[00:58:32.880] that is maybe maybe some obfuscation as
[00:58:36.559] well but uh that's a a very simple
[00:58:41.200] example of what you're talking about
[00:58:42.720] which is just we're not going to call it
[00:58:44.640] that anymore. We're going to go to our
[00:58:46.319] book and pull out the next name on the
[00:58:48.000] list and it's you know Dancing Daisy or
[00:58:51.040] whatever it is. you know, they just they
[00:58:52.799] find a new name and call it something
[00:58:54.480] different. And that's that's just
[00:58:56.640] >> yeah, there's actually a database that
[00:58:58.079] randomly generates the names, right?
[00:59:00.240] >> And that's a part of their program
[00:59:01.920] protection strategy where they do they
[00:59:03.599] do rotate things. And that's the same
[00:59:05.119] thing with how they hide this program
[00:59:07.280] based on time epochs and who they trust,
[00:59:09.520] career civil servants, career senior
[00:59:12.079] executives in industry. They rotate it.
[00:59:14.799] And it's there's no they randomize the
[00:59:17.520] schema, too. It's not like this one guy
[00:59:19.440] and this one DoD office always gets it.
[00:59:22.160] They spread it across and it's this like
[00:59:24.240] rule by committee flat hierarchy and
[00:59:27.280] that's how they bounce. And I've seen
[00:59:28.799] that in conventional programs that that
[00:59:31.520] weren't reported to Congress as well. It
[00:59:33.280] has nothing to do with the subject. The
[00:59:35.280] way they just will hide things and and
[00:59:37.520] make a program that's not technically a
[00:59:39.520] compartment.
[00:59:40.960] >> I will tell you all that stuff.
[00:59:42.400] >> I will tell you a true
[00:59:44.640] >> a true but funny story. This goes way
[00:59:47.520] back in time to the late 80s. I was
[00:59:50.480] assigned at uh Supreme Headquarters,
[00:59:52.799] Allied Powers Europe, uh shape Belgium
[00:59:56.000] and there was something that we were
[00:59:57.280] doing there that we thought we were very
[00:59:59.280] smart. [laughter]
[01:00:00.799] >> Yeah. And we we had this program up and
[01:00:03.280] running and we were doing our thing and
[01:00:05.760] the guy who was in charge of it. Uh my
[01:00:08.240] boss decided that he was going to call
[01:00:09.839] it by a certain nickname
[01:00:12.079] >> and uh it was not a nickname that you
[01:00:14.400] know was an NSA approved generated
[01:00:16.880] randomized nickname.
[01:00:18.799] >> He just picked a word, a single word
[01:00:21.680] that he thought would be great to call
[01:00:24.160] this thing that we were doing. And so he
[01:00:26.400] shot a message back to the Pentagon with
[01:00:29.119] a long list of CC's, everybody, you
[01:00:31.520] know, who had
[01:00:32.640] >> purportedly had an interest in this
[01:00:34.160] activity and started talking about it
[01:00:36.480] and [laughter]
[01:00:38.079] his phone went up and he's like, "What
[01:00:40.160] the hell are you doing sending?" It was
[01:00:43.280] like a It wasn't even a uh compartmented
[01:00:47.040] thing. It was a a straight secret uh
[01:00:49.599] tape. you know what are you doing
[01:00:51.920] talking about whatever this word was on
[01:00:55.040] an open you know this is compartmented
[01:00:57.920] it's got to go through the SSO what do
[01:00:59.760] you and uh anyway so that was a big blow
[01:01:03.920] up based upon a guy having a bright idea
[01:01:05.920] and assigning his own nickname to
[01:01:07.440] something um which resulted in him
[01:01:09.839] having to fly back to the United States
[01:01:11.972] [laughter]
[01:01:12.799] and had getting a a quick tutorial from
[01:01:15.440] the technology management office was the
[01:01:17.520] name of the organization
[01:01:18.720] >> ah I know I CMO. I know. Yeah. They gave
[01:01:22.319] him a a tutorial on how you're going to
[01:01:25.119] name things from now on out. And uh
[01:01:27.680] anyway, so that was just somebody having
[01:01:29.440] a bright idea and using the wrong term
[01:01:31.599] and shooting it out in a message and
[01:01:33.359] then realizing, uhoh, there already is
[01:01:36.480] something called that and you you can't
[01:01:39.920] you can't discuss it or debate it, you
[01:01:42.160] know, in classified message traffic. So
[01:01:44.640] nicknames are a curious and wonderful
[01:01:47.359] thing. And you know, from the late 80s
[01:01:49.280] to now, you can only imagine how much
[01:01:50.880] more uh complicated and confused it's
[01:01:54.559] become.
[01:01:55.520] >> I certainly seen that in my career where
[01:01:57.599] uh some people had some good ideas and
[01:01:59.280] they were briefing us and I had to
[01:02:01.440] purposely uh kill their program because
[01:02:03.920] I couldn't tell them that that already
[01:02:05.520] exists under another classified
[01:02:06.992] [laughter]
[01:02:07.520] program. And they're like, "Dave, why
[01:02:09.839] are you being an How come
[01:02:11.359] you're saying uh I need to stop what I'm
[01:02:13.359] doing and we're not going to do this?
[01:02:15.040] Isn't this a good idea?" I'm like, you
[01:02:17.280] know, Bobby, trust me, no. You know, I
[01:02:20.748] [laughter] can't help them. And I've
[01:02:22.720] seen I've seen a lot of other stuff
[01:02:24.640] duplicity. And so, like, you'll have
[01:02:27.040] like an IC controlled access program
[01:02:29.440] doing X. You have a DoD program doing X.
[01:02:32.400] They don't know each other exists. And I
[01:02:35.599] and I claimed to my fame for a long
[01:02:37.520] time. I was the guy that had both. And
[01:02:39.680] then I'd be like, "All right, program
[01:02:41.200] manager, come talk." And there's just a
[01:02:43.760] lot of fraud, waste, and abuse. And I
[01:02:45.440] hope President Vance because he's the
[01:02:47.680] now fraudzar as of March for President
[01:02:50.720] Trump looks into that because Doge never
[01:02:53.040] looked in these classified programs that
[01:02:55.359] there's the white world kind of fraud
[01:02:57.440] waste and abuse but a lot of these
[01:02:59.760] people use the secrecy these rice bowls
[01:03:02.559] these jobs programs for contractors and
[01:03:05.359] the duplication and the the governance
[01:03:08.559] which is called ICD96 and ICO
[01:03:12.079] and the DoD SAP and the senior review
[01:03:15.680] group they don't really deconlict and
[01:03:17.920] they don't have the right people the
[01:03:19.280] right aptitude either they're just a lot
[01:03:21.599] of like security wonks like okay is it
[01:03:23.760] legal they didn't they did we report the
[01:03:25.839] funding to the the depth sect def etc
[01:03:28.400] there's not people actually technically
[01:03:30.319] deconlicting and you know uh you know
[01:03:34.480] cape in in the in the Pentagon is not
[01:03:36.960] really doing it and you know myself and
[01:03:39.520] a a hodgepodge mly crew of uh geriatric
[01:03:43.280] millennials and a little bit autism
[01:03:45.119] ended up being the the guys that uh uh
[01:03:48.400] that's my joke. the government
[01:03:49.599] weaponized my autism for [laughter] for
[01:03:51.680] almost 20 years and uh it's very appropo
[01:03:54.799] I guess to you know what I figured out
[01:03:56.799] with as a whistleblower but it just the
[01:04:00.400] the amount of of fraud waste and abuse
[01:04:02.640] like and I think of certain programs
[01:04:04.160] that are in Golden Dome now
[01:04:06.799] they they do not the goods that they're
[01:04:08.720] selling don't really work and I and I
[01:04:11.599] you know sounded the alarm about six
[01:04:13.920] years ago when I was working on
[01:04:15.200] something with the joint staff and and I
[01:04:17.520] hope uh General Goolan who I know and
[01:04:19.599] other other folks working in Golden Dome
[01:04:21.760] uh understand that and some of these
[01:04:23.520] programs don't have the effectiveness
[01:04:26.480] that they're selling these contractors
[01:04:28.640] in these federally funded research and
[01:04:30.960] development centers. Yeah. They'll
[01:04:33.039] they'll tell some program manager that
[01:04:34.720] doesn't have the right technical
[01:04:35.680] background. We can do X, we can do Y,
[01:04:38.400] you know, pew pew, you know, look at all
[01:04:40.160] the things we can do, right? But when
[01:04:41.920] you actually mod and sim it out, and
[01:04:43.599] that was my kind of claim to fame,
[01:04:45.200] actually digging down, it just doesn't
[01:04:47.359] work. And and so the UAP issue, the
[01:04:49.599] crash retrieval issue, the reverse
[01:04:51.599] engineering of these technologies,
[01:04:52.880] that's a symptom of this greater rot in
[01:04:55.520] the deep state when it comes to these
[01:04:57.680] programs. And I speak from somebody who
[01:04:59.440] had that broad access, but the acumen to
[01:05:02.000] actually understand a lot of these
[01:05:03.359] programs. So
[01:05:04.799] >> David, uh, as we go to close here, I
[01:05:07.440] want you to think about, you know, a
[01:05:08.640] judicial watch audience, right? our
[01:05:10.640] audience, whether listening or viewing
[01:05:12.319] this,
[01:05:13.920] uh they're some pretty smart folks who
[01:05:16.480] have a good BS meter and they also are
[01:05:21.440] uh hungry for the truth.
[01:05:23.839] >> Yeah.
[01:05:24.079] >> Uh and and they can take it. They're not
[01:05:26.770] [laughter] they're not little thumb
[01:05:28.799] suckers who will curl up in the corner
[01:05:30.640] and and cry. Uh and they feel like
[01:05:33.839] they're being kind of jerked around and
[01:05:36.079] maybe even conned a little bit by some
[01:05:38.000] people. Um, so we want to try to get at
[01:05:40.799] the truth. We want to try to understand
[01:05:42.400] what the real deal is. Obviously, uh,
[01:05:45.839] you've done your part trying to reveal
[01:05:47.839] and expose what has been going on with
[01:05:50.240] regard to UAPs and we can call them
[01:05:53.920] biologics or nonhuman intelligence or
[01:05:57.119] but we got to see a way forward. You
[01:05:59.599] know, we there's a lot of frustration
[01:06:01.200] and a lot of crazy like looking
[01:06:03.119] backwards, frustration, bad stories, but
[01:06:06.400] looking forwards, looking ahead, whether
[01:06:08.160] it's weeks or months, uh give our
[01:06:11.599] viewers and listeners
[01:06:14.079] uh an honest but a real sense of what
[01:06:18.319] the hell's happening and where are we
[01:06:20.079] going? Give give them a a forward view
[01:06:23.119] on this.
[01:06:24.880] >> Yeah, certainly. I have my own personal
[01:06:26.559] lawfare strategy that I will execute
[01:06:28.480] responsibly in a gradient of uh uh
[01:06:31.839] veracity depending on things. Uh
[01:06:34.000] Chairwoman Luna right now is asking the
[01:06:36.319] Department of Defense to declassify
[01:06:38.240] about 46 videos. Right.
[01:06:40.079] >> Some of those videos I've seen um
[01:06:43.280] they're interesting but don't certainly
[01:06:44.960] prove uh the case uh that that I've
[01:06:47.839] presented. But I think uh Luna's very
[01:06:50.400] smart to exercise that process and you
[01:06:54.400] know threaten subpoening those records
[01:06:56.799] and and getting those in receipt of
[01:06:58.640] Congress. And I think as the
[01:06:59.839] administration starts releasing things
[01:07:02.480] um and I'm speaking on my personal
[01:07:04.160] behalf here today, but I would recommend
[01:07:05.760] you know professionally to Congress um
[01:07:08.160] to start using the power of subpoena. Uh
[01:07:10.559] they already have the list of some of
[01:07:11.839] these hostile folks uh that ran those
[01:07:14.079] programs. Uh unfortunately uh one of
[01:07:17.680] those individuals uh major general
[01:07:19.760] retired Neil McCaslin is currently
[01:07:21.920] missing um which is very concerning to
[01:07:24.480] me uh as well.
[01:07:25.920] >> That's a whole other topic we could do a
[01:07:27.599] show on.
[01:07:28.079] >> Yeah, that's a whole other topic. But I
[01:07:29.280] I think the president sees that this
[01:07:31.359] will cement in his legacy, but it's also
[01:07:33.200] a bipartisan thing. I don't want to make
[01:07:34.799] it political where releasing this is
[01:07:37.039] going to help the Republicans in the
[01:07:38.319] midterms. I think there's a bipartisan
[01:07:40.640] consensus that they want this out there.
[01:07:42.720] And I would encourage our elected
[01:07:44.079] leadership uh to give the American
[01:07:45.920] public uh that I mean I certainly do not
[01:07:48.640] encourage irresponsible
[01:07:50.960] whistleblowing because I'm trying to set
[01:07:52.799] the standard to follow all the rules and
[01:07:54.960] I'm you know everything I do and say I I
[01:07:57.520] abide by everything. So I think
[01:07:59.520] unfortunately the balls in the US
[01:08:01.440] government's port or I guess an allied
[01:08:04.160] or an adversarial government if they
[01:08:05.760] wanted to take uh initiative but u I
[01:08:10.240] think Trump understands his legacy and
[01:08:14.160] wants a lot of this information out
[01:08:15.839] there and I would encourage um you know
[01:08:18.159] his administration to do the right thing
[01:08:19.679] and I encourage them if they they're
[01:08:21.759] meeting up resistance there's certainly
[01:08:23.359] a coalition uh things I'm happy to
[01:08:26.159] participate in and there's other folks
[01:08:28.159] in the woodwork that just need uh called
[01:08:30.080] up to duty uh to help them get through
[01:08:32.719] this. So I I think they need to not be
[01:08:36.400] shy about asking for help. You know, us
[01:08:39.040] men sometimes we don't like to ask for
[01:08:40.480] help, but like I think in this case it's
[01:08:42.880] all hands on deck. And I don't want to
[01:08:44.960] be too prophetic or say by a certain
[01:08:47.040] date uh something's going to come out uh
[01:08:49.600] because there's a lot of casual factors,
[01:08:52.080] but I I do have confidence that it's
[01:08:55.199] going to escalate in the next 60 to 90
[01:08:57.120] days. And I think there's going to be a
[01:08:58.319] lot of a lot of pressure. I certainly
[01:09:00.319] know what Congress is doing, and I I
[01:09:02.000] won't reveal that here, but I I do see a
[01:09:04.799] lot of pressure to to get the
[01:09:06.880] substantiative empirical holdings that
[01:09:08.560] I've talked about, not videos or
[01:09:10.319] anything like that, out in the ether.
[01:09:12.799] And um you know I'm hoping that's the
[01:09:14.480] case, but there's certainly a lawfare
[01:09:16.080] strategy um class action multiplative
[01:09:19.199] lawsuits, RICO, other strategies to kind
[01:09:22.080] of pierce the veil on this um if it
[01:09:24.480] needed to go come to that. I don't want
[01:09:26.319] to be adversarial like that. And I
[01:09:28.480] believe uh in um coming together to
[01:09:32.560] advance kind of humanity on this
[01:09:34.239] subject, but there are legal instruments
[01:09:36.799] that we could use as well uh to ensure
[01:09:39.600] this coming out. But that is a
[01:09:40.960] multi-year, you know how lawsuits are
[01:09:42.560] god-awful long, a multi-year process.
[01:09:45.520] Sure. And likely a Supreme Court
[01:09:47.199] challenge um under unitary executive
[01:09:49.679] theory uh would ensue that in that case.
[01:09:52.719] >> Hypothetically,
[01:09:54.320] and I'm putting that in all caps, bold,
[01:09:56.640] underlined, hypothetically,
[01:09:59.840] >> uh is there a foreign power that could
[01:10:01.600] beat us to the punch and just release
[01:10:03.040] stuff that would be essentially parallel
[01:10:05.920] to what
[01:10:06.719] >> Yeah.
[01:10:07.440] >> Yeah. I would imagine
[01:10:09.120] >> there there are just like I mentioned
[01:10:10.640] there's a you know pure adversary of
[01:10:12.159] cold war everybody's doing it and nobody
[01:10:15.440] likes to talk about it and there has
[01:10:18.080] been resulting asymmetrical technology
[01:10:20.560] and that's the issue with it not being
[01:10:22.640] an overt mission area as we say is we're
[01:10:25.760] not able to put the whole defense
[01:10:27.360] industrial base on it and our
[01:10:30.080] adversaries have made breakthroughs in
[01:10:32.159] many areas that have provided them
[01:10:33.920] capabilities that threaten you know US
[01:10:36.320] national security, but because of the
[01:10:38.159] secrecy, it's a self-licking ice cream
[01:10:40.000] cone. We can't bring everybody in on it.
[01:10:42.400] We can't acknowledge it. We can't uh
[01:10:44.880] introduce the these uh advanced topic
[01:10:47.360] areas into STEM education. And so, we
[01:10:49.600] actually hurt national security long
[01:10:51.280] term by all the secrecy, but certainly
[01:10:53.840] an adversary, and I do worry about that
[01:10:56.159] for US supremacy in the world. Certainly
[01:10:59.040] um China because of their belt and road
[01:11:01.199] initiative jump ahead on this issue and
[01:11:03.679] they've messaged on this issue in the
[01:11:05.600] past
[01:11:06.239] >> in South China Morning Posts and other
[01:11:08.320] um uh PLA and CCP kind of mouth English
[01:11:11.360] language mouthpieces right
[01:11:13.199] >> and they could uh see an opening uh and
[01:11:16.880] geopolitically become kind of the
[01:11:18.800] messianic figure on this and that does
[01:11:20.640] worry me as an American
[01:11:22.239] >> that's what I think about is I'm not too
[01:11:24.000] worried about you know
[01:11:26.880] we'll manage it in our own awkward weird
[01:11:29.199] stupid way that we do. Um I'm thinking
[01:11:32.080] about Freedom of Information Act and
[01:11:33.920] FOYA and how the government stumbles
[01:11:35.920] through that in a
[01:11:37.840] >> in a very awkward cumbersome way. Um
[01:11:42.320] but that uh you know not even the
[01:11:45.760] Russians or the Chinese. I mean, how
[01:11:48.080] about the Brazilians? Some oddball, you
[01:11:50.800] know, uh,
[01:11:53.920] large enough, sophisticated enough
[01:11:57.040] country that's had sufficient experience
[01:12:00.960] with these various scenarios, vehicles,
[01:12:05.840] nonhuman intelligence,
[01:12:08.640] and they say, "Well, we heard that the
[01:12:10.239] Americans have been wrestling with this,
[01:12:11.840] but let us show you what we have." you
[01:12:14.239] know,
[01:12:15.360] >> well, South America is an interesting
[01:12:16.960] place, and I will say, and this is
[01:12:18.560] public record, you can look it up on X,
[01:12:20.960] uh, in Brazil, the former, uh, defense
[01:12:23.679] secretary in Brazil is running for
[01:12:26.000] president right now, and he said if he
[01:12:28.000] gets elected president of Brazil, he
[01:12:30.000] will release, uh, what the Brazilian
[01:12:32.000] government knows about this topic and
[01:12:34.239] that, you know, he said that public
[01:12:35.440] record. So, it's funny you say that.
[01:12:36.640] There's actually a possibility that even
[01:12:39.040] Brazil might release stuff just based on
[01:12:41.440] the statements of a current candidate
[01:12:42.800] for president down there.
[01:12:43.760] >> Yeah. And there's enough stuff out there
[01:12:45.679] publicly with Brazil having its own
[01:12:48.080] history of unusual objects moving around
[01:12:51.760] doing things,
[01:12:53.760] >> you know, it's kind of a natural. But,
[01:12:55.840] uh, listen, David, we really appreciate
[01:12:57.760] you coming in and talking to us. I I do
[01:12:59.760] want to I I kind of teed you up for a
[01:13:01.760] last word, but I want to give you a a
[01:13:04.159] postcript, a PS. any last word you have
[01:13:06.960] for our our viewers and listeners?
[01:13:10.239] >> Nope. Just want to say I I certainly
[01:13:12.400] want to lead on this issue and I'm
[01:13:13.840] trying to do everything in my power
[01:13:15.120] behind the scenes. If I'm quiet, that
[01:13:16.880] means I'm working and uh doing all the
[01:13:19.760] right things to responsibly uh do this.
[01:13:22.719] Uh like you mentioned, you know, I I
[01:13:24.560] currently still work for Congress.
[01:13:26.159] Apparently, I was the first
[01:13:27.280] whistleblower in US history to testify
[01:13:29.360] in front of Congress and then be
[01:13:30.640] subsequently hired by Congress. So, I do
[01:13:33.040] thank Representative Burlson for giving
[01:13:35.040] me the opportunity. Certainly, all my
[01:13:36.640] thoughts here were my own and don't
[01:13:38.480] represent members of Congress, but I
[01:13:41.520] certainly am a leader. Uh, I will I will
[01:13:43.840] take the the spears for everybody and I
[01:13:46.560] will hopefully uh lead us to a good end
[01:13:48.719] result and I really am open to working
[01:13:51.199] with the administration to make that
[01:13:52.560] happen um like I have been over the last
[01:13:54.800] several years.
[01:13:55.760] >> David, thanks for joining us. We really
[01:13:57.440] appreciate it.
[01:13:58.960] >> Yeah, thanks sir. David Gush joining us
[01:14:02.080] on watch. Thank you very much for
[01:14:03.840] joining us and stay tuned. We got a few
[01:14:06.320] more episodes coming up that I think
[01:14:08.159] will touch on this topic as well. You'll
[01:14:10.719] find it very interesting. I'm Chris
[01:14:13.280] Ferrell on watch.
[01:14:17.326] [music]
[01:14:23.876] >> [music]