[00:00:01.680] I'd first like to thank our witness, Dr.
[00:00:03.360] Sean Kirkpatrick, for testifying here
[00:00:05.520] and in today's earlier close session and
[00:00:07.600] for his long and distinguished career
[00:00:09.440] both in the intelligence community and
[00:00:11.200] in the department of defense. Dr.
[00:00:12.960] Kirkpatre is the director of the all
[00:00:15.200] domain anomaly resolution office or
[00:00:17.440] arrow. Congress established this office
[00:00:20.000] in law to get to the bottom of the very
[00:00:21.920] serious problem of unidentified
[00:00:23.519] anomalous phenomenon or UAP. Dr.
[00:00:26.320] Kirkpatre has a very difficult mission.
[00:00:28.640] While we have made progress, there
[00:00:30.400] remains a stigma attached to these
[00:00:31.840] phenomenon. There is a vast and complex
[00:00:34.320] citizen engagement and there's also very
[00:00:36.719] challenging scientific and technical
[00:00:38.640] hurdles. So, we appreciate the
[00:00:40.320] willingness of Dr. Kurpatre to lean in
[00:00:42.800] on this issue and the work that he has
[00:00:44.960] accomplished thus far and we look
[00:00:46.800] forward to both his opening statement
[00:00:48.640] and his presentation of examples of the
[00:00:50.800] work Arrow has done. In late 2017, media
[00:00:54.160] reports surfaced about activity set in
[00:00:56.160] motion by the late long-erving majority
[00:00:58.079] leader Senator Harry Reid more than a
[00:01:00.320] decade ago. We learned that there was
[00:01:02.160] strong evidence of advanced technology
[00:01:03.920] reflected in the features and
[00:01:05.199] performance characteristics of many
[00:01:06.720] objects observed by our highly highly
[00:01:09.040] trained service members operating
[00:01:10.880] top-of-the-line military equipment.
[00:01:13.600] We learned that for the at least the the
[00:01:15.680] past eight years, military pilots
[00:01:17.600] frequently encountered unknown objects
[00:01:19.280] in controlled airspace off both the east
[00:01:21.520] and west coast across the continental
[00:01:23.439] United States in test and training areas
[00:01:25.840] and ranges. We don't know where they are
[00:01:28.560] they come from, who made them, or how
[00:01:30.240] they operate. As former Deputy Secretary
[00:01:32.400] of Defense David Norquist observed, "Had
[00:01:34.640] any of these objects had the label made
[00:01:36.240] in China, there would be an uproar in
[00:01:38.240] the government and media. There would be
[00:01:40.079] no stone unturned and no effort spared
[00:01:41.920] to find out what we were dealing with.
[00:01:43.840] We can look at the recent incursion of
[00:01:45.360] the unidentified PRC high alitude
[00:01:47.439] balloon for as an example
[00:01:49.840] and but because of the UFO stigma the
[00:01:52.240] response has been irresponsibly anemic
[00:01:54.560] and slow congress established arrow. We
[00:01:57.119] made it clear that we expect vigorous
[00:01:59.200] action. We added very substantial
[00:02:00.880] initial funding for the office, but
[00:02:02.640] despite our best efforts, the
[00:02:04.479] president's budget for fiscos 23 and 24
[00:02:06.799] requested only enough funding to defay
[00:02:08.959] the operating expenses of Arrow. It
[00:02:11.039] included almost no funds to sustain the
[00:02:12.959] critical research and development
[00:02:14.160] necessary to support a serious
[00:02:15.440] investigation. It took a letter to
[00:02:17.280] Secretary Austin from Senator Rubio and
[00:02:19.200] me and 14 other senators to get the
[00:02:21.280] office temporary relief for the current
[00:02:23.040] fiscal year. In this hearing, I intend
[00:02:25.040] to probe a series of specific issues. In
[00:02:27.680] the recent incidents where multiple
[00:02:29.120] objects were shot down over North
[00:02:30.720] America, it seemed that Pentagon
[00:02:32.319] leadership did not turn to Arrow office
[00:02:34.480] to play a leading role in advising the
[00:02:36.319] combatant commander. We need to know
[00:02:38.080] whether this will continue. We need to
[00:02:39.519] know whether the leadership and DoD will
[00:02:41.280] bring Arrow into the decision-making
[00:02:42.879] process in a visible way. And we need to
[00:02:44.879] know what role AROW will play in inter
[00:02:46.640] agency coordination after the NSC
[00:02:48.640] working group disbands. In the fiscal
[00:02:50.959] year 2023 National Defense and
[00:02:52.640] Intelligence Authorization Acts,
[00:02:54.319] Congress established a direct reporting
[00:02:56.319] chain from the arrow director to the
[00:02:58.080] deputy secretary of defense. The role of
[00:03:00.239] the office of the under secretary of
[00:03:01.680] defense for intelligence and security is
[00:03:03.519] limited to providing administrative
[00:03:05.519] support. We need to know how this
[00:03:07.440] direction is being implemented. UAP are
[00:03:10.159] frequently observed flying in extremely
[00:03:12.080] high or very low speeds and come in
[00:03:14.159] various sizes and shapes. During the
[00:03:15.840] recent shootowns over North America, DoD
[00:03:18.000] disclo disclosed that filters on radar
[00:03:20.640] systems were adjusted to allow for
[00:03:22.239] detection and tracking of diverse sets
[00:03:23.840] of objects for the first time. While
[00:03:25.840] opening the aperture can overload the
[00:03:27.760] real-time analytic process, we cannot
[00:03:30.080] keep turning a blind eye to surveillance
[00:03:31.680] data that is critical to detecting and
[00:03:33.519] tracking UAP. We need to know whether
[00:03:35.519] Dr. Kurpatre can achieve the necessary
[00:03:37.360] control over sensor filters and the
[00:03:39.680] storage and access to raw surveillance
[00:03:41.599] data to find UAP anomalies. Finally, one
[00:03:44.239] of the tasks Congress set for Arrow is
[00:03:46.239] serving as an open door for witnesses of
[00:03:48.080] UAP events or participants in government
[00:03:50.640] activities related to UAPs to come
[00:03:52.879] forward securely and disclose what they
[00:03:54.799] know without fear of retribution for any
[00:03:57.280] possible violations of previously signed
[00:03:59.360] non-disclosure agreements. Congress
[00:04:01.200] mandated that Arrow set up a publicly
[00:04:03.680] discoverable and accessible process for
[00:04:05.680] safe disclosure. While we know that
[00:04:07.439] Arrow has already conducted a
[00:04:09.040] significant number of interviews, many
[00:04:11.040] referred by Congress, we need to set up
[00:04:12.959] a public process that that and we need
[00:04:15.360] to know where that effort stands. With
[00:04:17.440] that, I'd like to turn to Senator Erns
[00:04:18.799] for her opening statement.
[00:04:20.160] >> Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
[00:04:22.000] Dr. Kirkpatrick, for your testimony
[00:04:24.160] today. Uh, I'll keep these remarks very
[00:04:26.720] brief so that we have maximum time for
[00:04:29.040] your briefing. Uh the recent downing of
[00:04:31.360] the Chinese surveill surveillance
[00:04:33.360] balloon and three other objects
[00:04:34.960] underscores the need for domain
[00:04:37.199] awareness. Adversaries like China and
[00:04:40.000] Russia are working to hold US interests
[00:04:42.479] including our homeland at risk. That's
[00:04:45.280] why your testimony is so important and I
[00:04:48.400] so look forward to a progress update on
[00:04:50.320] the establishment of your office. As
[00:04:52.880] members know, your office evolved from
[00:04:54.560] the Navyled unidentified aerial
[00:04:56.639] phenomena task force to the all domain
[00:04:59.600] anomalous resolution office known as
[00:05:02.000] Arrow. Dr. Kirkpatre, your extensive
[00:05:04.880] background in science and technology,
[00:05:08.080] research and development and space makes
[00:05:11.120] you well suited to discuss these
[00:05:12.880] emerging challenges. My priority is that
[00:05:15.759] we understand the full range of threats
[00:05:18.560] posed by our adversaries in all domains.
[00:05:22.240] That is what the joint force needs to be
[00:05:24.240] prepared to fight and win in defense of
[00:05:26.800] our nation. This committee needs to know
[00:05:29.360] about Chinese or Russian advanced
[00:05:31.199] technology programs to exploit our
[00:05:33.919] vulnerabilities. and it needs to know
[00:05:36.000] whether your office along with the IC
[00:05:38.880] has detected potential Chinese or
[00:05:40.800] Russian capabilities to surveil or
[00:05:43.440] attack us. Finally, we need to ensure
[00:05:46.320] efficient inter agency coordination.
[00:05:49.360] Multiple elements of the DoD and IC own
[00:05:52.800] a piece of this mission to add value.
[00:05:56.400] Arrow's efforts cannot be redundant with
[00:05:58.960] others. Um, thank you again. We look
[00:06:01.199] forward to your testimony.
[00:06:04.160] >> Dr. Kurpatre, uh, you can give your
[00:06:06.160] testimony.
[00:06:08.400] >> Thank you, Chairwoman Juel Brand, uh,
[00:06:10.400] Ranking Member Ernst, distinguished
[00:06:12.319] members of the subcommittee.
[00:06:14.319] It's a privilege to be here today to
[00:06:15.840] testify on the defense uh, defense's
[00:06:18.319] efforts to address unidentified
[00:06:20.080] anomalous phenomena. First, I want to
[00:06:22.400] thank Congress for its extensive and
[00:06:24.160] continued partnership as the department
[00:06:26.000] works to better understand and respond
[00:06:27.840] to UAP in an effort to minimize
[00:06:30.319] technical and intelligence surprise.
[00:06:32.800] Unidentified objects in any domain pose
[00:06:35.440] potential risks to safety and security,
[00:06:37.680] particularly from military personnel and
[00:06:40.160] capabilities. Congress and DoD agree
[00:06:43.039] that UAP cannot remain unexamined or
[00:06:45.520] unressed.
[00:06:47.199] We are grateful for sustained
[00:06:48.800] congressional engagement on this issue
[00:06:50.720] which paved the way for the DoD's
[00:06:52.720] establishment of the all domain anomaly
[00:06:54.720] resolution office in July of last year.
[00:06:57.759] Though Arrow is still a young office,
[00:07:00.000] the spotlight on UAP in recent months
[00:07:03.039] underscores the importance of its work
[00:07:05.280] and the need for UAP to be taken
[00:07:07.440] seriously as a matter of national
[00:07:09.280] security.
[00:07:10.639] All leadership that I've had the
[00:07:12.240] pleasure of working with, whether DoD,
[00:07:14.560] IC, DOE, civil, scientific, or
[00:07:17.520] industrial, view Congress as a critical
[00:07:19.440] partner in this endeavor.
[00:07:21.759] Arrow has accomplished much in the last
[00:07:24.080] nine months since it was established.
[00:07:25.919] The Arrow team of more than three dozen
[00:07:28.160] experts is organized around four
[00:07:30.639] functional areas: operations, scientific
[00:07:33.360] research, integrated analysis, and
[00:07:35.440] strategic communications.
[00:07:37.440] In the nine months since Arrow's
[00:07:39.120] establishment, we've taken important
[00:07:40.880] steps to involve and improve uh UAP data
[00:07:44.479] collection, standardize the department's
[00:07:46.720] UAP internal reporting requirements, and
[00:07:49.599] implement a framework for rigorous
[00:07:51.440] scientific and intelligence analysis,
[00:07:54.400] allowing us to resolve cases in a
[00:07:56.400] systematic and prioritized manner.
[00:07:59.360] Meanwhile, consistent with legislative
[00:08:01.599] direction, Arrow is also carefully
[00:08:03.599] reviewing and researching the US
[00:08:06.000] government's UAP related historical
[00:08:08.080] record.
[00:08:09.599] Arrow is leading a focused effort to
[00:08:11.520] better characterize, understand, and
[00:08:13.039] attribute UAP with priority given to UAP
[00:08:16.720] reports by DoD and IC personnel in or
[00:08:19.759] near areas of national security
[00:08:21.520] importance. DoD fully appreciates the
[00:08:24.560] eagerness from many quarters, especially
[00:08:27.599] here in Congress and in the American
[00:08:29.199] public, to quickly resolve every UAP
[00:08:31.599] encountered across the globe from the
[00:08:33.760] distant past through today. It's
[00:08:36.000] important to note, however, Arrow is the
[00:08:38.719] culmination of decades of DoD,
[00:08:41.360] intelligence community, and
[00:08:42.640] congressionally directed efforts to
[00:08:44.320] successfully resolve UAP encountered
[00:08:46.800] first and foremost by US military
[00:08:49.120] personnel, specifically Navy and Air
[00:08:51.360] Force pilots. The law establishing Arrow
[00:08:54.480] is ambitious and it will take time to
[00:08:56.640] realize the full mission. We cannot
[00:08:59.120] answer decades of questions about UAP
[00:09:01.839] all at once, but we must begin
[00:09:04.320] somewhere. While I assure you that Arrow
[00:09:06.880] will follow scientific evidence wherever
[00:09:08.800] it leads, I ask for your patience as DoD
[00:09:11.839] first prioritizes safety and security of
[00:09:14.240] our military personnel and installations
[00:09:16.240] in all domains. After all, a UAP
[00:09:19.680] encountered first by highly capable DoD
[00:09:21.920] and IC platforms featuring the nation's
[00:09:24.640] most advanced sensors are those UAP most
[00:09:27.600] likely to be resolved by my office,
[00:09:29.760] assuming the data can be collected. If
[00:09:32.560] Arrow succeeds in first improving the
[00:09:34.720] ability of military personnel to quickly
[00:09:36.880] and confidently resolve UAP they
[00:09:39.120] encounter, I believe that in time we
[00:09:41.440] will have greatly advanced the
[00:09:42.880] capability of the entire United States
[00:09:44.720] government, including its civilian
[00:09:46.240] agencies to resolve UAP. However, it
[00:09:49.519] would be naive to believe that the
[00:09:51.600] resolution of all UAP can be solely
[00:09:54.160] accomplished by the DoD and IC alone. We
[00:09:57.279] will need to prioritize collection and
[00:09:59.040] leverage authorities from monitoring all
[00:10:01.120] domains within the continental United
[00:10:02.880] States. Arrow's ultimate success will
[00:10:05.519] require partnerships with the inter
[00:10:07.120] agency, industry partners, academia, and
[00:10:09.920] the scientific community as well as the
[00:10:11.839] public. Arrow is partnering with the
[00:10:14.399] services intelligence community, DOE, as
[00:10:16.640] well as civil partners and across the US
[00:10:18.560] government to tap into the resources of
[00:10:20.720] the inter agency.
[00:10:22.720] The UAP challenge is more an operational
[00:10:25.519] and scientific issue than it is an
[00:10:27.920] intelligence issue. As such, we are
[00:10:30.640] working with industry, academia, and the
[00:10:32.880] scientific community, which bring their
[00:10:34.640] own resources, ideas, and expertise to
[00:10:37.680] this challenging problem set.
[00:10:40.320] Robust collaboration and peer review
[00:10:42.480] across a broad range of partners will
[00:10:44.480] promote greater objectivity and
[00:10:46.160] transparency in the study of UAP.
[00:10:49.279] I want to underscore today that only a
[00:10:51.519] very small percentage of UAP reports
[00:10:54.240] display signatures that could reasonably
[00:10:56.560] be described as anomalous. The majority
[00:10:59.120] of unidentified objects reported to
[00:11:01.440] Arrow demonstrate mundane
[00:11:03.680] characteristics of balloons, unmanned
[00:11:05.920] aerial systems, clutter, natural
[00:11:07.839] phenomena, or other readily explainable
[00:11:09.839] sources.
[00:11:11.279] While a large number of cases in our
[00:11:13.279] holdings remain technically unresolved,
[00:11:16.160] this is primarily due to a lack of data
[00:11:18.720] associated with those cases. Without
[00:11:21.120] sufficient data, we are unable to reach
[00:11:23.360] defendable conclusions
[00:11:25.519] uh that meet the high scientific
[00:11:27.360] standards we set for resolution. And I
[00:11:29.680] will not close a case that I cannot
[00:11:31.519] defend the conclusions of. I recognize
[00:11:34.640] that this answer is unsatisfying to
[00:11:36.800] those who in good faith assume that what
[00:11:38.959] they see with their eyes, with their
[00:11:40.480] cameras, and with their radars is
[00:11:42.320] incontrovertible evidence of
[00:11:43.839] extraordinary characteristics and
[00:11:45.519] performance. Yet time and again, with
[00:11:47.920] sufficient scientific quality data, it
[00:11:49.920] is fact that UAP often, but not always,
[00:11:53.680] resolve into readily explainable
[00:11:55.760] sources. Humans are subject to deception
[00:11:58.560] and illusions, sensors to unexpected
[00:12:00.880] responses and malfunctions, and in some
[00:12:03.279] cases, intentional interference. Getting
[00:12:06.160] to the handful of cases that pass this
[00:12:08.160] level of scrutiny is the mission of era.
[00:12:11.120] That is not to say that UAP once
[00:12:13.279] resolved are no longer of national
[00:12:15.360] security interest. However, on the
[00:12:17.440] contrary, learning that a UAP isn't of
[00:12:19.760] exotic origin, but is instead just a
[00:12:22.000] quadcopter or balloon leads to the
[00:12:24.800] question of who is operating that
[00:12:26.320] quadcopter and to what purpose.
[00:12:29.120] The answers to those questions will
[00:12:30.720] inform potential national security or
[00:12:32.880] law enforcement responses.
[00:12:35.440] Arrow is a member of the department's
[00:12:37.200] support to the administration's Tiger
[00:12:38.959] Team effort to deal with stratospheric
[00:12:40.880] objects such as the PRC high altitude
[00:12:43.040] balloon.
[00:12:44.639] While when previously unknown objects
[00:12:47.120] are successfully identified, it is
[00:12:49.600] Arrow's role to quickly and efficiently
[00:12:52.000] hand off such readily explainable
[00:12:53.920] objects to the intelligence, law
[00:12:56.160] enforcement, or operational safety
[00:12:58.160] communities for further analysis and
[00:13:00.160] appropriate action. In other words,
[00:13:02.800] Arrow's mission is to turn UAP into SCP,
[00:13:06.480] somebody else's problem.
[00:13:09.440] The US government, the DoD and the IC in
[00:13:12.079] particular has tremendous capabilities
[00:13:14.000] to deal with those encountered objects.
[00:13:16.399] In the wake of the PRC HAB event, the
[00:13:19.279] inter agency is working to better
[00:13:21.040] integrate and share information to
[00:13:22.959] address identifiable stratospheric
[00:13:25.839] objects, but that is not Arrow's lane.
[00:13:29.440] Meanwhile, for the few cases in all
[00:13:31.440] domains, space, air, and sea, that do
[00:13:34.800] demonstrate potentially anomalous
[00:13:36.399] characteristics, Arrow exists to help
[00:13:38.320] the DoD, IC, and inter agency resolve
[00:13:41.120] those anomalous cases. In doing so,
[00:13:44.079] Arrow is approaching these cases with
[00:13:45.920] the highest level of objectivity and
[00:13:48.079] analytic rigor. This includes physically
[00:13:50.800] testing and employing modeling and
[00:13:52.480] simulation to validate our analyses and
[00:13:55.200] underlying theories, then peer-reviewing
[00:13:57.360] those results within the US government,
[00:13:59.680] industry partners, and appropriately
[00:14:01.440] cleared academic institutions before
[00:14:03.519] reaching any conclusions.
[00:14:05.760] I should also state clearly for the
[00:14:07.519] record that in our research, Arrow has
[00:14:09.680] found no credible evidence thus far of
[00:14:12.079] extraterrestrial activity, off-world
[00:14:14.320] technology, or objects that defy the
[00:14:16.959] known laws of physics. In the event
[00:14:19.600] sufficient scientific data were ever
[00:14:21.680] obtained that a UAP encountered can only
[00:14:24.720] be explained by extraterrestrial origin,
[00:14:27.199] we are committed to working with our
[00:14:28.800] inter agency partners at NASA to
[00:14:31.120] appropriately inform US government's
[00:14:33.040] leadership of its findings. For those
[00:14:35.680] few cases that have leaked to the public
[00:14:38.000] previously and subsequently commented on
[00:14:40.079] by the US government, I encourage those
[00:14:42.480] who hold alternative theories or views
[00:14:44.480] to submit your research to credible
[00:14:46.639] peer-reviewed scientific journals. Arrow
[00:14:49.199] is working very hard to do the same.
[00:14:51.600] That is how science works, not by blog
[00:14:54.160] or social media. We know that there is
[00:14:57.040] tremendous public interest in UAP and a
[00:14:59.440] desire for answers from arrow. By its
[00:15:02.240] very nature, the UAP challenge has for
[00:15:04.720] decades lent itself to mystery,
[00:15:06.959] sensationalism, and even conspiracy. For
[00:15:10.320] that reason, Arrow remains committed to
[00:15:12.480] transparency, accountability, and to
[00:15:14.800] sharing as much with the American public
[00:15:16.959] as we can, consistent with our
[00:15:19.120] obligation to protect in not only
[00:15:21.279] intelligence sources and methods, but US
[00:15:23.760] and allied capabilities.
[00:15:26.320] However, Arrow's work will take time if
[00:15:28.800] we are committed to do it right. It
[00:15:30.959] means adhering to the scientific method
[00:15:33.040] and the highest standards of research
[00:15:34.800] integrity. It means being methodical and
[00:15:37.839] scrupulous. It means withholding
[00:15:39.760] judgment in favor of evidence. It means
[00:15:42.000] following the data where it leads,
[00:15:44.000] wherever it leads. It means establishing
[00:15:46.639] scientific, peer-reviewed, theoretical
[00:15:48.639] underpinnings of observed data. And
[00:15:51.279] Arrow is committed to all of those
[00:15:53.199] standards. I'm proud of Arrow's progress
[00:15:55.920] over the last nine months. months. Much
[00:15:58.639] remains to be done, but the hard work is
[00:16:00.560] underway. Thank you for your continued
[00:16:03.199] support. And before we turn to
[00:16:04.880] questions, I'm going to walk you through
[00:16:06.720] some of our analytical trends in a
[00:16:08.639] couple of cases that we've prepared.
[00:16:14.160] So, one of the things that Arrow does is
[00:16:17.680] high integrity analysis. As I've said,
[00:16:21.279] this chart represents
[00:16:23.759] the trend analysis of all the cases in
[00:16:27.600] you Arrow's holdings right to date. What
[00:16:31.040] you'll see on the left is a histogram of
[00:16:35.120] all of our reported sightings as a
[00:16:37.920] function of altitude.
[00:16:40.320] So most of our sightings occur in the 15
[00:16:45.519] to 25,000 ft range. And that is
[00:16:48.880] ultimately because that's where a lot of
[00:16:50.240] our aircraft are.
[00:16:52.959] On the far right upper corner, you'll
[00:16:55.600] see a breakout of the morphologies of
[00:16:58.639] all of the UAP that are reported. Over
[00:17:01.680] half, about 52% of what's been reported
[00:17:04.799] to us are round orb spheres.
[00:17:10.240] The rest of those break out into all
[00:17:12.400] kinds of different other shapes. The
[00:17:14.319] gray box is
[00:17:17.039] essentially there's no data on what its
[00:17:19.600] shape is. Either it wasn't reported or
[00:17:21.919] the uh sensor did not collect it. The
[00:17:25.120] bottom uh map is a heat map of all
[00:17:28.319] reporting areas across the globe that we
[00:17:30.880] have available to us.
[00:17:33.600] What you'll notice is that there is a
[00:17:36.240] heavy what we call collection bias both
[00:17:39.039] in altitude and in geographic location.
[00:17:42.960] That's where all of our sensors exist.
[00:17:46.160] That's where our training ranges are.
[00:17:48.000] That's where our operational ranges are.
[00:17:49.919] That's where all of our platforms are.
[00:17:53.679] In the middle, what we have done is
[00:17:56.480] reduce the most typically reported UAP
[00:18:00.000] characteristics to these uh fields.
[00:18:04.240] Mostly round, mostly 1 to 4 meters,
[00:18:07.360] white, silver, translucent, metallic,
[00:18:10.400] 10,000 to 30,000 ft
[00:18:13.280] with apparent velocities from stationary
[00:18:16.240] to Mach 2. No thermal exhaust usually
[00:18:19.520] detected. We get intermittent radar
[00:18:22.320] returns. We get intermittent radio
[00:18:25.360] returns and we get intermittent thermal
[00:18:28.080] signatures.
[00:18:29.679] That's what we're looking for and trying
[00:18:31.919] to understand what that is.
[00:18:35.520] Next slide.
[00:18:39.120] So I'm going to walk you through two
[00:18:40.960] cases that we've uh declassified
[00:18:43.520] recently. Um this first one is an MQ9 in
[00:18:48.000] the Middle East observing that blow up
[00:18:51.039] which is an apparent spherical object
[00:18:53.120] via EO sensors. Those are not IR.
[00:18:58.240] If you want to go ahead and click that
[00:18:59.520] and play it,
[00:19:02.960] you'll see it uh come through the top of
[00:19:05.039] the screen. There it goes. And then the
[00:19:07.120] camera will slew to follow it.
[00:19:10.720] You'll see it pop in and out of the
[00:19:12.480] screw field of view there. This is
[00:19:15.600] essentially all of the data we have
[00:19:17.520] associated with this event from some
[00:19:19.360] years ago.
[00:19:22.240] It is going to be virtually impossible
[00:19:24.320] to fully identify that just based off of
[00:19:28.160] that video. Now what we can do and what
[00:19:30.880] we are doing is keeping that as part of
[00:19:34.000] that
[00:19:35.520] group of 52%
[00:19:38.240] to see what are the similarities, what
[00:19:40.799] are the trends across all these. Do we
[00:19:43.039] see these in a particular distribution?
[00:19:45.360] Do they all behave the same or not? As
[00:19:48.400] we get more data,
[00:19:50.720] we will be able to go back and look at
[00:19:52.559] these in a fuller context.
[00:19:55.600] How are we going to get more data? We
[00:19:57.840] are working with the joint staff to
[00:19:59.919] issue guidance to all the services and
[00:20:02.400] commands that will then establish what
[00:20:05.440] are the reporting requirements, the
[00:20:07.120] timeliness and all of the data that is
[00:20:09.200] required to be delivered to us and
[00:20:11.440] retained from all the associated
[00:20:14.240] sensors. That historically hasn't been
[00:20:17.039] the case and it's been happen stance
[00:20:18.799] that data has been collected.
[00:20:22.160] Next slide.
[00:20:25.039] This particular uh event South Asia MQ9
[00:20:29.919] uh looking at another MQ9 and what's
[00:20:32.960] highlighted there in that red circle is
[00:20:35.120] an object that flies through the screen.
[00:20:38.320] Unlike the previous one, this one
[00:20:41.440] actually shows some really interesting
[00:20:43.120] things that everyone thought was truly
[00:20:45.200] anomalous to start with. First of all,
[00:20:47.760] it's a high-speed object that's flying
[00:20:50.080] in the field of regard of two MQ9s.
[00:20:53.280] Second, it appears to have this uh trail
[00:20:56.640] behind it. All right, which at first
[00:20:59.919] blush you would think that looks like a
[00:21:01.919] propulsion trail.
[00:21:04.720] In reality, uh, if you want to play the
[00:21:08.000] first slide, we'll show you what that
[00:21:09.760] looks like in real time or first video.
[00:21:12.240] So, we're looking at that. There it
[00:21:13.679] goes.
[00:21:16.000] Why don't you play it again and then
[00:21:17.280] pause it halfway through
[00:21:19.840] right there. All right. If you might be
[00:21:22.559] able to see that trail there behind it,
[00:21:26.000] that's actually not a real trail. That
[00:21:28.240] is a sensor artifact. Um,
[00:21:32.080] each one of those little blobs is
[00:21:33.919] actually a representation of the object
[00:21:36.159] as it's moving through. And later in the
[00:21:38.400] video, as the
[00:21:41.280] as the uh camera slew, that trail
[00:21:45.039] actually follows the direction of the
[00:21:47.200] camera, not the direction of the object.
[00:21:52.080] We pulled these apart frame by frame. we
[00:21:54.480] were able to demonstrate that that is
[00:21:56.320] essentially a readout uh overlap of the
[00:21:59.440] image. It's a it's a shadow image,
[00:22:01.360] right? It's not real. Further, if you
[00:22:04.080] later um follow this all the way to end,
[00:22:07.440] it starts to resolve itself into that
[00:22:10.480] blob that's in that picture in the top
[00:22:12.720] right. And if you squint, it looks like
[00:22:15.039] an aircraft because it actually turns
[00:22:16.880] out to be an aircraft. Go ahead and put
[00:22:18.559] that on.
[00:22:21.840] So you'll see the tail sort of pop out
[00:22:24.159] there. And so what you're looking at is
[00:22:26.880] this is in the infrared. This is the
[00:22:28.720] heat signature off of the engines of a
[00:22:32.159] commuter aircraft that happen to be
[00:22:33.760] flying in the vicinity of where those
[00:22:35.600] two MQ9s were at.
[00:22:38.880] Why am I showing you this? So the first
[00:22:41.280] one that I showed you, we don't have
[00:22:42.799] resolved yet, right? That is an
[00:22:44.960] unresolved case we are still studying.
[00:22:47.840] This one we can resolve. But this is the
[00:22:51.039] kind of data that we have to work with
[00:22:53.200] and the type of analysis that we have to
[00:22:55.679] do which can be quite extensive when you
[00:22:58.080] have to pull these apart frame by frame.
[00:23:01.679] Further, we're now matching all of this
[00:23:04.559] with the models of all of those imaging
[00:23:07.440] sensors so that I can say I can recreate
[00:23:10.640] this. I can actually show how the sensor
[00:23:13.200] is going to respond.
[00:23:15.280] All of these sensors don't necessarily
[00:23:17.440] respond the way you think they do.
[00:23:19.440] especially
[00:23:20.960] out in the world and in the field
[00:23:25.919] and I believe that's all I have and I
[00:23:27.679] will open it up for your questions.
[00:23:30.320] >> Thank you so much Dr. Katrick. Um can
[00:23:33.200] you just give us some raw numbers of how
[00:23:35.440] many uh UAPs you've analyzed, how many
[00:23:39.520] have been resolved and sort of in what
[00:23:41.440] buckets and then how many are still left
[00:23:43.120] to be resolved. just an update from your
[00:23:45.919] January public report where it was 366
[00:23:48.799] or something and about 150 were were um
[00:23:52.400] balloons and about two dozen were
[00:23:54.240] drones. You know, just give us an update
[00:23:55.919] if you have one.
[00:23:56.559] >> Sure. So, as of this week, uh we are
[00:24:00.320] tracking over total of 650 cases.
[00:24:06.400] Now, uh, the report in January basically
[00:24:09.120] said about half of the ones at that
[00:24:11.360] time, about 150 were balloon were likely
[00:24:14.480] balloon like or something like that.
[00:24:16.640] >> That doesn't mean they're resolved.
[00:24:18.320] >> Oh, I see.
[00:24:19.039] >> Okay. So, what let me let me walk
[00:24:20.880] everyone through what our analytic
[00:24:22.799] process looks like.
[00:24:25.360] >> We have a essentially a five-step
[00:24:28.159] process, right? So, we have we get our
[00:24:30.559] cases in with all the data. We create a
[00:24:33.279] case uh for that uh event.
[00:24:37.679] My team does a preliminary scrub of all
[00:24:41.039] of those cases as they come in just to
[00:24:43.919] sort out, do we have any information
[00:24:46.159] that says this is in one of those likely
[00:24:49.279] categories? It's likely a balloon. It's
[00:24:51.360] likely a balloon, a bird, it's likely
[00:24:54.480] some other object or we don't know.
[00:24:59.440] Then we prioritize those based off of
[00:25:03.279] where they are. Are they attached to a
[00:25:05.760] national security area? Does it show
[00:25:08.880] some anomalous um phenomenology that is
[00:25:12.559] of interest? If it's just if it's just a
[00:25:14.960] spherical thing that's floating around
[00:25:16.559] with the with the wind and it has no
[00:25:19.520] payload on it, that's going to be less
[00:25:21.679] important than something that has a
[00:25:23.120] payload on it, which will be less
[00:25:24.720] important than something that's
[00:25:25.919] maneuvering. Right? So there's there's
[00:25:28.559] sort of a hierarchy of just binning the
[00:25:30.799] priorities because we can't do all of
[00:25:32.720] them at once.
[00:25:35.520] Once we do that and we prioritize them
[00:25:37.679] and we take that package of data in that
[00:25:39.760] case and I have set up two teams, think
[00:25:43.039] of this as a red team, blue team or
[00:25:45.120] competitive analysis. I have an
[00:25:47.600] intelligence community team made up of
[00:25:50.000] intelligence analysts and I have an S&T
[00:25:52.960] team made up of scientists and engineers
[00:25:55.520] and the people that actually build a lot
[00:25:57.200] of these sensors or physicists because
[00:25:59.440] you know if you're a physicist you can
[00:26:01.039] do anything right um and but they're not
[00:26:06.240] associated with the Intel community.
[00:26:08.559] They're they're not intel officers. So
[00:26:10.799] they they look at this through the lens
[00:26:12.559] of the sensor of of the what the data
[00:26:14.960] says. We give that package to both
[00:26:16.960] teams.
[00:26:18.480] The intelligence community is going to
[00:26:19.919] look at it through the lens of the
[00:26:21.200] intelligence record and and what they
[00:26:23.200] assess and their intel tradecraft which
[00:26:26.159] they have very specific rules and
[00:26:27.760] regulations on how they do that.
[00:26:29.760] Scientific community, technical
[00:26:31.440] community is going to look at it through
[00:26:32.960] the lens of what is the data telling me?
[00:26:35.360] What is the sensor doing? What would I
[00:26:37.760] expect a sensor response to be? And back
[00:26:41.520] that out. Those two groups give us their
[00:26:44.400] answers. We then adjudicate.
[00:26:48.159] If they agree, then I am more likely to
[00:26:51.200] close that case. If they agree on what
[00:26:53.279] it is, if they disagree, we will have an
[00:26:56.159] adjudication. We'll bring them together.
[00:26:58.240] We'll take a look at the differences.
[00:26:59.919] We'll adjudicate. What why do you say
[00:27:02.559] one thing and you say another? We will
[00:27:04.960] then come to a case um recommendation
[00:27:09.600] that'll get written up by my team.
[00:27:12.240] That then goes to a senior technical
[00:27:15.360] advisory group which is outside of all
[00:27:18.400] of those people made up of senior
[00:27:20.880] technical folks and and uh um intel
[00:27:24.400] analysts and operators from
[00:27:28.000] retired uh out of the community uh and
[00:27:31.360] they they essentially peer review what
[00:27:34.159] that case recommendation is.
[00:27:37.919] They write their recommendations that
[00:27:39.679] comes back to me. I review it. We make a
[00:27:42.480] determination and I'll sign off one way
[00:27:44.320] or the other. And then that will go out
[00:27:46.559] as the the case determination. Once we
[00:27:50.559] have an approved web portal to hang the
[00:27:53.440] unclassified stuff, we will de, you
[00:27:55.600] know, we will downgrade and declassify
[00:27:57.520] things and put it out there. In the
[00:27:59.760] meantime, we're putting a lot of these
[00:28:01.760] on our classified web portal where we
[00:28:04.799] can then collaborate with the rest of
[00:28:06.320] the community so they can see what's
[00:28:07.919] going on.
[00:28:09.840] That's in a nutshell that is the process
[00:28:13.360] right so uh
[00:28:17.440] because of that
[00:28:19.760] that takes time so of those over 650 you
[00:28:24.880] know we've prioritized
[00:28:27.679] about uh half of them to be of of um
[00:28:33.360] anomalous interesting value
[00:28:36.399] and now we have to go through those and
[00:28:38.000] go how much do I have actual data for
[00:28:40.799] because if I all I have is a is a
[00:28:43.360] operator report that says I saw X Y or Z
[00:28:47.360] my assessment is A B or C that's not
[00:28:50.960] really sufficient that's a good place to
[00:28:52.880] start but I have to have data I have to
[00:28:56.080] have radar data I have to have EO data I
[00:28:58.080] have to have thermal data I have to have
[00:28:59.919] overhead data and we need to look at all
[00:29:02.559] that
[00:29:04.480] now from a big picture perspective I
[00:29:07.039] still have that's all still very
[00:29:08.960] valuable data and we're looking at
[00:29:11.600] applying a lot of things new tools acu
[00:29:15.120] analytic tools like natural language
[00:29:17.840] processing so I can go across all of
[00:29:19.919] those reports and look for commonalities
[00:29:23.039] how many of them are being described as
[00:29:25.919] round spherical objects that are
[00:29:27.679] maneuvering how many of them are not
[00:29:29.279] maneuvering how many of them seem to
[00:29:31.360] have a plume to it or note
[00:29:35.279] that's also going to be very valuable to
[00:29:37.600] give us more of a global picture and a
[00:29:39.360] trends analysis of what are we seeing
[00:29:42.080] right and help us get to the
[00:29:43.919] determination. So go back to your
[00:29:46.880] question ma'am. We have um
[00:29:50.159] um this next quarterly report will be
[00:29:52.960] coming out here pretty soon. Our next
[00:29:54.880] annual report um you all have uh given
[00:29:59.279] us uh moved it up to to June July. We're
[00:30:02.880] going to be having that done about uh
[00:30:05.360] that time frame and we will have a we'll
[00:30:08.240] be combining a whole number of reports
[00:30:10.159] in into that one. Uh, I think we we're
[00:30:14.080] currently sitting at around
[00:30:19.520] if I remember correct, we were around 20
[00:30:22.559] to 30ish are about halfway through that
[00:30:25.600] analytic process. A handful of them have
[00:30:28.720] made it all the way out to the other
[00:30:30.080] side, gone through peer review. We've
[00:30:32.000] got case closure reports done and
[00:30:34.720] signed. We're going to get faster as we
[00:30:38.000] get more people on board uh and we get
[00:30:40.640] more of the community tools to automate
[00:30:44.080] some of the analysis that has to be
[00:30:45.760] done.
[00:30:48.799] >> Yeah. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Dr.
[00:30:51.200] Kirk Patrick. The ODNI annual threat
[00:30:54.000] assessment states that China's space
[00:30:57.039] activities are designed to erode US
[00:31:00.000] influence across military,
[00:31:01.840] technological, economic, and diplomatic
[00:31:04.960] spheres. Likewise, Russia will remain a
[00:31:07.840] key space competitor. In the course of
[00:31:11.120] your work, have you become aware of any
[00:31:13.200] Chinese or Russia technical advancements
[00:31:16.080] to surveil or attack US interests?
[00:31:20.480] So that's a great question. Part of what
[00:31:23.120] we have to do as we go through these um
[00:31:26.320] especially the ones that show signatures
[00:31:29.760] of advanced technical capabilities is
[00:31:32.799] determine if there is a foreign nexus.
[00:31:36.640] >> That's really hard if what we observe
[00:31:39.840] doesn't have a Chinese or Russian flag
[00:31:42.320] on the side of it.
[00:31:44.960] Now
[00:31:46.799] I think it is um prudent to say of the
[00:31:52.640] of the cases that are showing
[00:31:57.279] you know some sort of advanced technical
[00:31:59.200] signature of which we're talking single
[00:32:01.679] percentages of the entire population of
[00:32:04.399] cases we have
[00:32:06.960] um I am concerned
[00:32:09.600] about
[00:32:11.440] what that nexus is and I indicators that
[00:32:15.120] some are related to foreign
[00:32:17.200] capabilities.
[00:32:19.360] We have to investigate that with our IC
[00:32:22.320] partners and as we get evidence to
[00:32:25.440] support that, that gets then handed off
[00:32:27.840] to the appropriate IC agency to
[00:32:30.480] investigate.
[00:32:32.640] Again, it becomes an SCP at that point.
[00:32:35.279] >> Yeah. Somebody else's problem, right?
[00:32:37.279] Very good. Thank you. Yes. Is it is it
[00:32:41.840] is it possible that the Chinese or
[00:32:44.480] Russian advanced technologies could
[00:32:46.480] could be causing some of these anomalous
[00:32:49.279] behaviors and and you said there seems
[00:32:52.399] to be um some indicators. Uh so just for
[00:32:57.600] us today uh could you describe potential
[00:33:00.720] threat that might exist out there if
[00:33:03.279] they are foreign
[00:33:05.440] >> nexus
[00:33:07.760] >> in order to do this research
[00:33:09.760] appropriately
[00:33:11.760] we have to uh also be cognizant of what
[00:33:15.279] is the state-of-the-art in development
[00:33:17.039] across the S&T community. What is what
[00:33:20.559] are the DARPA of the world doing? What
[00:33:22.640] are our what's the horizon scanning of
[00:33:26.640] emerging technologies appropriate to
[00:33:29.360] this subcommittee?
[00:33:31.120] What is happening out there? And if
[00:33:33.440] somebody could accelerate that
[00:33:35.039] capability, how would that manifest
[00:33:37.519] itself? And what would it look like? And
[00:33:39.279] do those signatures match what we're
[00:33:41.360] seeing? Mhm.
[00:33:42.960] >> Um there are emerging capabilities out
[00:33:46.159] there that that in many instances
[00:33:51.120] Russia and China, well China in
[00:33:53.600] particular are
[00:33:55.760] on par or ahead of us in some areas,
[00:33:59.679] right? So previously I used to be the
[00:34:02.159] defense department's intelligence
[00:34:04.080] officer for science and technical
[00:34:05.679] intelligence. That was our job was to
[00:34:08.079] look for what does all that look like?
[00:34:11.040] Um, and then you know my last several
[00:34:14.399] years of course in in space command
[00:34:16.960] doing space
[00:34:20.800] the the adversary is not
[00:34:25.359] waiting.
[00:34:27.200] They are advancing and they're advancing
[00:34:29.200] quickly. If I were to put on some of my
[00:34:32.000] old hats, I would tell you they are less
[00:34:35.359] riskaverse at technical advancement than
[00:34:39.200] we are.
[00:34:41.119] right? They are just willing to try
[00:34:42.879] things and see if it works. Are there
[00:34:45.520] capabilities that could be employed
[00:34:47.440] against us in both an ISR and a weapons
[00:34:50.079] fashion? Absolutely.
[00:34:52.159] Do I have evidence that they're doing it
[00:34:54.240] in these cases?
[00:34:57.760] No. But I have concerning indicators.
[00:35:02.560] >> Thank you. I appreciate that. And that's
[00:35:04.720] that is why it's so important that you
[00:35:06.880] are working with the intelligence
[00:35:08.480] community as well. Um because you you
[00:35:11.280] have the science the data background but
[00:35:13.440] you also need to know um from various
[00:35:16.960] sources what adversaries may be working
[00:35:20.400] on. Is that correct?
[00:35:22.000] >> Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much.
[00:35:24.000] Thank you Madam Chair.
[00:35:25.280] >> Senator Rose.
[00:35:27.280] >> Uh well thank you Chair Gillibrand.
[00:35:29.200] Ranking member Ernst. Uh this is a
[00:35:31.200] really important hearing. I'd like to
[00:35:32.960] thank you Dr. Kirk Patrick for your
[00:35:35.280] service to the country and as a former
[00:35:37.680] systems analyst myself I really
[00:35:40.160] appreciate uh your flowchart the
[00:35:42.079] description of the process and
[00:35:43.680] particularly the trends analysis going
[00:35:45.760] forward how that's going to help us and
[00:35:48.079] you talked about language the large LLMs
[00:35:50.960] the large language models artificial
[00:35:52.800] intelligence that's really going to help
[00:35:54.400] us in the hunt forward predictive
[00:35:56.560] analysis I think uh um to some of your
[00:35:59.680] point what we be worried about but I
[00:36:01.920] want to focus on Nevada because uh I
[00:36:04.240] want to talk about the impact of UAPs on
[00:36:06.720] aviation safety. So when it comes to
[00:36:09.040] unified unidentified aerial phenomenal
[00:36:12.000] phenomena, excuse me, one of my first
[00:36:14.160] concerns is really about the safety of
[00:36:16.000] Nevada's military aviator. So we have
[00:36:18.800] airmen stationed at Nellis Air Force
[00:36:20.400] Base,
[00:36:21.200] >> naval aviators flying at Naval Air
[00:36:23.119] Station Fallon and service members
[00:36:25.520] across from across the world training at
[00:36:28.640] the Nevada Test and Training Range. I
[00:36:30.320] know you know all this and unfortunately
[00:36:32.160] the existence of advanced UAPs in the US
[00:36:34.720] airspace and over US military
[00:36:37.119] installations um not a new phenomenon.
[00:36:40.720] The Navy's officially acknowledged that
[00:36:42.640] between 2004 and 2021 11 near misses
[00:36:47.040] occurred involving UAPs that required
[00:36:49.520] pilot action and follow-up reports. As a
[00:36:52.560] result, in 2019 the Navy established a
[00:36:54.800] protocol for pilots to report on their
[00:36:57.440] dangerous encounters. So, could you
[00:36:59.599] speak to any ongoing efforts within DoD
[00:37:02.480] to ensure the safety of our aviators
[00:37:04.480] with a potential um UAP encounter and
[00:37:07.680] what's your relationship with Northcom,
[00:37:09.440] NORAD, Spacecom when it comes to this
[00:37:11.520] immediate real-time response and how
[00:37:15.280] they're they're there right there in the
[00:37:16.880] moment, right?
[00:37:17.520] >> Absolutely. That's a great question. So,
[00:37:20.560] uh let me start with um you know, my
[00:37:22.960] relationship with the commands are are
[00:37:24.880] are very good. I just came back from uh
[00:37:27.440] sitting down with with General Van Herk
[00:37:29.200] and all the all the J staff out at
[00:37:30.880] Northcom a couple weeks ago talking
[00:37:33.440] through exactly what we need to do to
[00:37:35.760] help them get their arms around this. Uh
[00:37:38.960] we are also working very closely with
[00:37:42.079] joint staff and the joint staff has has
[00:37:44.320] just been very outstanding in helping uh
[00:37:47.040] work through policy and guidance issues
[00:37:49.359] to the forces and to the services.
[00:37:53.520] And I would like to just make sure that
[00:37:55.280] we we message back to all of the
[00:37:58.320] operators the importance of their uh
[00:38:01.760] reporting and the fact that you're about
[00:38:04.480] to get a you know a bunch of new
[00:38:06.079] requirements that we're issuing through
[00:38:08.000] the joint staff on all of the data that
[00:38:11.440] we're going to need you to save and and
[00:38:13.760] report back to us.
[00:38:15.520] um it is invaluable and we are working
[00:38:18.400] to try to to take the most advantage of
[00:38:21.040] that to learn what it is that we're
[00:38:22.720] trying to mitigate. To get directly to
[00:38:25.119] your question,
[00:38:27.040] first thing that we're doing is
[00:38:29.200] normalizing our reporting, right? We're
[00:38:31.040] standardizing our reporting and the
[00:38:32.960] requirements associated with that. Uh
[00:38:35.359] guidance from the joint staff I think
[00:38:36.960] goes out maybe this week um maybe next
[00:38:39.920] week on that we've been working with
[00:38:41.440] them for some months that does exactly
[00:38:43.040] what I just said. gives them timelines.
[00:38:45.119] It gives them requirements. It gives
[00:38:46.880] them here's all the data you have to
[00:38:48.480] have. Um, and you got to retain it.
[00:38:53.119] The next thing that comes after that is
[00:38:55.119] a plan or that will go out to the
[00:38:58.320] commands for mitigation and response.
[00:39:01.280] So, there's a couple of things that we
[00:39:02.960] have to do.
[00:39:04.560] one, I need to uh work with uh the
[00:39:08.240] commands and with the IC and with um our
[00:39:12.000] outside of our DoD and IC partners to
[00:39:14.560] extend our collection posture
[00:39:17.440] >> targeted at some of these key areas that
[00:39:19.839] you saw on that heat map
[00:39:22.480] uh that have a lot of activity so that
[00:39:24.720] we can turn on extra collection when an
[00:39:28.400] operator sees something. So part of this
[00:39:30.960] is generating
[00:39:33.359] as a response function what we call a
[00:39:36.000] tactic technique and procedure for an
[00:39:38.720] operator when he sees something calls
[00:39:40.800] back to the operations floor they can
[00:39:42.960] turn on additional collection. What does
[00:39:45.280] that collection look like? How do I
[00:39:47.440] bring all that together so I can get
[00:39:48.800] more data on what is that thing?
[00:39:50.880] >> Can can I ask really quickly? Do you
[00:39:53.440] have the authorities you need to extend
[00:39:55.280] your collection posture between agencies
[00:39:57.760] or or uh branches of the military?
[00:40:00.480] Because that seems to me to uh maybe be
[00:40:02.720] a sticking point. I know my time's just
[00:40:04.720] about up. I'd love to follow up about
[00:40:06.400] your risk management methodologies for
[00:40:08.800] some of these. But do you have need any
[00:40:10.560] authorities that you don't have to uh
[00:40:12.960] get get the data?
[00:40:13.920] >> There are some authorities that we need.
[00:40:15.440] We currently are operating under title
[00:40:17.359] 10 authorities but we have um you know
[00:40:20.240] good relationships across the other
[00:40:22.079] agencies but having additional
[00:40:24.000] authorities for collection tasking
[00:40:26.079] counter intelligence that's something
[00:40:27.760] >> those are all things that would be
[00:40:29.280] helpful. Yes.
[00:40:30.640] >> Thank you. To follow up Dr. Kurpatre
[00:40:32.640] will you help us write that language so
[00:40:34.480] we can put it in the defense bill this
[00:40:35.920] year so that we know what authorities
[00:40:37.440] you need?
[00:40:38.560] >> We can do that.
[00:40:39.520] >> Thank you. Um we're going to start
[00:40:41.520] second round. So if you want to stay you
[00:40:43.040] can ask another round. I have at least
[00:40:44.800] three more questions. So,
[00:40:47.280] >> do do you want to do you want to go
[00:40:48.640] right now? So, you in case you have to
[00:40:50.480] leave.
[00:40:50.800] >> Oh, I could. I do.
[00:40:51.839] >> Yeah. Go ahead.
[00:40:53.920] That would be great. Um, I'm going to
[00:40:55.680] stay on the drones issue because
[00:40:58.079] obviously we also have preach air force
[00:41:00.079] base.
[00:41:04.079] But last February, the Chinese spy
[00:41:06.000] balloon. It did cross through the US
[00:41:08.000] airspace shot down by a Sidewinder
[00:41:10.319] missile fired from an F-22.
[00:41:13.119] Sidewinders cost us close to half a
[00:41:15.839] million dollars each. So given the cost
[00:41:19.280] of these missiles, the cost per flight,
[00:41:21.440] all of these other things, like I said,
[00:41:23.119] follow up on the authorities, your
[00:41:24.560] methodologies, the data collection, they
[00:41:26.560] can help us in other ways, but how do
[00:41:28.880] you think we can develop a sustainable,
[00:41:30.960] affordable response to UAPs where we
[00:41:34.079] need to um that may that will definitely
[00:41:37.520] violate our airspace? not may definitely
[00:41:40.319] violate our airspace every chance that
[00:41:42.640] they can get because there are
[00:41:43.920] adversaries. They want this information.
[00:41:46.000] So, what do you think some
[00:41:47.040] cost-effective measures might be that we
[00:41:49.680] can um get what we need out of that or
[00:41:52.560] take them down? Whatever is appropriate,
[00:41:54.160] whatever the appropriate measure is,
[00:41:55.760] let's put it that way.
[00:41:56.480] >> So, that that is actually wrapped into
[00:41:58.400] the plan or that we're working with
[00:42:00.000] joint staff to send out. What do the
[00:42:01.760] commands need from both a capabilities
[00:42:04.640] perspective for kinetic and non-kinetic
[00:42:07.200] engagements? what are the response
[00:42:09.280] functions of the of the uh particular
[00:42:12.880] wings or or navy what have you and then
[00:42:18.240] what authorities do they need right
[00:42:20.240] >> so one of the one of the challenges that
[00:42:22.160] we've seen is is you know there's an
[00:42:24.560] authorities issues with the with the
[00:42:27.280] owners operators of those ranges that
[00:42:30.400] they need to work through and we're
[00:42:31.839] working that with uh joint staff and and
[00:42:34.079] OSD so
[00:42:36.880] big picture. We need to do all that. If
[00:42:39.520] you want to get down to the specifics
[00:42:41.119] for, you know, there are non-kinetic
[00:42:42.800] options to engage pretty much
[00:42:44.400] everything, right? Whether it's
[00:42:46.400] electronic warfare, whether it's, you
[00:42:49.200] know, laser technology.
[00:42:50.400] >> That's where this data come having the
[00:42:52.319] good data collection, predictive
[00:42:53.920] analytics, you can
[00:42:56.800] make some assumptions and possibilities.
[00:42:59.200] >> That's right. and we will inform uh
[00:43:01.359] recommendations back to the department
[00:43:03.119] on here's what could work, here's what
[00:43:05.440] we've seen work, here's what doesn't
[00:43:07.040] work.
[00:43:07.920] >> Thank you so much. Thank you, Madam
[00:43:09.440] Chair. Appreciate it. Thank you very
[00:43:11.359] much. Um can I just wanted to just talk
[00:43:13.920] a little bit about your logistics, who
[00:43:15.520] you report to, how that's going, uh
[00:43:17.920] whether you need different reporting
[00:43:19.680] lines. Um, by congressional legislation,
[00:43:22.160] your office is administratively located
[00:43:24.160] within the office of the under secretary
[00:43:25.760] of defense for intelligence security,
[00:43:27.520] but you're not substantively subordinate
[00:43:29.599] to the under secretary. Rather, you are
[00:43:31.440] a direct report to the deputy secretary.
[00:43:33.520] Are you taking direction directly from
[00:43:34.960] the deputy secretary? Are you able to
[00:43:36.640] meet and brief the deputy secretary? Um,
[00:43:39.599] is the office of USD
[00:43:42.480] um working with you to have the right
[00:43:44.960] framework?
[00:43:46.880] So USDS uh the I I currently report to
[00:43:52.400] USDS
[00:43:54.319] um until they come up with the the plan
[00:43:58.319] for how they're going to implement
[00:43:59.520] legislation.
[00:44:02.560] DoD and DNI are working through that
[00:44:05.680] now. I'd have to refer you back to USDS
[00:44:08.880] on what their plan is.
[00:44:11.520] Um,
[00:44:15.920] >> do I need to update your reporting
[00:44:17.920] structure in the next defense bill or is
[00:44:19.680] this something that you think will work
[00:44:20.960] its way out or does it need further
[00:44:22.640] clarity?
[00:44:23.200] >> I think they're planning on coming back
[00:44:24.720] to you with an answer on what that plan
[00:44:27.200] is and I think at that time that will
[00:44:29.680] inform what you want to do.
[00:44:32.560] >> Okay. Thank you. Um, as you know, uh,
[00:44:36.079] Dr. Dr. Kpatrick, Congress has mandated
[00:44:38.000] that your office establish a
[00:44:39.440] discoverable and accessible electronic
[00:44:41.440] method for potential witnesses of UAP
[00:44:44.240] incidents and potential participants in
[00:44:47.040] government UAP related activities to
[00:44:49.040] contact your office and tell their
[00:44:50.400] stories. Congress also set up a process
[00:44:53.040] whereby people uh subject to
[00:44:55.440] non-disclosure agreements preventing
[00:44:57.200] them from disclosing what they may have
[00:44:58.720] witnessed or participated in could tell
[00:45:00.400] you what they know without risk of
[00:45:02.400] retribution from the or violation of
[00:45:04.079] their NDAs. Um, have you submitted a
[00:45:06.720] public-f facing website product for
[00:45:08.240] approval to your superiors and how long
[00:45:09.920] has it been under review?
[00:45:12.079] >> I have uh we submitted the first version
[00:45:15.200] of that before Christmas.
[00:45:19.760] >> And do you have an estimate from them
[00:45:21.760] when they will respond and when you'll
[00:45:23.599] have feedback on that?
[00:45:25.440] >> No, I don't.
[00:45:26.640] >> Okay. We will author a letter asking for
[00:45:29.119] that timely response um to your
[00:45:32.160] superiors. Uh when when do you expect
[00:45:35.839] that you will establish a public-f
[00:45:37.359] facing discoverable um and access portal
[00:45:41.200] for people to use to contact your office
[00:45:42.960] as the law requires?
[00:45:45.920] >> So I would like to first say thank you
[00:45:49.040] all very much for um referring the
[00:45:52.000] witnesses that you have thus far to us.
[00:45:54.319] I appreciate that. We've brought in uh
[00:45:56.640] nearly two dozen so far. It's been it's
[00:45:59.200] been very uh helpful. I'd ask that you
[00:46:01.599] continue to do that until we have an
[00:46:03.440] approved plan.
[00:46:05.200] >> Um, we have a multi-phased approach for
[00:46:08.160] doing that that we've been uh uh
[00:46:11.440] socializing and have submitted for u
[00:46:14.079] approval
[00:46:15.760] some time.
[00:46:18.079] >> Once that happens, then we should be
[00:46:19.599] able to push all that out and get uh get
[00:46:21.920] this a little more automated.
[00:46:23.520] >> Great. Um,
[00:46:24.560] >> what I would ask though is as you all
[00:46:26.560] continue to uh refer to us and refer
[00:46:29.280] witnesses to us. I' I'd appreciate if
[00:46:31.200] you do that um please try to prioritize
[00:46:34.480] the ones that you want to do because we
[00:46:36.160] do have a small uh research staff
[00:46:39.280] dealing with that.
[00:46:41.040] >> Thank you. Um and then do you have any
[00:46:43.760] uh plans for public engagement that you
[00:46:45.599] want to share now that you think it's
[00:46:47.520] important that the public knows what the
[00:46:49.440] plan is?
[00:46:51.119] So we have a u uh a number of public
[00:46:55.359] engagement u recommendations uh
[00:46:58.240] according to our strategic plan. Um all
[00:47:01.119] of those have been submitted for
[00:47:03.280] approval. They have to be approved by
[00:47:05.200] USDS. Um we are waiting for approval to
[00:47:09.119] go do that.
[00:47:09.839] >> Okay. I will follow up on that. Um and
[00:47:12.319] then my last question is about um
[00:47:16.560] the integration of departments UAP
[00:47:18.560] operations, research, analysis and
[00:47:20.160] strategic communications. Um during the
[00:47:23.839] recent UAP incidents over North America,
[00:47:26.319] it didn't appear that you were allowed
[00:47:28.000] to play that role. Um do you agree that
[00:47:30.560] the public perception is generally that
[00:47:32.160] you and your office did not appear to
[00:47:33.680] play a major role in the department's
[00:47:35.040] response to the detection of objects
[00:47:36.480] over North America?
[00:47:38.400] uh what can you tell us um that's going
[00:47:40.400] on behind the scenes from your
[00:47:41.680] perspective and in the afteraction
[00:47:44.079] assessment process is there awareness
[00:47:46.319] that there is a need to operate
[00:47:47.760] differently in the future and a
[00:47:49.119] commitment to doing so
[00:47:51.920] >> when the when the objects were first
[00:47:54.000] detected I got called by joint staff
[00:47:57.040] leadership uh to come in uh late one
[00:48:00.720] night to review uh events as they were
[00:48:03.839] unfo unfolding and to give them a you an
[00:48:07.760] assessment based on what we knew at that
[00:48:09.760] time. Uh I did that, worked with the
[00:48:13.920] director of joint staff, the J2 and the
[00:48:16.079] J3 uh that night and over the couple of
[00:48:19.359] following days on what are the types of
[00:48:22.160] things that we are tracking from a
[00:48:24.240] unidentified object perspective. What
[00:48:26.480] databases do we use those sorts of
[00:48:29.040] things for for norm for known objects
[00:48:31.440] known tracking?
[00:48:33.359] Um
[00:48:35.839] beyond that the response I would have to
[00:48:38.800] I would have to refer you back to the
[00:48:40.319] White House for the decision on how they
[00:48:42.720] did the the response. Uh we did not play
[00:48:46.079] a role in what you would respond other
[00:48:49.280] than that initial um you know advice on
[00:48:52.640] what we are seeing and how we are seeing
[00:48:54.400] it.
[00:48:58.720] >> Thank you ma thank you madam chair. Um
[00:49:02.319] Dr. Patrick, I I know that your office
[00:49:05.520] has gotten a lot of attention uh
[00:49:07.839] recently and of course any new agency
[00:49:11.599] there tends to be a push to increase
[00:49:14.319] size and and funding. Um we want to make
[00:49:17.680] sure that you're able to meet your
[00:49:19.200] goals, but what I also need to ensure is
[00:49:22.079] that we're not duplicating or
[00:49:24.400] replicating existing functions um and
[00:49:27.440] creating redundancy within DoD and uh
[00:49:31.119] the inter agency. So what steps are you
[00:49:34.240] taking right now to make sure that your
[00:49:37.440] particular office and function is is
[00:49:41.760] unique uh to any of the other agencies
[00:49:45.680] that might be involved in these types of
[00:49:48.000] cases?
[00:49:48.720] >> Yeah, that's a that's a great question.
[00:49:50.319] So I would like to um lay down here's
[00:49:53.760] here's what I you know sort of my
[00:49:56.160] mission and my goal and my vision here.
[00:49:58.160] So the vision is at at one point at some
[00:50:01.520] point in the future, you should not need
[00:50:04.079] an arrow. If I'm successful in what I'm
[00:50:07.119] doing, we should be able to normalize
[00:50:09.599] everything that we're doing into
[00:50:11.440] existing processes, functions, agencies,
[00:50:13.760] and organizations and make that part of
[00:50:16.400] their mission and their role. Right now,
[00:50:18.720] the niche that we form is really going
[00:50:21.920] after the unknowns. If you I think you
[00:50:25.280] articulated it early on. This is a hunt
[00:50:27.680] mission for what might somebody be doing
[00:50:30.800] in our backyard that we don't know
[00:50:32.559] about. All right. Well, that that that
[00:50:35.599] is what we are doing, right? But at some
[00:50:37.920] point, we should be able to normalize
[00:50:39.839] that. That's why it's so important the
[00:50:42.000] work we're doing with joint staff to
[00:50:43.599] normalize that into
[00:50:46.079] DoD policy and guidance. We are bringing
[00:50:49.359] in all of our inter agency partners. So
[00:50:52.160] NASA is providing a a liaison for us. I
[00:50:55.520] have FBI liaison. I have OSI liaison. I
[00:50:58.720] have service liaison.
[00:51:00.880] The I half of my staff come from the IC.
[00:51:05.280] Half of my staff come from uh other
[00:51:07.839] scientific and technical backgrounds. I
[00:51:09.680] have DOE. And so what we're trying to do
[00:51:12.720] is ensure
[00:51:14.720] again as I make UAP into SE they get
[00:51:19.040] handed off to the people that that is
[00:51:21.839] their mission to go do so that we aren't
[00:51:24.720] duplicating that. I'm not going to go
[00:51:26.800] chase the Chinese high altitude balloon
[00:51:28.720] for example. That's not my job. It's not
[00:51:30.559] an unknown and it's not anomalous
[00:51:32.960] anymore.
[00:51:33.839] >> Now it goes over to them.
[00:51:35.520] >> Right.
[00:51:36.079] >> Very good. Thank you, Madam Chair.
[00:51:38.240] >> Thank you. Um, I wanted to just uh
[00:51:41.200] follow up on the filters for
[00:51:43.520] surveillance. Um, outside observers has
[00:51:45.599] speculated that DoD sets filters on
[00:51:47.760] certain sensors to eliminate objects
[00:51:50.079] that are moving really fast or slow
[00:51:51.839] because what we are looking for
[00:51:53.920] militarily are conventional aircraft and
[00:51:55.839] missiles. UAP that doesn't fit into
[00:51:58.800] these programs would thereby be weeded
[00:52:00.880] out and never noticed. This specul
[00:52:03.119] speculation was proven to be true during
[00:52:04.720] the UAP incidents over North America
[00:52:06.480] where DoD publicly acknowledged that we
[00:52:08.880] were able to start seeing these UAPs
[00:52:10.960] only when we opened up these filters.
[00:52:13.280] Um, obviously our military operators
[00:52:15.680] cannot be overloaded with objects that
[00:52:17.440] are not conventional aircraft or
[00:52:19.040] missiles. Can you nonetheless make sure
[00:52:20.960] that the raw data is being captured and
[00:52:23.359] subsequently processed that your office
[00:52:25.040] knows what's really out there? And is
[00:52:27.680] that going to cost money? Will you
[00:52:29.119] expect to pay for that money out of
[00:52:30.400] Arrow's budget?
[00:52:34.240] One of the key tenants that we're trying
[00:52:36.480] to do in our science plan is understand
[00:52:39.119] what those signatures are. So we get all
[00:52:42.480] the raw, for example, radar data prior
[00:52:46.240] to the scrubbing and filtering to allow
[00:52:49.520] it to enter into our weapon systems and
[00:52:51.520] our detection systems.
[00:52:54.240] We are now taking all that data and
[00:52:56.800] cross-correlating it to what pilots are
[00:52:59.680] saying they're seeing or other
[00:53:01.440] observations from other operators.
[00:53:06.079] What that allows us to do is then see if
[00:53:08.559] there are any any signatures in that
[00:53:11.359] data that I can pull out, generate uh
[00:53:15.440] what we'll call automatic target
[00:53:17.119] recognition algorithms that allow us to
[00:53:19.680] then use that signature associated with
[00:53:22.400] a observed UAP, whatever that UAP may
[00:53:26.400] be.
[00:53:28.400] We will then make those recommendations
[00:53:30.800] of what those changes should be back to
[00:53:33.440] the department. So the deputy secretary
[00:53:35.599] had asked me last October to make those
[00:53:39.280] recommendations. What changes do we need
[00:53:40.800] to make to radars to uh platforms to
[00:53:44.720] detection systems and algorithms to to
[00:53:46.960] pull on those those algorithms make
[00:53:49.200] those changes? That's going to take some
[00:53:51.119] time. That's where the research and
[00:53:52.480] development comes in. Right? It's not
[00:53:55.040] it's not instantaneous. right now a lot
[00:53:57.520] of the I won't say uh you know a lot of
[00:54:02.000] the the things that fall outside of the
[00:54:05.599] ranges of those filters have been
[00:54:07.839] identified by people in the loop and you
[00:54:10.559] can't have people in the loop all the
[00:54:12.559] time. You can you know it's just not
[00:54:14.480] cost-effective.
[00:54:16.400] So part of our budget is working through
[00:54:19.200] what is what does that look like and
[00:54:22.000] then making those recommendations back
[00:54:23.760] to the big program offices for them to
[00:54:26.079] put into changes and acquisition.
[00:54:31.119] >> My last question is about the academic
[00:54:33.040] community. Um can you give us an update
[00:54:35.680] on sort of how you collaborate with the
[00:54:37.200] academic community and um whether um how
[00:54:40.559] the independent study being done by NASA
[00:54:42.720] complements Arrow's work?
[00:54:44.559] >> Sure.
[00:54:46.480] two questions. So I'm try to make it
[00:54:48.400] quick. The u in 1979
[00:54:52.319] Carl Sean said extraordinary claims
[00:54:55.839] require extraordinary evidence.
[00:54:58.720] I would go one step further and I would
[00:55:00.559] say extraordinary claims require not
[00:55:03.520] only extraordinary evidence but
[00:55:04.880] extraordinary science. And so how do you
[00:55:06.880] do that? You do that with the scientific
[00:55:08.960] method. Right? And so as Arrow is
[00:55:11.760] developing and implementing its science
[00:55:14.319] plan, it has to do so grounded in a
[00:55:17.920] solid foundation of scientific theory
[00:55:20.319] across the entire range of hypotheses
[00:55:24.160] that have been presented for what UAP
[00:55:27.680] are.
[00:55:30.000] That range spans adversary breakthrough
[00:55:33.760] technology on one hand, known objects
[00:55:37.040] and phenomena in the middle, all the way
[00:55:39.680] to the extreme theories of
[00:55:41.359] extraterrestrials.
[00:55:43.599] All of that has physics-based signatures
[00:55:47.760] associated with it. Whether it's
[00:55:49.520] theoretical from the academic community,
[00:55:52.960] known from things like hypersonic
[00:55:55.200] weapons or uh adversary breakthrough
[00:55:59.200] technologies as we've talked about
[00:56:01.200] before or the known objects that we have
[00:56:04.400] to go measure.
[00:56:06.319] The idea is across that entire range you
[00:56:09.359] have to come up with peer-reviewed
[00:56:13.200] scientific basis for all of it. The
[00:56:16.000] academic community plays a very big role
[00:56:18.559] on the one end of the spectrum, the
[00:56:21.760] intelligence community on the other end
[00:56:23.520] of the spectrum and then measurement in
[00:56:25.839] the middle. Once I have those signatures
[00:56:29.440] identified in in validated peer-reviewed
[00:56:34.160] um documents, then I have something to
[00:56:36.319] point to for all that data because all
[00:56:39.280] that data is going to match one of those
[00:56:40.960] signatures, right? And then I can go,
[00:56:43.680] well, it's that and not that or it's
[00:56:46.079] that.
[00:56:47.680] And that helps us go through all that.
[00:56:50.880] where NASA comes in and and the the
[00:56:54.160] study that they're doing which I'm uh
[00:56:57.760] supporting is
[00:57:00.960] really um looking at the unclassified
[00:57:05.520] data sources that might be used to
[00:57:08.480] augment our classified data sources to
[00:57:11.839] understand if there's a signature there
[00:57:14.000] we can pull on. So very similar to the
[00:57:16.240] radars but
[00:57:19.839] civil capabilities. So for example, we
[00:57:22.160] have a lot of climate science satellites
[00:57:24.559] for example that look at earth.
[00:57:27.359] Lots of them. How many of those is the
[00:57:31.359] data valuable
[00:57:33.760] in seeing these kinds of objects?
[00:57:37.119] The challenge in that is those those
[00:57:40.400] platforms don't necessarily have the
[00:57:43.040] resolution you need. So, if you remember
[00:57:45.119] the slide I put up there with the
[00:57:47.200] trends, the size of the objects we're
[00:57:49.599] looking for are typically reported to be
[00:57:52.319] 1 to 4 meters.
[00:57:54.559] Well, the resolution of many of the
[00:57:56.400] climate science civil um science, you
[00:57:59.280] know, civil satellites is much larger
[00:58:01.920] than that, which means you'd have a hard
[00:58:04.160] time picking out something that's
[00:58:05.680] smaller than a pixel on the imagery on
[00:58:09.119] the data. That's not to say all of it's
[00:58:11.520] not useful and there are ways of pulling
[00:58:13.760] through that data and going through that
[00:58:15.359] is what NASA is focused on right now. So
[00:58:17.680] what is what are some other data sources
[00:58:20.400] that could be used in addition things
[00:58:22.480] like open source and um crowdsourcing of
[00:58:25.839] of data. We're exploring public private
[00:58:28.720] partnerships ma'am as you know we've
[00:58:30.559] talked about in the past to look at is
[00:58:34.079] there a way to smartly
[00:58:37.520] crowdsource additional data that might
[00:58:39.920] be useful
[00:58:41.680] to augment some of my classified sources
[00:58:45.680] and what does that look like and how
[00:58:47.760] would we do it so that we're not
[00:58:49.440] overwhelmed by you know everybody who
[00:58:51.839] wants to take a picture of anything.
[00:58:57.599] >> Is there anything Is there anything else
[00:58:59.119] you like to tell the committee before we
[00:59:00.799] close? Or do you have another round?
[00:59:02.799] Yeah. Do you have anything else you'd
[00:59:03.839] like to tell the committee before we
[00:59:05.040] close?
[00:59:05.760] >> Thank you very much for allowing us to
[00:59:07.920] come and share a little bit of insight
[00:59:09.760] into what Arrow is up to and what we're
[00:59:11.760] doing. I hope to be able to share a
[00:59:13.440] whole lot more in the future. Um, we
[00:59:16.160] have a lot of work to do. So, if you
[00:59:18.240] don't hear from me outside, it's because
[00:59:20.720] we've got a lot of work to do.
[00:59:22.960] Well, thank you so much, Dr. Kapatrick.
[00:59:24.799] Thank you for the hearing.
[00:59:25.599] >> Thank you.